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The following thesis examines factors that affect children’s imitation, and 
presents evidence that imitation is a composite ability which involves multiple 
mechanisms developing throughout childhood. In Chapter 1 previous findings are 
reviewed to highlight the mechanisms underlying the ability to reproduce other people’s 
actions. The evidence suggests that imitation, whilst based on basic action control 
mechanisms in infancy, is also affected by higher-order cognitive processes in later 
childhood. Previous literature is still unclear on how the influence of such processes 
changes at different ages. Chapter 2 used a successive-models task with children aged 2 
to 12 years to reveal how children’s imitation changes with age. Results showed that 
whilst children under the age of 5 years did not imitate deviant models as much as the 
first model, children above the age of 6 years begin to copy multiple models faithfully, 
particularly after the age of 10 years. Chapter 3 investigated the role of multiple factors 
that may have made children under the age of 5 years imitate deviant models less than 
the original model. In particular, it was found that model evaluations, object 
associations, and motor inhibitory skills all affect children’s imitation of multiple 
models. These findings support the interpretation that imitation requires different 
abilities depending on the type of action that is being imitated. Chapter 4 shows that 
children’s imitation also depends on the type of goal that they associate with the action. 
By pre-school age children will imitate actions faithfully if they believe that the goal of 
the action was the movement itself. The results of the thesis support the idea that 
imitation, while involving general processes of action control, is also affected in a top-
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Understanding how children learn to copy other people and the factors that determine 
what they copy has been the focus of a considerable amount of research for decades. Imitation 
is a foundational ability in human development – it helps foster relationships with other people 
(Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Lakin & Chartrand, 2003), acquire cultural and tool-related 
knowledge as an alternative to trial-and-error learning (Gardiner, Bjorklund, Greif & Gray, 
2012; Gardiner, 2014) and allows people to gain knowledge already existing in their social 
group (Schillaci & Kelemen 2014). This thesis will provide an investigation of imitation 
throughout childhood. It will focus on cognitive processes known to develop during childhood 
and will examine whether these processes affect children’s imitation. It will also analyse the 
role of goal understanding in imitative behaviour. An action’s goal will be defined as a 
perceived external outcome, an external state of the world brought about by that action (Csibra 
& Gergely, 2007; Perner & Doherty, 2005). The thesis will thus provide a comprehensive 
analysis what drives copying behaviour at different ages. 
There are varying definitions of what constitutes imitation, each with slightly different 
implications. It has been defined as “the recognition and reproduction of the goal of an observed 
behaviour, as well as the specific actions that brought about that goal” (Want & Harris, 2002, p. 
3; see also Tomasello, 1990). According to this definition an understanding of the goal of an 
action is required in order to be imitating: one must realise that the model held a goal in mind 
and that their actions were directed specifically for achieving that goal. Want and Harris (2002) 
point out that it is possible for the learner to be unaware as to how actions achieve the model’s 
goal – this ignorance as to the specific effects of the actions towards the goal is what 
distinguishes “blind imitation” from “insightful imitation”. Other definitions have limited 
imitation to be copying the actions of another (Whiten, McGuigan, Marshall-Pescini & Hopper, 
2009) in contrast to emulation, where one deviates from imitating the precise actions observed. 
This view does not specify whether the learner requires an understanding of the model’s goals, 
although Want and Harris refer to imitation without an understanding of the model’s goal as 
“mimicry”.  
An important caveat should be addressed at this point: the term “goal” has been used with 
varying definitions. Some authors have equated “goal” with “a desire to bring about an external 
state of the world” (Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne & Moll, 2005). But this does not 
differentiate between goals (as external states of the world) and intentions (which are mental 
states, and involve a desire to bring about an external state of the world). Perner and Doherty 
(2005) highlight that actions can be understood as goal-oriented (i.e., an action is done to bring 
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about an effect in the world) without understanding that the model was acting with the intention 
to bring that goal about. The latter case is referred to as goal-directed action, when one 
understands that the action was performed by the model with a particular goal in mind (i.e., an 
intention). This is made particularly clear when considering failed intentions and unexpected 
outcomes, as outlined in the following example:  
Picture James Bond who has infiltrated the villainous lair of the evil Dr. Wunderkind. 
Bond only has his trusty gadgets with which to foil the mad doctor’s dastardly plan to 
destroy the world. He creeps into a room and sees Wunderkind sitting at his Doomsday 
machine. To stop him from destroying the world, Bond decides to shoot a sleeper dart 
from his watch towards Wunderkind. Bond now has an intention – it involves 
incapacitating Wunderkind (the outcome) by shooting him with a sleeper dart (the 
action). He takes aim, and fires – but oh no! He misses and the dart shoots past 
Wunderkind, hitting a button on his desk. It’s the trapdoor to the pool full of sharks… 
Wunderkind falls down the hole with a final, defiant scream and the world is saved.  
In this example, the outcome Bond wanted was satisfied, but not in the way he 
planned. His intention was to incapacitate Wunderkind using the dart: this outcome was 
achieved but only by using a different method. Thus his intention was not satisfied. 
Whilst Bond may have meant the achieved outcome of incapacitating Dr Wunderkind, he 
did not mean to do so by dropping him into the shark tank. There is a difference between 
understanding an action as bringing about a goal and understanding that the model was 
using that action with a particular goal in mind. Using Perner and Doherty’s terminology, 
a goal-oriented understanding would not allow us to understand why Bond would be 
disappointed at his marksmanship: only when we grasp his action as goal-directed do we 
understand why he would be annoyed that he was unable to hit Wunderkind, even though 
he incapacitated him via shark instead. 
Following previous distinctions, I will use the term “mimicry” to refer to copying 
another’s actions without understanding that those actions were done to achieve a goal. The 
term “imitation” will be used to refer to copying another person’s actions and understanding 
that those actions have a goal, but only in the sense of goal-oriented action as defined by Perner 
and Doherty (2005). As will be seen below, there is conflicting evidence over whether 
intentions are understood in infancy, therefore relating imitation to goal-oriented action avoids 
involving intentional understanding. It will also permit the distinction between cases when 
children understand the goals of actions and when they merely reproduce those actions blindly 
(which will be termed mimicry). Having clarified this terminology, the first step is to examine 
the beginnings of social learning, and analyse the way infants begin to copy other people.  
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2. Infancy: imitation or mimicry? 
Is imitation special? Evidence for goals and intentions in infancy  
Different theories have been proposed over whether infants’ imitation can be 
considered mimicry or imitation. One of the earlier theories was formulated from the seminal 
work performed by Meltzoff and colleagues (Meltzoff & Moore, 1977, 1983; Meltzoff, 1995). 
Meltzoff’s work on imitation in neonatal infants and young children raised critical questions 
about the nature of imitation and the way this ability develops throughout childhood. They 
argued for a nativist approach to social cognition, positing that children show an innate capacity 
and tendency for imitation. They also suggested that children develop an understanding of goals 
and intentions within the first two years of life and that this subsequently guides their imitation. 
These conclusions came from several studies: Meltzoff and Moore (1977) observed that new-
borns (under one month of age) would imitate facial movements demonstrated to them by adults 
– they replicated this finding with babies less than 71 hours old (Meltzoff & Moore, 1983). 
Meltzoff subsequently argued that children show an innate proclivity to copy the actions of 
others, though he does specify that development helps this tendency improve throughout 
childhood (Meltzoff, 1995). In the same paper Meltzoff (1995) conducted studies on children’s 
understanding of failed intentions. 18-month-olds observed a model attempt an action (e.g. pull 
a dumbbell apart) but fail, and were then given the opportunity to act on the same materials as 
the model. Eighteen-months-olds would not simply repeat the actions they saw the model do, 
but would perform the full attempted action – they would pull the dumbbell apart instead of 
merely tugging on the ends as the model had done. This effect only occurred when the model 
was a person but not when children observed a set of mechanical arms attempt the same actions. 
Meltzoff deduced that children at 18 months reason about actions in terms of intentions: if they 
were focussing merely on reproducing an end goal then they would not have differentiated 
between mechanical and human models. Thus, Meltzoff argued that infants not only imitated 
using a goal-oriented understanding of actions, they also understand actions as goal-directed. 
Given the finding of neonatal imitation and completion of failed acts, Meltzoff concluded that 
infants use intention-reading from very early on in their development and that imitative abilities 
are already quite complex within the first two years of life. This account was formally described 
in the active-intermodal mapping model of imitation (the AIM model) formulated by Meltzoff 
and Moore (1997).  
Whilst Meltzoff’s account helps explain children’s strong proclivity to imitate, others 
have argued that this theory is not the correct way of interpreting the data. Alternative 
explanations have been proposed for the findings of both neonatal imitation and replication of 
failed outcomes. For instance Meltzoff and Moore’s finding of neonatal imitation (1977) has 
not been consistently replicated. Oostenbroek et al. (2016) conducted a longitudinal study with 
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infants from 1 week to 9 weeks of age, and did not find reliable imitation of various movements 
at any stage. Similarly, the only gesture consistently found to be imitated by neonates across 
multiple studies is tongue protrusion (Anisfield, 1996; Ray & Heyes, 2011). However infants 
have also been shown to stick out their tongue in response to other stimuli such as a felt pen tip 
moving close to and then away from the infants’ face (Ray & Heyes, 2011). These authors 
suggest that sticking out one’s tongue may be an excitatory response to stimuli resembling an 
approaching nipple. Given that the response is reliably elicited by other stimuli, not just the 
same movement, this behaviour cannot be taken as evidence of imitation or mimicry (as both 
imply a one-to-one matching between stimulus and response). As such this weakens the case for 
the existence of neonatal imitation. 
With regards to ascribing intentions to failed actions, alternative ways of interpreting 
the data have been suggested. Ruffman, Taumoepeau and Perkins (2012) proposed that 
children’s completion of failed actions can be explained by action outcome reasoning, not 
mental state understanding. When children see the model attempt an action, they may predict 
that the action involved will lead to a likely end state (e.g. pulling a dumbbell’s ends = the 
dumbbell will come apart). By 18 months infants have experience of seeing others pull on 
things and know that manipulating objects has effects – the primary learning context for 
children during the second and third years of life is mainly through object-led activities with 
adults (Whitebread & O’Sullivan, 2011). Infants’ joint attention between objects and people in 
play settings increases between the ages of 6 and 18 months (Bakeman & Adamson, 1984), 
meaning that during their second year infants are used to seeing adults manipulate objects. 
Infants could thus reason about likely outcomes (or goals, in the goal-oriented sense) from 
observing other people’s actions. Their ability to predict action outcomes is related to their own 
action experience (Hunnius & Bekkering, 2014): given that children typically have much less 
experience observing machines pull objects, it may have been harder for them to infer the goal 
“pull the dumbbell apart” from the machine model. As such it is not necessary to posit that 
infants understand intentions to explain their completion of failed actions: they can infer the 
goal of a failed action from their own action experience and are primed to perform the goal they 
have associated with those actions. If infants reason about goals at all to imitate, it is goals in 
the sense of goal-oriented action (this action Y will achieve effect X) and not as goal-directed 
action (the model intends to bring about effect X by using this action Y). In conclusion 
Meltzoff’s account, whilst able to explain some of the findings, is less parsimonious and less 





The principle of rational action 
A different account of imitation in infancy was proposed by Gergely and Csibra (2003). 
According to their account infants use a “principle of rational action” to evaluate the behaviours 
of those around them. To illustrate consider an example provided by the authors themselves 
(Gergely & Csibra, 2006). A woman named Sylvia recalls that, whenever her mother would 
prepare a roast joint, she would always cut off the ends before placing it in the oven. Therefore 
every time Sylvia would prepare a roast she cut each end off before placing it in her own oven. 
As a grown woman, Sylvia has her mother round for lunch and decides to prepare a roast. 
While she is preparing it and cuts the ends off, her mother enters and asks her why she is cutting 
the ends off. Confused Sylvia replies “Well, that’s how you always did it.” Her mother replies 
“Well, that’s because my oven was too small!” 
In the example above Sylvia assumed that her mother had a good reason for cutting the 
ends off of the roast before placing it in the oven. As it turns out she did, as her oven was too 
small, but Sylvia did not know the reason and subsequently assumed that it should apply to 
herself as well. The principle of rational action can thus be formulated as agents have a good 
reason for performing the actions they do. If I see someone show me an action, I assume that 
they had a good reason for doing the action in the way they did. The principle of rational action 
posits that during the first year of life, infants’ understanding of actions is teleological: they will 
believe that actions will be done to achieve a goal, and this action will be done because of 
certain constraints of the situation (Gergely & Csibra, 2003). Infants can evaluate whether the 
context permits certain actions, and whether an action is an efficient way of achieving a specific 
goal. The authors highlight that this does not require understanding intentions or theory of 
mind, but merely relies on reasoning about likely goals from the context. If Sylvia sees her 
mother cut off the ends of the roast, she will assume this is done for the goal of cooking the 
roast. She does not need to understand intentions, as in that her mother’s actions are done with a 
particular goal in mind, and she intends certain consequences will occur because of her actions.  
Evidence for children using the principle of rational action comes from studies looking 
at how children imitate models doing things in unexpected ways. For example Gergely, 
Bekkering and Király (2002) conducted a study with 14-month-olds who observed a model turn 
on a lamp using her head to push the switch. In one condition the model had a blanket wrapped 
around her and was holding it with her hands appearing to be cold; in the other condition the 
model’s hands were free and placed on the table on either side of the lamp. The infants used 
their own heads to turn on the lamp significantly more in the hands-free condition than in the 
blanket condition. The authors argued that the infants assumed that the model had a good reason 
for not using her hands in the hands-free condition, making them copy the head touch more.  
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Schwier, Van Maanen, Carpenter and Tomasello (2006) found a similar result with 12-
month-olds. In their study infants observed a model move a toy dog towards a toy house, the 
door of which was either open or closed. Regardless of the state of the door the model always 
made the dog enter the house via the chimney. When children were allowed to copy, the door of 
the house was left open. The infants were significantly more likely to move the dog down the 
chimney when the door had been open during the demonstration (81%) than when it had been 
locked (44%). Schwier et al. (2006) argue that children assumed that the model had a good 
reason for making the dog go down the chimney in the closed door condition, which made them 
more likely to copy this uncommon action. Using the Sylvia example from earlier, if Sylvia had 
paid attention to the size of her mum’s oven, she may have understood that the constraints 
which applied to her mum did not apply to her. She may therefore only have cut off the ends of 
the joint if she too had a small oven. The principle of rational action explains why children 
sometimes selectively imitate the actions they see another person doing: they understand that 
the constraints affecting the model (e.g. holding the blanket around them; the door to the house 
being locked) do not apply to them and so do not copy the model’s actions exactly but emulate 
the goal.  
However the principle can also explain why children sometimes display high-fidelity 
imitation (also termed over-imitation, Lyons, Young & Keil, 2007). High-fidelity imitation 
refers to the tendency to copy actions that are clearly inefficient towards performing a goal. 
According to the principle of rational action, children assume that the agent had a good reason, 
albeit not clearly understood by them, for performing the action that they did (e.g. putting the 
mouse down the chimney when the door is open; touching the lamp with one’s head when one’s 
hands are free) and so copy all actions faithfully. It has similarly been argued that pre-schoolers 
copy a model who performs clearly inefficient actions because they assume that the model had 
a good reason for doing so (e.g. Horner & Whiten, 2005). The principle of rational action can 
thus explain both selective and high-fidelity imitation, which indicates good explanatory power 
(it explains both the presence and absence of a phenomenon with the same rule). However the 
idea that infants possess such a principle has received some challenges both from experimental 
evidence and on a theoretical level.  
Gergely et al.’s (2002) head-touch study has come under criticism, most strongly from 
Paulus and colleagues (Paulus, Hunnius, Vissers & Bekkering, 2011). In particular they argue 
that the head-touch action in the blanket condition is very difficult for infants to do because they 
cannot bend at the waist whilst holding their arms in front of them. Paulus et al. (2011) 
demonstrated that the likelihood of 14-month-olds performing the head-touch was affected by 
how easy it was for the infants to copy the model’s action (e.g. they imitated more faithfully in 
conditions where the model’s hands were placed on either side of the light). This would suggest 
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that it is motor resonance – how well the model’s action can be mapped onto the child’s own 
motor repertoire – that determines imitation fidelity, not rational action. A similarly low-level 
interpretation of the data was formulated by Beisert, Zmyj, Liepelt, Jung, Prinz and Daum 
(2012) who suggested that the blanket condition is more perceptually salient, and may have 
distracted infants from the fact that the model used their head to turn on the light. When 14-
month-olds were given a habituation period to get used to the distracting blanket, they imitated 
the head-touch just as much as in the no-blanket condition.  
Similar caution can be levied against Schwier et al.s study (2006). Their results can be 
explained by low-level perceptual processes as suggested by Beisert et al. (2012). It is possible 
that children copy a model’s actions more faithfully when the set-up used by the child matches 
the set-up used by the model more accurately. For example, in the closed door condition the set-
up for the child does not match the set-up used by the model (as the door was open for the latter 
and closed for the former), whereas it does match in the open door condition. The mismatch 
between the two set-ups may have encouraged the child to deviate from the original action 
sequence more in the closed door condition.  
It could be argued that this is a Straw Man approach: dismissing some of the studies 
supporting the idea of a principle of rational action instead of critiquing the principle itself. 
However there are theoretical objections raised against the idea of such a principle in infancy. 
Paulus (2012a) argues that “a principle of rational action” would also require infants to possess 
a number of other abilities. Firstly, to be able to evaluate other people’s actions as rational, 
children need to understand that people are capable of performing some actions and not others. 
This would allow them to grasp the most efficient action for that agent to perform to achieve 
their goal. Children under 3 years do not seem able to reason about agents’ action capabilities, 
that is, the range of actions and movements that agents are able to perform (Paulus & Moore, 
2011), which makes it unlikely that infants can do so. Secondly, infants need to be able to 
evaluate the efficiency of other people’s use of different body parts. They also need to be able 
to relate this evaluation to their own body, effectively deciding whether what is most efficient 
for other people is what is most efficient for themselves. But it is not until the third year of life 
that infants can map other people’s body topography onto their own (e.g. after seeing stickers 
placed on another person’s body, children under 30 months cannot reliably place stickers on the 
same locations on their own body; Brownell, Nichols, Svetlova, Zerwas & Ramani, 2010). 
Infants do not therefore seem able to map efficiency judgements about other people’s actions 
onto their own bodies. Thirdly, if infants can imitate rationally then they require the ability to 
engage in what is known as counterfactual reasoning. In the head-touch study it is assumed that 
infants understand that the model in the blanket condition could have used their hands if they 
had not been holding the blanket (Perner, Sprung & Steinkogler, 2004). This ability to reason 
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about possibilities under alternative situations is counterfactual reasoning. However this ability 
has not been demonstrated in children younger than 3 years (Harris, German, & Mills; 1996; 
see also Rafetseder, Cristi-Vargas & Perner, 2010; Rafetseder, Schwitalla & Perner, 2013). 
Beck, Robinson, Carol and Apperly (2006) have also shown that children under 6 years cannot 
reason about what alternative actions an agent could have done in a certain situation. From 
Paulus’ objections it seems unlikely that infants possess the complex cognitive abilities to 
evaluate other people’s actions in rational terms. The theoretical objections to the principle of 
rational action suggest that the data should be interpreted using processes that do not require an 
understanding of goals, which are supported by evidence (Paulus et al., 2011a; Beisert et al., 
2012). Whilst one may be tempted to forego all discussion of goal understanding in infancy, 
there is an alternative theory of imitation that refers to both goals and non-goal processes, which 
is the focus of the following section.  
The goal-directed theory of imitation (GOADI) 
As mentioned above, there is little evidence that infants use an understanding of 
intentions to guide their imitation. Similarly if infants were imitating using the principle of 
rational action, this would require a number of abilities that do not develop until later in 
childhood. There is indeed evidence that infants’ imitation can be explained without reference 
to complex mental state understanding or rational action evaluations. In particular, a point made 
in the above sections is that imitation in infancy is affected by the infants’ own action 
experience (Hunnius & Bekkering, 2014; Paulus et al., 2011a). This idea comes from an 
important theory in the field of action understanding: the ideomotor account. The ideomotor 
account (e.g. James, 1890) posits that movements (internal motor programs) are encoded in 
terms of their effects (perceived sensory consequences). If a movement and effect co-occur 
enough times then the cognitive representation of that effect is associated with that movement – 
if I see K occur enough times after doing M then I learn that M leads to K (Hommel, 2009). 
This association is bi-directional: seeing an effect primes the movement associated with said 
effect, and observing a movement leads you to expect the effect associated with it (Paulus, 
2014).  
The ideomotor account of action has been posited as an explanation for children’s 
copying behaviour. It forms a key component in a theory of imitation formulated by 
Wohlschläger and colleagues known as the Goal-Directed theory of Imitation (the GOADI 
account: Bekkering, Wohlschläger & Gattis, 2000; Wohlschläger, Bekkering & Gattis, 2003). 
This theory was first described by Bekkering et al. (2000) as an alternative to direct-mapping 
theory (such as Meltzoff’s AIM account) which posited that humans have an innate ability to 
match an observed movement in another person with a similar (but non-observable) movement 
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in themselves. In contrast Bekkering et al. (2000) argued that when one observes an action (e.g. 
scratching one’s head) one does not represent it as a unitary motor pattern (e.g. the motor 
pattern of scratching one’s head). The process of imitation rather has five propositions or rules: 
- Decomposition: when one observes actions, these are broken down into their perceived 
goal aspects (the end goal of the action, how it was done, with what effector it was 
done…) 
- Selection: only a few of these aspects are chosen due to working memory constraints 
- Hierarchy: the selected goal aspects are hierarchically organised, with goals being 
prioritised over the means (like effector choice and movement paths) 
- The ideo-motor principle: selected goal aspects elicit the motor program with which they 
are most strongly associated. 
- General validity: this process is the same for adults, children and animals. The main 
difference between them is at the selection stage, as working memory capacity differs 
greatly between the types of agent. 
The GOADI account thus combines both goal understanding processes and basic 
action-matching mechanisms to explain imitation. Support for GOADI came from work 
showing that when actions are seen to have clear goals, children tend to reproduce those goals 
more faithfully than the specific movements involved. Bekkering et al. (2000) conducted a 
series of studies where 4- to 6-year-old children observed a model demonstrate contralateral 
arm movements that either terminated on a visible end point (touching a dot on a table) or did 
not terminate on a visible end point (touching a blank spot on the table). They found that 
children copied the contralateral arm movement more faithfully when the dots were absent than 
when they were present. This was argued to be evidence that, in the absence of a visible goal, 
movements are more likely to be copied as they are retained during the selection phase after 
action decomposition. Gleissner, Meltzoff and Bekkering (2000) replicated this finding in 3-
year-olds: children showed more errors when copying movements terminating on a body part 
(e.g. touching one’s ear) than when the errors terminated near the body part (grasping the air 
near an ear). Both studies also showed that when the goal remains constant and less attention 
needs to be devoted to it, children can focus on reproducing the exact movement involved and 
copy it more faithfully (Bekkering et al., 2000; Gleissner et al., 2000). These studies were taken 
as evidence that different aspects of the motor program could be highlighted for imitation and 
that goals were given a higher place in the hierarchy than movements.  
A similar finding was reported in infants by Carpenter, Call and Tomasello (2005). In 
this study 12- and 18-month-olds observed an adult either hop or slide a toy mouse across a mat 
towards a toy house (House condition) or towards a blank location (No House). Children copied 
the hopping movement significantly more faithfully in the No House condition than in the 
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House condition. In contrast they placed the mouse in the correct location far more often in the 
House condition. Such findings suggest that if there is no observable goal infants copy the 
movement more faithfully, which fits with the hierarchy of goals suggested by GOADI 
(Wohlschläger et al., 2003). When children understand the goal of an action (e.g. touch your 
ear; put the mouse near the house), the motor programme most strongly associated with that 
goal is activated, leading children to omit specific details of the action sequence (as these motor 
programmes seldom contain details such as “hop the mouse this way” or “cross your arm in 
front of you when you touch your ear” as we are unlikely to have acted often in this way; 
Wohlschläger & Gattis, 2002). GOADI thus posits imitation in infants and children to be goal-
oriented, with effects and end goals prioritised over movements. It draws upon the ideomotor 
principle of action-effect associations and explains why movements are imitated more faithfully 
when no goal can be attributed to them. Nevertheless there are criticisms of this theory that 
should be considered.  
Bird, Brindley, Leighton and Heyes (2007) argue that a problem with GOADI is the 
implicit assumption that imitation involves special processes beyond those involved in ordinary 
perception and action control (e.g. attention direction, working memory…). GOADI assumes 
that imitation is necessarily goal-driven, and prioritises goals as the essential features of actions 
to be reproduced (beyond other action features such as the movement). Bird et al. suggest that 
imitation does not require specialist, goal-focussed processes and instead can be accounted for 
using generalist features of stimulus-response association. To demonstrate this Bird et al. (2007) 
conducted a replication of a study by Wohlschläger et al. (2003) where adults saw a model lift a 
pen and put it into one of two differently coloured cups. In the original study adults made more 
mistakes about how to grasp the pen (using the left hand, upside down) and how to put it into 
the cup (rotating it counter-clockwise and inserting it tip down) than over which cup to put it 
into. However Bird et al. (2007) were able to change this error pattern by highlighting different 
elements in the demonstration. In their replication adults observed a model take a pen and move 
it into a cup: in different conditions distinct parts of the demonstration were highlighted with a 
colour (the cup, the pen, the hand of the model or the specific fingers). The adults were then 
asked to reproduce the actions performed by the model over many trials, to induce automatic 
imitation (where imitation of the model becomes an unconscious reflex). It was found that 
adults made fewer errors on whichever element was coloured: for instance when the hands were 
coloured the adults would make more cup errors than hand errors, and vice versa in the cups-
coloured condition. There was no overall preference for reproducing the goal (moving the pen 
into the cup) over copying the movement or the grip. Bird et al. claim that GOADI would have 
predicted that the goal (moving the pen into the cup) should have been copied regardless of 
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what element was highlighted by colour. That they did not find this showed that there is no 
intrinsic preference for goals over movements and thus runs counter to GOADI’s predictions.  
Generalist hypotheses (Bird et al., 2007) would also suggest that children’s imitation is 
guided by broad processes of visual attention and action control. With fewer things to focus on 
in the absence of external effects (e.g. the No House condition in Carpenter et al.’s study, 2005) 
children may be able to focus on the movement in more detail. They may be less distracted by 
the external effect and thus perform the movement more faithfully. This would explain 
imitation in these conditions without requiring goal understanding in children. In conclusion 
GOADI, whilst drawing upon the solid principle of ideomotor learning, claims that goals (as 
external effects) should be imitated more than movements which is not substantiated in the 
literature. Other theories of imitation should explain why goals and movements can be equally 
prioritised depending on the context. Two such theories will be reviewed in the next section – 
the association sequence learning model and the ideomotor approach to imitative learning.  
Associative sequence learning (ASL) and the ideomotor approach to imitative learning (IMAIL) 
GOADI predicts that, all other things being equal, when an action sequence is observed 
the end state (or goal) should be retained more and imitated more faithfully than the specific 
movements with which the goal was brought about. This prediction has been challenged by 
Bird et al. (2007) who showed that it is possible to prompt more faithful imitation of the 
movement rather than the goal. Similar findings to Bird et al. (2007) were reported by Leighton, 
Bird and Heyes (2010) who replicated this colour-error pattern and extended it to imitation of 
non-biological stimuli. In their study adults would make the same colour-error pattern when the 
actions were demonstrated by geometric shapes on a screen. This showed that the colour-error 
pattern could not have been due to intention attribution and imitation on this task was due to 
general processes such as perception and attention. The colour-error pattern was replicated in 4- 
to 6-year-old children by Mizuguchi et al. (2011). Such findings suggest that imitation is not 
essentially goal-oriented, as automatic imitation studies show it can be affected by the same 
processes that govern perception in general (e.g. attention directed towards perceptually salient 
stimuli). If imitation can be said to be goal-oriented, goals are not end states of actions but 
outstanding action characteristics (e.g. parts highlighted by colour). Whatever is perceptually 
emphasised is copied more faithfully by the imitator.  
The above findings are compatible with the associative sequence learning (ASL) 
account of imitation described by Heyes and colleagues (Brass & Heyes, 2005; Catmur, Walsh 
& Heyes, 2009). According to this imitation is governed by general mechanisms of associative 
learning (Catmur et al., 2009). The ASL account argues that experience is a key factor driving 
children’s ability to imitate. When I perform an action X, I can see the way it looks (sensory 
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representation of action X) and I know its motor command (motor representation of how to do 
action X). When the sensory and motor representations of X co-occur enough times in a 
predictive way, such that “motor X leads to sensory X” then a sensorimotor action 
representation of X is formed. These action representations are excitatory, vertical associations 
whereby seeing X activates the sensory representation of X, and this triggers the motor 
representation of X. This priming of imitation can only occur if children have experience of 
those actions beforehand, either from watching other people or by observing their own 
movements, as if there is no sensorimotor linking then observing an action will not prime any 
motor representation. 
A similar theory to ASL, formulated by Paulus (2014), is the ideomotor account of 
infant learning (the IMAIL approach). This theory builds on the action-effect coding principle 
previously explained: as in ASL every action is controlled by a bidirectional action-effect 
association. Repeated co-occurrence between a motor code and its sensory consequences 
creates this action-effect association. Thus wanting to elicit a particular effect activates the 
motor program associated with it. Similarly to ASL the IMAIL approach highlights the role of 
experience on children’s imitation: observing another person’s action will only activate a motor 
code in the observer if the action is in the observer’s motor repertoire. Once a bidirectional 
action-effect link is formed the degree to which an observed action stimulates the same action 
in the observer is due to the similarity between the observed and executed actions. If the way I 
see action X done by someone else is very similar to the way action X looks like when I do it, 
the sensory code of X (and consequently its motor code) is strongly activated. This is termed 
“motor resonance”. 
ASL and IMAIL are very similar theories of action production and imitation: they both 
refer to the ideo-motor principle in that observed actions stimulate action production in the 
observer, most likely via the mirror neuron system (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). They also 
both claim that sensory effects of actions are associated with that action’s motor code when the 
effect and the action co-occur in a predictive way. The main difference between the two 
accounts is on emphasis: ASL focuses on how bidirectional sensorimotor codes are first formed, 
whereas IMAIL focuses on how imitation occurs once these codes have been established 
(Catmur et al., 2009). ASL and IMAIL both claim that actions are imitated primarily in terms of 
their effects – these are not end states as GOADI would predict, but merely perceived 
consequences of actions (e.g. seeing an arm raised). Intentional action is represented in terms of 
these effects, so that when infants see an effect produced they can want to produce the same 
effect themselves (Paulus, 2014). An action’s effect is thus the common representational format 
between observed actions performed by other people and executed actions performed by 
oneself: it is the common denominator between other people’s actions and our own acts.  
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Both ASL (Catmur et al., 2009; Leighton et al., 2010) and IMAIL (Paulus, 2014) 
suggest that goals in the sense of intentions (i.e., goal-directed action) may affect imitation. 
However the base mechanisms of imitation do not require an understanding of intentions, as we 
can imitate via the low-level processes of associative learning and motor resonance. Thus, ASL 
and IMAIL both suggest that the ideo-motor system helps infants imitate needing to understand 
actions as either goal-oriented or goal-directed. However ideo-motor processes can be used to 
help understand action goals in the goal-oriented sense. Paulus’ (2012b) paper on action 
mirroring makes a very similar point to Perner and Doherty (2005). He cites Jacob (2009; Jacob 
& Jeannerod, 2005) who pointed out that seeing someone perform a goal is not the same thing 
as understanding people’s actions in terms of intentions. You can see someone grasp a mug and, 
using your own motor system, can form your own goal of grasping the mug. This is not 
automatic but will be possible if one has experience of the action and is used to seeing it cause 
an effect – this will enhance imitation of this action (Gampe, Prinz & Daum, 2015). But this is 
not the same as believing the other person wants to grasp the mug. You need an understanding 
of intention to represent the goal of an action as a person’s intention: you can infer an action’s 
effect using your motor system, but this does not equate to intention understanding. Similarly 
Uithol, van Rooij, Bekkering and Haselager (2011) argue that while mirror neurons help 
understand action effects, they could not be used to infer action intentions by themselves, as 
intentions are context-dependent and require abductive reasoning processes. This distinction is 
further strengthened by neuro-imaging evidence. Studies show distinct brain regions for the 
“mirror” system, used for imaging and reproducing other people’s actions, and for the 
“mentalising” system which helps process other people’s intentions (de Lange, Spronk, 
Willems, Toni & Bekkering, 2008; van Overwalle & Baetens, 2009).  
The ASL and IMAIL accounts thus provide strong theoretical arguments for conceiving 
of the base mechanisms in imitation as quite simple: it involves a matching of learned responses 
to perceived stimuli, where sensory-motor codings are formed on the basis of action experience 
(Paulus, 2014; Ray and Heyes, 2011). This can occur without reference to goals, and does not 
require specific mechanisms beyond simple associative learning (Leighton et al., 2010; 
Mizuguchi et al., 2011). Imitation is not a specialised, innate mechanism, but can be explained 
via general theories of action control and is modified by learning and experience. However both 
theories acknowledge that imitation is rarely a simple case of action-effect matching in a 
vacuum. Imitation is undoubtedly affected by higher-order cognitive processes such as 
mentalising, but these abilities help modulate imitation, they are not necessary parts of it. These 
abilities will presumably only affect imitation when they have fully developed, which means 
their effects will only be observed in older children. I will therefore now move away from 
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imitation in infancy, and examine how imitation is affected by other socio-cognitive abilities 
later in childhood. 
3. Imitation after infancy – how growing cognitive and social faculties affect imitation 
Having described the basic mechanisms of imitation in infancy I will now examine how 
this ability develops throughout childhood. Jones (2007) demonstrated that infants’ imitation 
increases in fidelity throughout the first two years of life. Imitation of actions without salient 
effects (that is, arbitrary actions1) develops later (at around 16 months) than does imitation of 
actions with salient effects, around 8 or 10 months. The IMAIL account predicts that this is 
because arbitrary actions lack the salient effects that form common triggers for observed and 
executed actions (Paulus, 2012b), and both the IMAIL and ASL models suggest that infants 
have less experience producing actions without observable effects (Catmur et al., 2009). For 
action-effect codings to be formed for such actions, we rely on imitative partners who show us 
what our actions look like when they are performed. It therefore takes longer for imitation of 
arbitrary actions to develop, and this can be dependent on the child’s own experience of being 
imitated. One may expect greater imitation of arbitrary actions with age: this is one of the 
findings observed after infancy. 
One might be tempted to argue that imitation in pre-schoolers and older children is no 
different from imitation in infancy. If one were talking about the mechanisms involved in 
imitation, this would be accurate: Leighton et al. (2010) and Mizuguchi et al. (2011) have 
convincingly shown that imitation in adults and children is affected by general processes of 
action-effect matching. Imitation in both adults and children is driven by associations between 
perceived sensory effects and internal motor programs. However it is a different question 
altogether to say that the functions of imitation remain identical from infancy to adulthood. 
Nadel (2002, 2014) as well as Zmyj and Seehagen (2013) argue that imitation serves two 
functions throughout development: to promote skill acquisition and to foster communication 
and interaction with other agents. From the age of about 18 months infants spontaneously 
imitate one another in free play settings (Nadel & Fontaine, 1989). This spontaneous imitation 
peaks at around 30 months of age and has certain general characteristics: it involves referential 
use of objects, it is reciprocal, and follows conventional rules. However, this communicative 
                                                          
1 It should be noted that “arbitrary” in this thesis will refer to actions without salient effects, in 
both game and non-game contexts. Some previous studies (e.g. Gardiner, 2014) have used 
“irrelevant” or “non-functional” as opposed to “relevant” or “functional” actions, but this does 
not apply easily to game contexts where one can perform an action that has no observable effect 
but is still relevant to the game. It also does not apply to ambiguous tasks where the (non-
)functionality of an action is unclear to children, for example if an apparatus is opaque. 
“Arbitrary” thus applies to both game contexts (where arbitrary rules and actions are expected) 




function of imitation disappeared once language was mastered, as 3-year-olds would use objects 
cooperatively but not imitatively (Nadel & Fontaine, 1989). Imitation may therefore serve as a 
transitory communicative language in preverbal infants (Nadel, 2002). As well as 
communication, imitation has also been shown to promote affiliation with one’s partner in 
social learning situations. Carpenter, Uebel and Tomasello (2013) demonstrate that 18-month-
infants who are copied by an adult are more likely to help that adult with a task than if the adult 
did not mimic them. Similarly Lakin and Chartrand (2003) observe that adults primed with 
prosocial language are more likely to mimic other people, suggesting a bi-directional 
relationship between mimicry and prosocial behaviour. Lakin, Jefferis, Cheng and Chartrand 
(2003) suggest that the unconscious urge to imitate originally served a communicative function, 
allowing individuals to be accepted into social groups, before evolving into a type of “social 
glue” sustaining relationships. 
The complex functions of imitation do not go against the ASL and IMAIL accounts. 
Both theories stress that imitation is modulated by other cognitive processes with age. Paulus 
(2014) suggests that infants’ growing awareness of their own body topography (which is still 
immature under the age of 2: Brownell et al., 2010) helps them explicitly reason about how the 
actions they see correspond to movements they themselves can do. He also argues that language 
development may help children acquire new ways of imitating, citing Rumiati and Tessari’s 
dual-route theory of imitation (2002, 2004). This model suggests that imitation draws upon two 
possible routes: a direct visuo-motor mapping route which relies solely on ideomotor processes 
and working memory, or via an indirect semantic route that draws upon action representations 
stored in long-term memory (Rumiati et al., 2005). Having linguistic representations of actions 
can thus help children imitate via the semantic indirect route. 
The mechanisms underlying imitation may thus be identical for infants and older 
children. However it should be noted that social learning nearly always involves factors beyond 
mere action reproduction and mimicry. Throughout development other cognitive processes 
begin to affect children’s copying behaviour, and imitation comes to serve a communicative 
function where the replication of another’s actions will lead to social consequences. Theories of 
imitation in pre-schoolers therefore need to consider socio-cognitive processes if they wish to 
explain how imitation develops throughout childhood (Paulus, 2014). 
The development of imitation throughout childhood 
Having clarified the need to consider other factors beyond ideo-motor and associative 
learning beyond infancy, I will now examine key developments in children’s imitation 
throughout childhood. As mentioned above children’s imitation of arbitrary actions increases 
with age (Jones, 2007). This is paralleled by the appearance of a phenomenon known as “over-
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imitation” or “high-fidelity imitation”, which refers to the tendency of children to copy even 
meaningless actions demonstrated by a model. A seminal work illustrating this behaviour came 
from Horner and Whiten (2005) who compared chimpanzees and 5-year-old children on an 
imitation task. Chimpanzees and children observed a model who demonstrated a series of 
actions on a box before eventually retrieving a reward from the box. Some of the actions were 
necessary to get to the reward (e.g. opening the door to the reward) and some were irrelevant 
(e.g. opening a lid on top of the box to an empty compartment). The effects of the actions were 
sometimes clear because the box was transparent, and sometimes hidden because the box was 
opaque. Horner and Whiten found that whilst nonhuman primates only copied the irrelevant 
actions when the box was opaque, the children copied the irrelevant actions even when it could 
be seen that they were irrelevant (i.e., non-functional) to getting the reward. This finding has 
been extended beyond pre-schoolers, with multiple studies showing that it increases throughout 
childhood and is present even in adults (McGuigan, Makinson & Whiten, 2011; McGuigan, 
Gladstone & Cook, 2012; Moraru, Gomez & McGuigan, 2016; Whiten, Allan, Devlin, Kseib, 
Raw & McGuigan, 2016). 
Imitation during childhood does not only become more faithful, it also appears to 
become more indiscriminate. Yu and Kushnir (2014) observed that 2-year-olds would copy a 
model’s exact movements faithfully during a task only if they were primed to do so by playing 
a mimicry game with the model beforehand. In contrast 4-year-olds copied the model faithfully 
regardless of the type of priming training they received. Moraru et al. (2016) demonstrated a 
similar finding for children between 3 and 6 years. They observed that 3-year-olds’ imitation 
was more faithful if the verbal prompt accompanying the demonstration indicated a more 
conventional aspect to the task (“I will show you how to do the task”) than when it indicated 
flexibility (“I will show you one way to do the task”). For children above 4 years the type of 
verbal prompt did not affect imitative fidelity.  
However this finding of indiscriminate imitation is paralleled by the development of the 
opposite ability: children become more able to be selective in their copying behaviour. By the 
age of 4 years children can track how reliable informants are based on bystander approval, and 
subsequently endorse labels provided by reliable informants over unreliable ones (Fusaro & 
Harris, 2008). This ability appears to go through developmental stages: Koenig and Jaswal 
(2011) observed that 3- and 4-year-olds do not so much prefer reliable informants but avoid 
unreliable informants. This was also observed by Pasquini, Corriveau, Koenig and Harris 
(2007) who found that whilst 4-year-olds will monitor each informant’s overall accuracy, 3-
year-olds tended to be distrustful of a model who had made one mistake, preferring to avoid 
previously inaccurate models’ choices. These findings show that while imitative fidelity 
increases with age children also show more discriminate imitation. High-fidelity imitation is 
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thus unlikely to be an uncontrollable, automatic process, so theories explaining it should explain 
why such selective imitation can also occur. The following sections will review different 
theories surrounding the appearance of high-fidelity imitation and selective copying in the pre-
school years. In particular I will examine the direct perception hypothesis; the role of causal 
reasoning; the desire to affiliate with other people; and the effect of normativity and the 
conventional status of actions. 
The direct perception hypothesis: how action understanding modulates imitation fidelity 
As mentioned above both ASL and IMAIL argue that the mechanisms underlying 
imitation are not specialised or intrinsically goal-focussed. Other people’s actions are imitated 
because of bindings between perceived sensory effects and associated motor programs. This can 
explain imitation in a parsimonious way without positing higher-order cognitive abilities in 
infancy. But both theories acknowledge that such higher-order cognitive factors can affect 
imitation once they are in place. One theoretical account that suggests how higher-order factors 
may affect imitation is the model of direct perception as formulated by Froese and Leavens 
(2014). This model claims that actions are perceived primarily in terms of their effects. When 
seeing someone pouring themselves a drink, one does not focus on the precise way they hold 
their hands or the angle at which they pour the cup. Rather one focuses on the overall goal of 
the action, which was pouring a drink. Less attention is paid to precise details and more to the 
overall goals of actions. Froese and Leavens argue that focussing on the specific movements of 
an action is cognitively harder to do than to merely reproduce the end goal. This is because one 
has to override the motor representation of actions associated with that goal and focus on 
copying all of the actions: if I see someone lifting a cup and drinking, it is harder to focus on 
reproducing the precise finger and arm movements involved that just activate my own motor 
program of “drink from the cup”. The theory of direct perception thus predicts a somewhat 
counter-intuitive result: physical details and intelligibility are in conflict with one another.  
There is substantial evidence that action understanding is affected by cognitive factors 
in a top-down way. Teufel, Fletcher and Davis (2010) review neurological findings which show 
that explicit Theory of Mind (ToM) beliefs affect action understanding and perception. ToM 
attribution encourages automatic gaze following (Teufel, Alexis, Clayton & Davis, 2010b), 
which shows that assuming an agent has beliefs biases one’s attention as we expect agents to act 
in certain ways (e.g. to look in certain places). Liepelt, von Cramon and Brass (2008) also 
showed that if a model’s finger movements seemed intentional, this resulted in a greater 
automatic imitation effect in the observer. Teufel et al. (2010) argue that attributing mental 
states to actions facilitates the sensory processing of said actions within the superior temporal 
sulcus (Blakemore & Decety, 2001), enabling a strong perception-action coupling. Support for 
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the direct perception hypothesis also comes from the phenomenon of change blindness (Simons 
& Levin, 1998; Simons & Rensick, 2005) where even drastic changes to visual scenes go 
unnoticed by observers provided the overall meaning of the situation is unchanged. Perceiving 
the goal of an action means one does not need to analyse the specific movements involved, and 
should reduce imitative fidelity of the precise movements of that action.  
It could be argued that this theory is just GOADI in disguise. Certainly the parallels are 
worth mentioning: the direct perception hypothesis claims that intentional action is primarily 
represented in terms of their goals, and GOADI claimed that goals are focussed on more than 
precise means in the hierarchy of action components. Both predict that goals will be focussed 
on more than means in reproducing actions. However, as mentioned above goals will not 
always be reproduced more faithfully than movements (Bird et al., 2007; Leighton et al., 2010; 
Mizuguchi et al., 2011). It could be said that the direct perception hypothesis is open to the 
same criticisms and weaknesses as GOADI (which are that it claims that goals are always 
prioritised over means, and requires a specialist goal-processing mechanism for imitation 
beyond normal visual processing abilities). But this is not the case: Froese and Leavens (2014) 
state that goals will only be a focus of imitation in the case of meaningful actions, where 
obvious goals can be attributed to the movements observed. Where actions are unintelligible 
(i.e. when they are arbitrary) children are not used to performing them as they are typically 
novel, so no known motor program can interfere with the production of the specific movements, 
which means that movements should be copied more faithfully than specific end states. This 
explains why high-fidelity imitation of arbitrary actions occurs, as the arbitrary action cannot be 
assumed to have a known goal which is already associated with a known motor program. 
Supporting this, there is evidence that when the goal of an action sequence is 
emphasised by the model, children will prefer to copy the goal over the means. Elsner and 
Pfeifer (2012) conducted an imitation study where 3- to 5-year-olds saw a model move a toy 
sheep from a central platform either into one of two bowls (low salience condition), or moving 
into one of two salient locations (Nicky wakes up and decides to sit in the boat/on the bench). 
They also varied whether verbal cues emphasised the sheep’s movement (Nicky goes up/down) 
or the goal (Nicky goes to sit in the boat/on the bench). When the children were asked to have a 
turn, they had to use a different platform where the movement and the goal were mutually 
exclusive: if they tried to copy the model’s movement (e.g. Nicky goes up) then they would end 
up at a different goal to the model (either in the wrong cup/wrong location). Likewise if they 
wished to copy the goal (Nicky went to the red cup/boat) then they had to move the sheep in the 
opposite direction to the model. Elsner and Pfeifer found that if the model drew attention to the 
goal in their verbal description, children copied the goal of the action over the movement, 
bringing about the same outcome via different means. They showed no preference for copying 
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the movement over the goal if the goal was not mentioned by the model. Elsner and Pfeifer also 
found that children copied the goal over the movement when the goal was highly salient (the 
bench or the boat) but did not show a preference for copying movements over goals in the low 
salience condition (when the sheep was moved into one of two bowls). These results show that 
meaningful goals, emphasised by either verbal cues or cultural relevance, encourage imitation 
of those goals over specific movements.  
Elsner and Pfeifer (2012) found that when no verbal emphasis was placed on the goal of 
the action, and when the goal was not socially salient, children had no preference for 
reproducing the goal over the precise movements of the model. These conditions replicate those 
of automatic imitation studies as in these experiments the model places no verbal emphasis on 
the goal of the action and the end goal is arbitrary rather than socially meaningful (Bird et al., 
2007; Leighton et al., 2010; Mizuguchi et al., 2011). Such studies find that in the absence of 
emphasis on goals, movements and goals are copied equally faithfully. Goals are not always 
replicated more than movements, but contextual cues make it more likely for the learner to 
perceive a relevant goal to the action, and they will then focus on that action more. The ASL 
and direct perception accounts are thus not exclusive: they may even be complementary with 
the former explaining the mechanisms of imitation and the latter describing how these 
mechanisms may be modulated with reference to action understanding.  
The direct perception hypothesis explains why imitation of specific movements is 
reduced when those actions can be fitted into a wider, meaningful context. Context plays an 
important role in whether an action will be understood as having a salient goal (Hunnius & 
Bekkering, 2014; Uithol et al., 2011). If goals are arbitrary and not emphasised by verbal or 
perceptual cues, there is no tendency to copy them over movements. However if actions can be 
related to goals whether by relevant social cues or by verbal instruction, those goals will be 
preferentially copied over specific movements (Elsner & Pfeifer, 2012). The direct perception 
hypothesis does not so much describe the base mechanisms of imitation, but explains how these 
mechanisms are modulated by growing action experience and socio-cultural awareness. Given 
that pre-schoolers seem to attend more to goals when these are emphasised by verbal or 
sociocultural cues (Elsner & Pfeifer, 2012) this suggests that after infancy children begin to 
prioritise goals when imitating actions. 
Children’s causal reasoning abilities 
As mentioned above, one explanation of high-fidelity imitation in children is the direct 
perception hypothesis, which states that perceiving the goal of an action can actually decrease 
precise imitation of the action’s components. High-fidelity imitation of arbitrary actions occurs 
because no explicit external goal is associated with the actions, meaning that these actions can 
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be imitated more precisely. A second explanation of high-fidelity imitation was formulated by 
Lyons and colleagues (Lyons et al., 2007; Lyons, Damrosch, Lin, Macris & Keil, 2011). 
Termed “automatic causal encoding” (ACE), this account suggests that children believe that 
intentionally demonstrated actions are causally meaningful to the task in question. Therefore 
children reproduce all actions that they see demonstrated because they mistakenly assume that 
they are all necessary to bring about the same effect. Lyons and colleagues formulated the ACE 
account following a number of findings: one study (Lyons et al., 2007) looked at imitation in 3- 
to 5-year-olds. Children in this study observed a model perform a series of actions to remove a 
toy dinosaur from a box. Some of the actions were necessary and some were arbitrary: all action 
effects could clearly be seen as the boxes were transparent. Children would reproduce arbitrary 
actions even if they had received training and were encouraged to try and avoid doing “silly 
extra things”. The children also imitated the arbitrary actions in the absence of the model, which 
the authors argued was evidence that they were not imitating just to please the model. Lyons et 
al. (2011) also showed that children performed arbitrary actions in competition settings, even 
when doing so worsened their performance overall. The only manipulation reducing imitation 
of irrelevant actions was when these actions were performed on a disconnected section of the 
apparatus (Lyons et al., 2007). The authors argue that this is because this violates the “contact 
principle” which states that objects can only mechanically affect one another when they touch 
one another (Spelke, 1994).  
The ACE account explains high-fidelity imitation through distorted causal inferences. 
Children seeing a model demonstrate an intentional action mistakenly assume that these actions 
were causally necessary to obtain the effect in question. Note here that intentional is used as 
opposed to accidental, as children do not attribute causal status to actions that a model marks as 
a mistake (by saying “whoops, I didn’t mean to do that!”, Carpenter, Akhtar & Tomasello, 
1998). However there are some challenges to the ACE account. One is that children will 
continue to imitate actions even if they are aware that they are causally unnecessary. Kenward, 
Karlsson and Persson (2011) had 4- and 5-year-old children imitate a series of actions, some of 
which were necessary and some arbitrary. They found that, when asked whether the actions 
were needed to retrieve the marble, children recognised that the necessary action was needed 
and that one could retrieve the marble without the arbitrary actions. There was however still a 
high rate of imitation of arbitrary actions in this study, showing that children would reproduce 
the arbitrary action regardless of whether they knew it was necessary or not. If children were 
only interested in reproducing causally necessary actions then they should not reproduce actions 
they know to be arbitrary, even if they are demonstrated intentionally. Similarly Marsh, Ropar 
and Hamilton (2014) conducted a study where 5- to 8-year-olds imitated models performing 
arbitrary and causally necessary actions. In this study children not only imitated arbitrary 
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actions more faithfully with age, but older children were more likely to imitate arbitrary actions 
if they rated them as less causally necessary. The studies by Kenward et al. (2011) and Marsh et 
al. (2014) provide evidence that pre-schoolers will reproduce actions that they know to be 
arbitrary, which suggests that mistaken causal encoding is not driving their imitation.  
Further evidence against the ACE account comes from Hoehl, Zettersen, Schleihauf, 
Gratz and Pauen (2014). They conducted a study where 5-year-olds were shown two ways of 
removing tokens from a box by two models: one used only efficient, relevant actions to remove 
the tokens and the other included irrelevant actions in their demonstration. If children saw the 
inefficient way first, then they would only switch to the more efficient way if it was modelled 
by a communicative, engaging model (who had played a warm-up session with the child and 
prefaced their actions on the task by getting the child’s attention and saying “Watch!”). In 
contrast if the model was uncommunicative then children did not stop performing the action in 
the inefficient way. This shows that children were not affected solely by whether or not they 
saw the efficient solution: their imitation was also affected by how this efficient solution was 
demonstrated and the connection they had with the model. It should also be noted that when the 
first model used the inefficient solution, children showed quite high levels of high-fidelity 
imitation, even though children could see the effects of each action on the apparatus as it was 
transparent. They should therefore have been able to infer causal relations of the actions, and 
the fact that almost no children performed arbitrary actions in a no-demonstration control 
supports this. So in spite of the fact that they could see the actions to be arbitrary, 5-year-olds 
reproduced these actions and would not omit them unless shown how to do so by an engaging 
demonstrator. This speaks against the ACE account and suggests that ascription of causality is 
not the only factor affecting high-fidelity imitation in pre-schoolers. 
A more moderate argument regarding children’s causal inferences was developed by 
Gardiner, Greif and Bjorklund (2011) who observed that 3- to 5-year-olds were more likely to 
imitate arbitrary actions when a model verbally marked these actions as intentional (by saying 
“There!” whilst doing it) as opposed to when the action was accidental (by saying “Whoops!”). 
Gardiner (2014) extended this by demonstrating that it is only when children cannot infer causal 
relations by themselves that they use intentionality as a cue to relevancy. In her study she 
showed that if action effects were unknown (by making the apparatus on which they were 
performed opaque) and children did not infer causal relations from observation, they imitated 
the model’s actions more when they were intentional rather than accidental. In contrast when 
the effects of the actions could be seen, children would not perform arbitrary actions regardless 
of whether they were intentional or not. This theory provides a more measured view of 
children’s causal reasoning and explains why they may sometimes defer to copying other 
people when action effects are unknown. But this theory only predicts that pre-schoolers should 
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imitate non-functional actions when action effects are ambiguous: it does not explain why 
actions that are clearly unnecessary are still imitated (Horner & Whiten, 2005; Kenward et al., 
2011). It also does not explain why high-fidelity imitation of arbitrary actions increases with 
age (as has been found by several studies: McGuigan et al., 2011; Whiten et al., 2016; Yu & 
Kushnir, 2014) as children’s understanding of causality improves with age (McCormack, 
Butterfill, Hoerl & Burns, 2009). To summarise, causal reasoning abilities may help children 
understand actions, but as social learning situations often involve more variables beyond action 
causality, other factors are required to help understand pre-schoolers’ imitation of arbitrary 
actions. Any theory focussing mostly on causal reasoning therefore lacks explanatory power to 
explain high-fidelity imitation.  
The social side of social learning 
As mentioned above children will imitate clearly arbitrary actions. High-fidelity 
imitation cannot solely be due to children reasoning about whether certain actions bring about 
an observed effect. Over and Carpenter (2012) emphasise that social learning is inevitably 
“social”. If this is the case, then the quality of the interaction between the model and the learner 
should affect imitation fidelity. Evidence for this has been demonstrated in multiple studies. 
Nielsen looked at how communicative cues affected imitation in 18- and 24-month-olds (2006, 
Experiment 3). In this study children observed a model press a switch on a box before opening 
said box: the model either used their hand or a tool to press the switch. The model was either 
very sociable (they met the child before the study began; throughout the task they smiled and 
frequently made eye contact with the infant) or acted in an aloof manner (they did not build 
rapport with the child before the task; they avoided eye contact with the child during their 
demonstration). Eighteen-month-olds were more likely to copy the model’s use of the tool to 
open the box in the social condition; the 24-month-olds would copy the tool use at equal rates 
for either type of model, but were more successful at opening the box in the social model 
condition. Nielsen argues that the rapport with the model made infants above 18 months more 
likely to copy their exact tool use to sustain the interaction.  
With regards to high-fidelity imitation, Over and Carpenter (2012, 2013) argue that 
children’s imitation will be more faithful if the child has a “social goal”. Imitation is not about 
performing the task in a particular way, but about expressing likeness with the demonstrator, to 
affiliate with them. Evidence for this type of behaviour comes from Nielsen and Blank (2011) 
who showed that 4- and 5-year-olds, after seeing two models demonstrate different action 
sequences to open a box, preferred to copy the actions of whichever model was present during 
the children’s own turn. Although children had seen the two ways of opening the box, they 
would copy the method used by the present model. Similar results were found by Nielsen and 
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Tomaselli (2010) – they conducted an imitation study with children aged 2 to 13 years. Children 
were given an artificial fruit to open, and then shown another way of opening it which included 
arbitrary actions. Children who had been successful in opening the box without the arbitrary 
actions would begin to demonstrate them if the model used them. Children showed a tendency 
to bring their copying behaviour in line with that of the model. Therefore whilst children know 
how to perform the task in another, simpler, way, they prefer to use the solution demonstrated 
by their interactive partner to affiliate with them. It is also possible to encourage the goal to 
affiliate which increases high-fidelity imitation. Over and Carpenter (2009) showed 5-year-olds 
a video depicting a shape being ostracized by two other shapes playing catch or a neutral video 
showing two shapes and a butterfly. They found that, following a model’s demonstration of 
manipulating a tool on a box to turn on a light, children who had seen the ostracism video were 
more likely to copy the model’s exact movements than children who had seen the neutral video. 
Children copied the action outcome at equal rates between conditions, showing an equal 
motivation in both conditions to achieve the effect. The only difference was the matching of the 
model’s exact movements (e.g, holding the tool in a certain way). The authors argue that this 
shows that ostracism enhances the recollection of social information and/or primes a goal of 
affiliation with the model.  
Further evidence for the effect of the model-learner relationship on imitation comes 
from comparisons of video and live models. In imitation tasks children usually observe a model 
perform a series of actions on an apparatus. If it were just a matter of learning which actions to 
produce, then it should not matter whether the demonstration comes from a real-life person or 
from a video demonstration. But studies have shown that live models are imitated more 
faithfully than actors on video. Nielsen, Simcock and Jenkins (2008) presented 24-month-olds 
with either live or video models showing children how to open several boxes using a specific 
tool on each box. Whilst the number of boxes opened did not differ between conditions, the 
children imitated the model’s use of the tool significantly more in the live-model condition than 
when the model was on video. However this difference disappeared when the model could 
communicate on video by means of a CCTV link: when this occurred children copied the 
model’s tool use significantly more than when the model was in a non-interactive video display. 
This shows that the crucial factor encouraging faithful imitation in live models over video 
displays is the contingency and interaction between the model and the learner (Krcmar, 2010). 
Evidencing preference for live models over video actors beyond infancy, Marsh et al. (2014) 
showed that children between the ages of 5 and 8 years also copy live models more faithfully 
than models on video. 
The above studies show that aspects of the model-learner relationship such as model 
reciprocity and the drive to affiliate encourage high-fidelity imitation. But there are important 
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caveats to be considered here, particularly from studies looking at how imitation occurs in third-
party contexts. One is that high-fidelity imitation can occur in the absence of direct interaction 
with the model. Nielsen, Moore and Mahomedally (2012) had 4-year-olds watch an adult show 
another adult how to retrieve a toy from a closed box using a series of actions, some of which 
were arbitrary (e.g. tapping the top of the box three times). When children were given the box 
after seeing this demonstration, they would copy the arbitrary actions displayed by the model. 
This occurred even if children had previously been able to open the box by themselves without 
using the arbitrary actions (see also Nielsen & Tomaselli, 2010). Children’s imitation was also 
unaffected by whether the adult who had taught the action was present in the room. This shows 
that the quality of the model-learner relationship is not the only factor affecting imitation, as 
children imitate faithfully even if the original teacher is not present. A related finding was 
observed by Shimpi, Akhtar and Moore (2013) who looked at imitation in 19- and 24-month-
olds. They found that children were far more likely to imitate a model in a direct interactive 
setting if they had previously played a warm-up game with that model. However, familiarity 
with the model did not affect the likelihood of children imitating that model when seeing them 
demonstrate actions to a third party. Children imitated familiar and unfamiliar models at equal 
rates when they were observing actions demonstrated to others. This shows that the quality of 
the model-learner relationship only improves imitation fidelity in direct interactive settings, and 
it is not necessary for children to imitate faithfully when merely observing others.  
The results from third-party imitation studies suggest that the dynamic between learner 
and teacher is not the only determinant of imitative fidelity. This makes sense if we consider 
that dyadic interactions are often situated within the wider context of cultural exchanges. 
Nielsen et al. (2012) argue that high-fidelity imitation following third-party demonstrations 
indicates that such imitation is used to acquire cultural traditions from those around us. Copying 
the purposeful actions of others, even if they are unnecessary and not modelled directly to us, is 
a useful strategy in order to acquire culturally-driven behaviour. Such cultural behaviour goes 
beyond the learner and teacher dyad, and imitation can be used to learn behaviour related to a 
social group rather than an individual. This leads me to discuss another factor affecting 
imitation: emphasis on the conventional status of actions. 
The role of convention and normativity 
A fourth explanation of why high-fidelity imitation occurs in children is normativity. 
Researchers focussing on normativity suggest that when children are shown how to perform a 
new task they infer that the demonstrated way is the proper way of doing it. The demonstration 
is interpreted as a rule or norm which should be followed. The normativity account has 
primarily been formulated by Rakoczy and colleagues (Rakoczy, Warneken & Tomaello, 2008; 
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Schmidt, Rakoczy & Tomasello, 2012; Keupp, Behne & Rakoczy, 2013; Keupp, Bancken, 
Schillmoller, Rakoczy &Behne, 2016). According to Rakoczy and Schmidt (2013) norms have 
certain characteristics: they are conventionally constructed (and therefore to a certain extent 
arbitrary); they are context-dependent and only apply in certain situations; and they provide us 
with a standard by which to act and by which to evaluate other people’s behaviour. Norms are 
not merely statistical expectancies about what is the most frequent response in a given situation 
X: norms relate to what ought to be done in situation X (Southwood & Eriksson, 2011). 
The normativity account suggests that high-fidelity imitation occurs when children 
believe that the way they see the task performed is the “correct” way to perform the task in that 
context. Supporting evidence for this interpretation has come from several studies: Schmidt, 
Rakoczy and Tomasello (2011) found that 3-year-olds imitated a model’s actions more 
faithfully when the model appeared to demonstrate known actions than when they appeared to 
be inventing actions. Keupp et al. (2016) also conducted imitation tasks with 4- to 5-year-olds. 
In one condition the conventional nature of the game was emphasised with a special label 
(“daxing”), and in the other the instructions simply emphasised the end goal of the game 
(“ringing the bells”). Children would imitate a model’s arbitrary actions more when they were 
performed with the conventional prompt. However the authors also found that when the 
arbitrary actions resulted in a negative consequence for a third party (e.g. placing marbles in a 
box would mean none would be left for the experimenter), children were far less likely to 
imitate them. These findings show that not only do children imitate unnecessary actions when 
they have conventional status, they do so in a flexible way depending on the context (as would 
be predicted by normativity theory). It can also be pointed out that Keupp et al.’s (2016) finding 
fits with Gardiner’s (2014) study as the former found high-fidelity imitation with a conventional 
prompt and both found selective imitation with an instrumental prompt. 
Normativity theory not only predicts high-fidelity imitation of meaningless actions in a 
given context, it also holds that a proper understanding of social norms should lead to the 
capacity to protest against other people not following those norms (Rakoczy & Schmidt, 2013). 
There is evidence that children will enforce social norms when they see third parties deviate 
from them. Rakoczy et al. (2008) found that 3-year-olds, and to some extent 2-year-olds, 
critiqued a puppet for playing a game incorrectly, enforcing the rules of the game. Subsequent 
studies demonstrated that this protest is not automatic but affected by multiple factors. Children 
protest when a mistake is made in the appropriate context but not in a context where the rule 
does not apply (Rakoczy et al., 2009); they enforce conventional rules only for the specific 
group members to whom those rules apply (Schmidt, Rakoczy & Tomasello, 2012); and 
children protest more if a third party’s mistake will result in negative consequences for someone 
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else (Keupp et al., 2016). Normativity theory can therefore explain both high-fidelity imitation 
and protest towards deviant third parties.  
There are certain parallels that can be drawn between normativity theory and the 
multiple-stance account from Nielsen, Kapitány and colleagues (Nielsen, Kapitány & Elkins, 
2015; Kapitány & Nielsen 2015; see also Herrman, Legare, Harris & Whitehouse, 2013 for a 
very similar account). This framework argues that a foundation of human cultural evolution has 
been the development of ritual, and that humans are biased to interpreting certain types of 
actions as ritualistic (Herrman et al., 2013). Actions are viewed as ritualistic: a) when the action 
is causally redundant, b) when the action is repetitive, and c) when there is a specific, 
distinctive way of performing the action (e.g. “daxing” is distinct from “ringing the bells” in 
Keupp et al.’s study, 2016). On the basis of these cues a learner can interpret the actions of a 
model in one of two possible ways: one way is the instrumental stance, where the model’s 
actions are interpreted as a personal choice, mainly task-driven, and can thus be deviated from. 
There is no cultural meaning attached to their actions and so no pressure to conform to the way 
they do it. The other way is the conventional stance, where the model’s actions reflect a social 
norm and actions have a cultural significance beyond their instrumental effects. To relate this 
account back to Rakoczy’s framework, actions are more likely to be construed as normative 
when the conventional stance is active: when this is the case children will imitate more 
faithfully and should protest more to seeing deviant third parties. 
The multiple-stance theory has also been used to explain why children display high-
fidelity imitation of irrelevant actions. Wilks, Kapitány and Nielsen (2016) conducted a study 
where 4- and 5-year-olds watched videos of either individuals or group members (marked by 
wearing identical t-shirts to observers) performed actions on a set of boxes. The individual 
would always perform actions that led to the box being opened. The group member only ever 
performed causally irrelevant actions. Wilks et al. found that when both videos were 
demonstrated in an instrumental way (i.e. no ritualistic cues) children copied the successful 
individual over the unsuccessful group; however when the group’s actions were marked by 
ritualistic cues (humming, bowing…) children would copy these actions over the individual’s 
successful actions (similar findings come from Herrmann et al., 2013). Imitation can thus be 
increased by highlighting the conventionality of the actions in question. Given that the actions 
performed by the individual in Wilks et al.’s study (2016) were equally observable in the 
instrumental and conventional conditions, children were not causally confused about the effects 
involved in the tasks but motivated to copy the arbitrary group actions. The idea of instrumental 
and ritual stances complements the theory of normativity by explaining how normativity can be 
ascribed in different situations.  
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The concept of normativity can explain both high-fidelity imitation and third-party 
protest in children. Normative protest begins to occur at around the age of 2 years (Rakoczy et 
al., 2008), hence at around the same time as high-fidelity imitation (Jones, 2007). It could 
therefore be argued that an awareness of the conventional status of actions drives both protest 
and high-fidelity imitation. However there are some limitations to be considered. As mentioned 
by both Rakoczy and Schmidt (2013) and Kapitány and colleagues (Kapitány et al., 2016) 
normativity is not automatic. Normative status is only applied to actions in certain situations: 
children do not blindly imitate but reason about the consequences of their imitation, and do not 
imitate faithfully if it means others cannot play the game (Keupp et al., 2016). Other factors 
affect children’s imitation when normativity cannot apply (for instance when synchrony and 
conventionality cues are absent). For example, Nielsen and Blank (2011) conducted a study in 
which 4- to 5-year-olds observed two models display two ways of opening the same box. One 
of the models left and the remaining model asked the child to open the box. Children were more 
likely to copy the actions used by whichever model was present, with no preference for either 
type of action. In this case children did not learn a norm (as this would have presumably led 
them to copy the task the first way they saw it done) but copied whichever model was present at 
the time. Wood, Kendal and Flynn (2013b) also showed that 5-year-olds can acquire multiple 
ways of performing the same task and will use both solutions flexibly. In such cases children do 
not seem to learn “the correct way” to perform a task: they learn multiple ways and use these 
solutions flexibly.  
There are also theoretical objections against the normativity account. As seen above a 
lot of work looking at children’s understanding of norms has used protest towards third parties 
as evidence of norm understanding (Rakoczy et al., 2009; Schmidt et al., 2012; Keupp et al., 
2013; Keupp et al., 2016). Children verbally protest towards third parties around the age of 2 
(Rakoczy et al., 2009). However Brandl, Esken. Priewasser and Rafetseder (2015) point out that 
protest can be caused by other factors: a) the deviant third party not listening to the model, b) a 
mismatch between what the deviant model says they’re going to do and what they actually do, 
or c) the inability of the deviant third party to follow a rule. As such protest in and of itself is 
not sufficient to establish normative understanding. Brinck (2015) makes a similar objection to 
Rakoczy’s methodology. Normativity implies that there is an ideal behaviour which is the 
“correct” way of performing the task (e.g. “daxing”) in question. However corrective protest 
towards a deviant third party may simply be used to show how daxing is usually performed, not 
how it should be performed. Brinck argues that children see the deviant puppet not as violating 
a social norm (e.g. play peacefully, be nice, take your turn) but merely as not participating in 
the practice of daxing. Children do not believe the puppet is daxing in the wrong way, but 
simply not daxing at all, and thus they tell them how to dax properly. Correcting a 
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misunderstanding is not the same as enforcing a social norm, and full-blown normative 
understanding is unlikely to develop until later in childhood (Köymen, Lieven, Engemann, 
Rakoczy, Warneken & Tomasello, 2014).  
To summarise, normativity explains why children imitate arbitrary actions, even when 
they can see that those actions are unnecessary. An understanding of rules helps explain why 
children will protest against deviant third parties and display high-fidelity imitation, even of 
unnecessary actions. Normativity is not automatically attributed to all situations but is context-
dependent: cues to conventionality may enhance the likelihood of normative status being 
attributed to actions. However children will sometimes deviate from actions shown to them by a 
model (Wood et al., 2013b), and normativity is not attributed in all situations. There is also 
some debate as to how normative children’s understanding of rules is (Brandl et al., 2015), as it 
could be explained with reference to more descriptive rules (Brinck, 2015). Therefore other 
factors should be considered when normativity cannot apply.  
Overall, the theories discussed above all point to different factors to explain why pre-
schoolers display high-fidelity imitation. The theories suggest different functions of imitation: 
the direct perception hypothesis and the ACE account situate imitation within the context of 
reproducing observed goals. If an action seems purposefully directed towards a goal then 
actions unrelated to that goal can be omitted; in contrast if no goal is emphasised for that action 
then movements and goals are imitated equally faithfully. Imitation can also help affiliate with 
the model: interactions with the model reinforce one’s motivation for performing the task in a 
certain way, and the threat of social exclusion enhances one’s desire to perform the task in a 
certain way. Copying other people can also be used to acquire relevant cultural norms. 
Understanding that people have specific, conventional ways of performing a task enhances 
faithful imitation of otherwise arbitrary actions on these task. These theories are not mutually 
exclusive: rather they all highlight the importance of different factors in children’s imitation, 
affecting the likelihood of faithful copying. They thus attempt to explain faithful and selective 
imitation at different ages. The next section will review the main factors that the above theories 
suggest affect imitation, discussing evidence for them in turn. 
4. Factors encouraging high-fidelity imitation  
The preceding review has shown that the mechanisms of imitation based on associative 
learning between actions and effects. However the functions of imitation are more complex, and 
over the course of development higher-order socio-cognitive abilities influence and control 
these lower-level mechanisms. I have reviewed multiple theories that attempt to explain why 
high-fidelity imitation occurs. These theories implicate different factors in children’s social 
learning which will now be reviewed to give a clearer picture of how to investigate imitation in 
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childhood. The factors will be grouped under the headings of model factors and action-related 
factors. 
Model factors 
The identity of the model being imitated and the quality of their relationship to the 
learner have both been implicated in children’s imitation. Live models are copied more 
faithfully than models on video: this effect is present in 2-year-olds (Nielsen et al., 2008) and is 
still present by the age of 8 (Marsh et al., 2014). This effect is driven by the contingency and 
interaction between the learner and the model: one waits until the other is done before doing 
something else (Nielsen et al., 2008; Kcrmar, 2010). It should be noted that a sociable model 
only seems to encourage precise imitation of a model’s exact movements, not of the end goal 
itself. For example, for children aged 24 months a sociable model will encourage precise 
reproduction of a model’s tool use (Nielsen et al., 2008), but the overall goal is reproduced just 
as much if it is modelled by an aloof adult (Nielsen, 2006) or learned by observation in a third-
party context (Nielsen et al., 2012; Shimpi et al., 2013). Similarly if children are exposed to a 
video depicting ostracism, they will imitate a model’s movements (i.e. manipulating a tool a 
certain way) more faithfully than if they are exposed to a neutral prime, but they reproduce the 
goal of the movement (i.e. turning on a light in a box) equally faithfully regardless of the type 
of prime. High-fidelity imitation of the model’s precise actions is thus increased by interactions 
with an engaging model.  
Other model factors are children’s preferences to copy (or avoid) specific models. 
Wood, Kendal and Flynn (2013a) conducted an extensive review of model-based biases in 
children, where they argue that children show tendencies to copy certain types of models. They 
will copy models who intend to teach (who display ostensive pedagogical cues); models who 
are proficient; models belonging to groups that have a reputation for being proficient; models 
that resemble the child themselves; and models who have a high status. There is substantial 
evidence to support these claims. Children’s ability to determine proficient models is 
particularly flexible: for instance 3- to 5-year-olds will prefer to question peers about toys but 
adults about food (Vanderborght & Jaswal, 2009). Children learn to assess an informant’s 
previous reliability and use it to guide their decision-making (Fusaro & Harris, 2008). The 
ability to evaluate reliability improves with age: at age of 3 children are relatively inflexible in 
their judgements, preferring to avoid models who have made one mistake rather than track 
overall reliability (Pasquini et al., 2007). Koenig and Jaswal (2011) remark that 3- and 4-year-
olds show a marked aversion to endorsing labels from models who are marked as incompetent 
in one area, even if the task is in a completely different area. This shows that children aged 4 
years and under display a domain-general reluctance to trust “silly” models. Bernard, Proust 
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and Clement (2015) observed that while 4- and 5-year-olds will prefer to endorse labels 
provided by an unreliable consensus, 6-year-olds will prefer to endorse a reliable dissenter. As 
children age they get better at evaluating the reliability of the model and can go against the 
pressure of an incorrect majority – this ability is still underdeveloped at age 4 (Haun & 
Tomasello, 2011) but seems to be in place by age 6 (Bernard et al., 2015). 
To summarise, there are multiple factors relating to the model that increase imitative 
fidelity. These are if the model is seen as proficient and if they interact directly and in a sociable 
way with the learner. After having considered characteristics of the model, I will now review 
how characteristics of the action affect the likelihood of high-fidelity imitation occurring. 
Action factors 
As mentioned by Gardiner (2014) children aged 3 to 5 used their causal reasoning 
abilities to guide their imitation of a model’s actions. If actions could clearly be seen to be 
irrelevant to the model’s stated goal then it did not matter if they were intentionally performed 
or not, they were not reproduced as frequently as necessary actions. However when the effects 
of actions were unknown (because the apparatus was opaque) children would copy the actions 
more faithfully when they were demonstrated as intentional. This suggests that by 3 years 
children seem to use both their own causal reasoning capabilities and their sensitivity to other 
people’s verbal statements (accidental versus intended actions) to evaluate action importance. In 
Gardiner’s study the demonstration and task was related to retrieving a toy. The actions were 
thus all stated with the end goal of retrieving the toy from the box. If actions could clearly be 
seen to be unrelated to helping achieve this goal (either because the box was transparent or the 
model said “Oh! I didn’t mean to do that!”) then children did not imitate these actions as often. 
In contrast when the effect of the actions was unclear but the model still performed them 
intentionally then children seemed more likely to copy the actions faithfully. This suggests that 
when children can relate actions to specific goals they are more likely to only produce actions 
that seem relevant to that goal. This would fit with the direct perception hypothesis formulated 
by Froese and Leavens (2014): if an action can be related to a goal then actions that are clearly 
relevant to that goal will be imitated. This may also explain why Horner and Whiten (2005) 
found high-fidelity imitation of irrelevant actions with 3- to 4-year-olds using a similar 
paradigm to Gardiner (2014). Horner and Whiten noted in pilot testing that children believed 
the goal of the demonstration to be about copying the model, and thus reproduced even 
irrelevant actions faithfully. In their study they provided children with limited verbal 
instruction, whereas the children in Gardiner’s study were explicitly told that the demonstration 
and the imitation task were all about retrieving the toy. It is therefore possible that the goal of 
“retrieving the toy” was emphasised more in Gardiner’s study which led children to rely on 
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their own causal reasoning abilities more. From these studies we can conclude that the effects of 
actions influence their imitation: if actions relate to an observed goal then the necessary 
components of those actions will be copied more faithfully.  
Children also show greater imitation of actions on objects than of actions on their own 
bodies. Objects have been argued to contain “affordances” which bias children to reproduce the 
actions associated with them (Gibson, 1986). Children learn to imitate actions demonstrated on 
objects earlier in infancy than body movements (Christie & Slaughter, 2009). Object-centred 
interaction has also been suggested to be the primary learning context for infants during the 
second year of life (Whitebread & O’Sullivan, 2011). Kim, Oturai, Kiraly and Knopf (2015) 
demonstrated that at 18 months, infants prefer to copy actions on objects than body movements. 
They also showed that when object actions led to salient effects (e.g. turning on a light, ringing 
a bell) infants imitated them more. However when body movements led to salient social effects 
(e.g. a third model mimics the child) this did not increase imitation over when the body 
movements led to no salient effects. This suggests that for children under 2 years, salient action 
effects may be a crucial factor in imitative fidelity for object-directed actions. As children this 
age did not show increased imitation for body movements that led to salient social effects, it is 
possible that social effects may only increase imitation for older children – this would fit with 
data showing a greater sensitivity to social cues with age (Marsh et al., 2014).  
Children’s preference for copying object actions over body actions may be related to 
the ASL and IMAIL accounts of imitation. Paulus (2014) argues that salient, perceptual effects 
form the common representational format between seeing other people’s actions and our own 
actions. Seeing someone bring about an effect X leads me to perform the actions I have 
associated with effect X. It may take longer to learn to imitate body actions because often the 
perceptual effect is hidden or does not match the actions that I would do to perform it (I cannot 
tell how I look when I smile, but I can see someone else smile; Catmur et al., 2009). It takes 
longer to form associations between observed and performed movements in the absence of 
salient effects, because salient effects help focus one’s attention and are easier to remember. 
When action effects are known and can thus be inferred, we would expect that children will 
copy those action effects more faithfully.  
However salient action effects cannot be the only factor driving imitation for children 
after infancy. As has been seen high-fidelity imitation of arbitrary acts increases throughout 
childhood and even into adulthood (McGuigan et al., 2011; Whiten et al., 2016). If actions can 
be understood within meaningful goals (e.g. they are directed towards achieving a known 
effect) then this goal is the effect that is copied (see also Paulus, 2012a). But as children get 
older they become more and more exposed to situations where there are seemingly no effects to 
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actions, but they are nevertheless performed intentionally. Children above the age of 3 years 
will copy these types of actions (Gardiner, 2014) showing that by this age children do not solely 
copy actions leading to meaningful effects. Infants therefore show a tendency to copy only 
actions leading to salient effects. However older children will copy actions more faithfully if 
they are unaware as to the overall purpose of the action sequence, or if they infer the social goal 
of copying the model. Such a prediction is in line with the direct perception hypothesis (Froese 
& Leavens, 2014) which argues that understanding the purpose of actions should actually lead 
to lower imitation of actions. In contrast when no known goal can be inferred from an action 
then children should copy all parts equally faithfully, forming the social goal of copying the 
model.  
Action factors that affect the likelihood of high-fidelity imitation are the type of action 
(on objects or on one’s body); children’s own action experience; and whether a salient goal can 
be attributed to that action. Younger children and infants seem to focus on reproducing salient 
action effects, whereas above the age of 3 years children will copy intentional actions even if 
they are unsure of their effects or even if they are useless. 
To summarise, there are several factors that have been shown to encourage high-fidelity 
imitation: characteristics of the model and the actions involved will affect the likelihood of their 
being copied. In the final section I will outline how this thesis will help clarify the roles of these 
factors in more detail, and show how previous research has not controlled how the effects of 
these factors changes throughout childhood.  
5. A systematic investigation of high-fidelity imitation throughout childhood 
The above literature review highlights changes that occur in imitation from infancy into 
pre-school age. The same mechanism seems to underlie imitation in infancy up into adulthood 
(Paulus, 2014; Leighton et al., 2010; Mizuguchi et al., 2011). Imitation is driven by experience: 
associations are formed between perceived action effects and motor programs. These 
associations are bi-directional, which lead to action effects triggering the motor program when 
these effects are observed. The mechanism of imitation is thus not specially rational or goal-
driven, but instead works via general associative learning (Catmur et al., 2009). However, as 
children age other factors begin to affect their interactions with others and shape their 
understanding of people’s actions.  
Different theories argue for the role of various socio-cognitive abilities in pre-
schoolers’ imitation. The theory of direct perception claims that children place the actions of 
others into meaningful, goal-oriented categories. They will thus show a predilection to copy 
actions relevant to those goals that are emphasised by the model (Froese & Leavens, 2014; 
Gardiner, 2014; Elsner & Pfeifer, 2012). Some emphasise that imitation also serves a social 
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function, beginning as an early form of communication (Nadel & Fontaine, 1989). This is later 
replaced by language, but imitation continues to foster pro-sociality (Carpenter et al., 2013) and 
is enhanced by social cues such as interactivity (Nielsen et al., 2008) and the threat of ostracism 
(Over & Carpenter, 2009; see also Haun & Tomasello, 2011). In particular social factors 
encourage the imitation fidelity of specific movements rather than reproducing overall action 
effects. Going beyond the model-learner dyad, other theorists claim that imitation comes to be 
situated within the context of culture and norms. Actions presented as cultural conventions will 
be copied more faithfully (Wilks et al., 2016) and children tend to correct models who deviate 
from such conventions (Keupp et al., 2016; Schmidt et al., 2011). In summary after infancy 
imitation comes to serve not merely a function of information acquisition but also becomes a 
powerful tool in navigating one’s socio-cultural environment (Zmyj & Seehagen, 2013; Over & 
Carpenter, 2012). The base mechanism of imitation remains the same, but it comes to be 
modulated by other cognitive abilities (in line with Rumiati et al.’s dual-route model of action 
understanding, 2005).  
A key factor that affects imitation is age: this thesis looks at how children’s copying 
behaviour changes throughout childhood in a standard successive-models imitation task. In this 
task children observe two models who show them different methods of performing the same 
task (e,g,: Nielsen & Blank, 2011; Keupp et al., 2013). Gauging children’s reactions to the two 
models has been used to understand how they interpret the goal of the social learning situation. 
Using the successive-models paradigm across childhood can be used to determine how children 
imitate multiple models on the same task at different ages, and what affects their imitation.  
In Study 1 I therefore present a study on imitation of successive models in children 
aged 2 to 12 years. Successive-models paradigms have been used to disentangle different 
theories of high-fidelity imitation (Nielsen & Blank, 2011; Keupp et al., 2013). In such studies 
children typically observe two models demonstrate two different ways of performing the same 
novel task, after which the child is asked to imitate. No previous studies however have looked at 
such a wide age range, which will show how children from toddlerhood to pre-adolescence 
react to models providing different information. Previous studies have also used either a puppet 
and an adult as the two models (Rakoczy et al., 2008; Keupp et al., 2013) or have allowed the 
two models to demonstrate their actions in one another’s presence (Nielsen & Blank, 2011). 
The two models are thus not identical, and they also tacitly endorse other people doing things in 
a different way. Perhaps not surprisingly studies with inequivalent models have found that 
children endorse the higher-status model’s actions (Keupp et al., 2013) whereas when the two 
models demonstrate their actions in each other’s presence children show no preference for 
either model’s solution but prefer to copy whichever model is present during their own turn 
(Nielsen & Blank, 2011). In Study 1 I therefore eliminated these confounds by having two adult 
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models who demonstrate their actions in each other’s absence. Children saw two models 
demonstrate two different versions of the same novel action, which they referred to by the same 
novel name (e.g. “lopping”). Children were allowed to imitate once after each model, and, after 
having seen the two models, they performed the task a final time in one model’s presence. 
Seeing how 2- to 12-year-old children imitate the two models allowed me to infer how children 
imitate deviant models at different stages in childhood. There was a significant age-related 
change in the way children imitated on this task: notably as children aged they became more 
likely to copy the present model on each turn. Children under 3 years showed faithful imitation 
of the first model, but would not imitate the second model at all. Four- to five-year-olds were 
more likely to also imitate the second model than younger children, but were at chance as to 
who to copy once they had seen both models’ solutions. Above the age of 6 years children 
began to copy whichever model was present, and this tendency grew stronger with age. In later 
childhood children copied whichever model was present without deviation.  
Chapter 3 presents four follow-up studies to investigate this age-related change of 
imitation. Study 2 investigated the effect of labels on children’s imitation. In Study 1 both 
models used the same label but then used different actions. As discussed above children protest 
against seeing third parties doing actions in different ways while announcing they would to the 
same. Children may dislike observing a mismatch between what the model says they will do 
and what they end up doing (Brandl et al., 2015), thus resisting to copy M2 in Study 1. To 
control for this possibility I included a control condition where the two models referred to their 
actions with different labels (e.g. one referred to their actions as “lopping” but the other model 
referred to theirs as “daxing”). If labels affect children’s imitation then children should imitate 
the two models’ actions more faithfully when the two models use different labels. Study 2 
found that there was no effect of labelling on children’s imitation (although there was an effect 
on adults’ imitation) and particularly younger children, like in Study 1, kept imitating the first 
model’s action, suggesting that the preference for the first model’s actions is not driven by an 
inflexible use of labels. 
Study 3 investigated the effect of motor inhibition on children’s imitation of successive 
models in the first Study. Given that the base mechanism of imitation in younger children and 
infants is ideo-motor learning, they show a greater tendency to imitate actions they themselves 
can do (Paulus et al., 2011). This motor resonance may bias children’s imitation in successive-
models paradigms, as having imitated the first model, during the second model’s turn, they 
cannot help but perform the action they have just performed during the first model’s turn. The 
follow-up investigated whether children’s imitation flexibility on a successive-models paradigm 
was influenced by their motor inhibition abilities and by whether or not they were given the 
opportunity to imitate each model in turn. This controlled for whether motor inhibition and 
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ideo-motor learning still bias children’s imitation in the early pre-school years. It was found that 
children’s inhibitory ability did affect their imitation, but only when they needed to inhibit 
performing an action they had previously done. When imitating a model involved adding an 
action, or performing a task for the first time, this was not related to inhibitory ability, 
suggesting that imitation may involve separate faculties depending on the type of action that is 
being performed. 
Study 4 looked at the effect of inequivalent models on children’s imitation in the 
successive-models paradigm. As mentioned above, studies looking at children’s reactions to 
deviant models have typically used puppets as the deviant model (Rakoczy et al., 2008; Schmidt 
et al., 2011; Keupp et al., 2013; Keupp et al., 2016). They also tended to include training phases 
where the puppet was shown to be rather silly (making elementary mistakes on simple tasks) 
and children were encouraged to correct them. This means there are additional cues, beyond 
model identity, that suggest one model is correct and the other is incorrect. In study 4 I tested 
how 3- to 5-year-olds reacted to seeing either the puppet or an adult as the deviant model in the 
successive-models paradigm. I was interested whether children always prefer to imitate adults 
or puppets, or whether their preference depends on the type of action being performed by these 
models (e.g., when one model includes arbitrary actions). Children did indeed prefer to imitate 
the adult over the puppet, showing that under the age of 5 years children are sensitive to model 
identity and use this to decide whether or not to imitate a model. Interestingly, model identity 
also affected children’s ability to omit a previously performed action. 
In Study 5 I looked at how it would affect children’s imitation when different cues 
(model vs. object) are in conflict. Children saw two models demonstrate different action 
sequences, but this time the two models used different versions of the same object. It was then 
varied which model and which object were present when the child was allowed to imitate. In 
some cases the model was present with their own object and in others they had the object used 
by the other, not present model. This set-up investigated whether children would prefer to 
demonstrate the action they had seen the present model perform, or whether they would prefer 
to demonstrate the action they had seen the object used for. Given that the social function of 
imitation seems to emerge around age 2 (Jones, 2007; Kim et al., 2015) and becomes more 
prevalent with age (Yu & Kushnir, 2014; Marsh et al., 2014) it is possible that, as children 
become older, they will prefer to copy the model, rather than what was done on the object. In 
study 5 children were more likely to demonstrate the action of the model who was present than 
the actions performed on the object and this effect was unrelated to age. However, like in 
adults, the effect was stronger if the object present on the child’s turn was that used by the 
present model. This study suggests that pre-school aged children and adults are sensitive to 
objects and models as cues guiding their imitation.  
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Overall the results from Chapter 3 suggest that imitation is not a unitary ability but is 
affected by distinct factors such as model identity, object affordances, motor experience and 
inhibitory ability, but not novel labels. Finding no effect of label suggests that in the type of 
game context used here, imitation fidelity is not primarily determined by action labels. The 
finding that imitation is related to inhibitory ability fits with accounts such as IMAIL and ASL 
which stress that imitation uses the same generalist processes involved in other instances of 
perception and action production. The findings from Study 4 (the Puppet study) and Study 5 
(contrasting the effect of the object or the model) also suggest that model presence and model 
identity can influence lower-level mechanisms of imitation. This further reinforces the idea that 
imitation is a composite ability which is affected by action production abilities and higher-order 
cognitive processes.  
As mentioned above the evidence from Chapter 3 suggests that imitation can be 
affected by more complex cognitive factors than just generalist processes of action production. 
Taking this further, and following previous work on goal-oriented action understanding, 
Chapter 4 investigated the effect of action goals and context on high-fidelity imitation. As 
discussed above, whether actions can be related to meaningful goals affects the likelihood of 
their being copied faithfully (Gardiner, 2014; Elsner & Pfeifer, 2012; Froese & Leavens, 2014). 
Whilst infants tend not to copy meaningless actions (Jones, 2007) and prefer to copy actions 
with salient effects (Kim et al., 2015), in the absence of meaningful goals pre-schoolers seem 
equally likely to copy movements as well as end effects (Mizuguchi et al., 2011). Schachner 
and Carey (2013) suggest that one reason for this is that as children age they become more 
exposed to actions where the movement is an end goal in itself. This would for instance be the 
case for dancing and ritualistic actions (in line with Wilks et al., 2016; Herrmann et al., 2013). 
Adults infer such movement-based goals for actions demonstrated without context or evident 
effects (Schachner & Carey, 2013). This is also compatible with the direct-perception 
hypothesis which argues that actions are represented in terms of their likely goals from an 
evaluation of the context (Froese & Leavens, 2014).  
The aim of Chapter 4 was to determine whether children aged between 3 and 5 years 
would also interpret actions as having movement-based goals if these were performed without 
evident external goals. If so then it was predicted that actions would be imitated more faithfully 
when movement-based goals were inferred. This was what was confirmed in Study 6: pre-
schoolers imitated body- and object-directed actions more faithfully when these were performed 
without context, replicating previous findings (Bekkering et al., 2000). Study 7 extended this 
finding by seeing whether children’s imitation of action sequences was affected by emphasising 
that the action sequences had two distinct, unrelated external goals, or a specific movement 
which led to an external goal. Replicating the results from Study 6 pre-schoolers imitated 
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actions more faithfully when they could be related to a movement-based goal than when they 
could be related to distinct external goals. In comparing the results from Studies 6 and 7, 
children were shown to imitate actions more faithfully when movement-based goals could be 
inferred, even when the amount of actions and objects present was the same. This suggests that 
by age 3 years, children’s imitation of actions is indeed affected by the goals that can be 
associated with those actions, and that pre-schoolers, like adults (Schachner & Carey, 2013), 
readily interpret actions performed without contexts as having movement-based goals. 
The findings from the above chapters will be discussed in the concluding chapter 5. I 
will argue that from the findings in this thesis and from previous research, imitation does not 
seem to be a unitary ability, but is modulated by a number of general action production abilities. 
Thus children will only be able to imitate an action faithfully if they have the potential to 
produce that action. However high-fidelity imitation will occur if children can infer a 
movement-based goal to the model’s actions. This shows that pre-schoolers’ evaluations of 
action goals also affect their imitation of those actions. These evaluations change throughout 
childhood, as children become more susceptible to social cues and will be more likely to imitate 
faithfully with age. Imitation is affected by children’s interpretations of the action in question, 
and from pre-school age onwards children use their action understanding capabilities to infer 
likely goals about actions which therefore modulate their copying behaviour. Imitation can 
therefore be affected by higher-order cognitive processes in a top-down manner, like perception 
(as when expectancies bias one’s perceptions). Overall the evidence suggests that, as posited by 
generalist accounts of imitation, there is not one simple imitative skill but rather a multitude of 
abilities subserving the ability to replicate another’s actions. Finally I will highlight directions 
for future research and I conclude by showing that imitation is affected both by what the child 











Imitation is a particularly efficient means for children to acquire new skills. By 
copying other people’s actions children learn how to use new tools (e.g., Whiten & 
Flynn, 2010) and thereby avoid costly trial-and-error learning (Gardiner, Bjorklund, 
Greif, & Gray, 2012; Gardiner, 2014). Imitation also helps acquire relevant cultural 
knowledge (Gergely & Csibra, 2005) and is a way of communicating and socializing 
with others (Nadel & Fontaine, 1989; Nadel, 2002; Over & Carpenter, 2012). As such 
imitation can serve multiple functions, such as knowledge acquisition and affiliation 
with a person or a social group.  
The type of function may be defined through the context in which an action is 
presented and can affect the way children copy: for example, 2-year-olds are more 
likely to copy non-functional actions (e.g., removing a latch from door A before 
opening door B) in a social context (‘Copy-Me’) than in a learning context (‘Find-the-
piece’, Yu & Kushnir, 2014). Similarly in some contexts children imitate selectively 
(e.g. they copy intentional but not accidental actions, Carpenter, Akhtar & Tomasello, 
1998; Gardiner, Greif, & Bjorklund, 2011; Hoicka & Gattis, 2008; see emulation, 
Wood, 1989; Tomasello, 1990) whereas in other contexts they imitate overly faithfully 
(e.g. they copy actions non-functional to the goal, Horner & Whiten, 2005; Nagell, 
Olguin & Tomasello, 1993; see over-imitation, Lyons, Young, & Keil, 2007).  
As the function of imitation affects the way children copy, a crucial question is 
whether this changes throughout childhood. There are a number of changes in imitation 
with age. Children under the age of 2 years prefer to imitate actions on objects that lead 
to obvious consequences (e.g. tapping a hammer on a peg to put it through a hole) than 
body movements that do not have salient effects (i.e. arbitrary actions; Christie & 
Slaughter, 2009; Kim et al., 2015). This is presumably because salient action 
consequences can be associated easily with specific movements (Paulus, 2014). During 
the second year of life, however, infants spontaneously begin to mimic others during 
play (Nadel & Fontaine, 1989), and children’s imitation of arbitrary actions without 
salient external effects also increases during their second year. Imitation of arbitrary 
actions even increases beyond infancy, as older children and adults copy arbitrary 
actions more faithfully than younger toddlers (McGuigan, Makinson & Whiten, 2011). 
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As children age they also become more likely to display high-fidelity imitation in the 
absence of instructions to do so (Moraru, Gomez & McGuigan, 2016; Whiten, Allan, 
Devlin, Kseib, Raw & McGuigan. 2016; Yu & Kushnir, 2014). This could be taken as 
evidence that the social function of imitation becomes more important for children with 
age: to copy what the model does faithfully without being told to do so could indicate 
that the learner wants to affiliate with the model, and, as high-fidelity imitation 
increases with age, older children may imitate for social reasons more than younger 
children.    
A useful way of assessing how children interpret a model’s actions (and 
subsequently imitate) has been to analyse children’s imitation of successive models 
(e.g. Rakoczy, Warneken & Tomasello, 2008). In this paradigm, children observe two 
models, Model 1 (M1) and Model 2 (M2) who demonstrate slightly different ways of 
performing the same task (which is referred to by the same label, for example 
“daxing”). Children’s imitation of the two models gives some indication of the way 
they interpret the actions of the models and thus how they feel they should imitate. For 
example, children may interpret the first action sequence as the correct way to perform 
the task and therefore not imitate the second model at all. This would indicate that 
children view one action sequence as the “correct” way of performing the task. They 
may in contrast show no preference for either action sequence and instead focus on 
copying the actions of whichever model is present, showing a social goal of affiliation 
with their counterpart. 
Up until now successive-models paradigms have mostly been used to look at the 
imitation of pre-school aged children (e.g. Keupp, Behne & Rakoczy, 2013; Nielsen & 
Blank, 2011; Rakoczy, Warneken & Tomasello, 2008; Rakoczy, Brosche, Warneken & 
Tomasello, 2009; Rakoczy, Hamann, Warneken & Tomasello, 2010; Schmidt, Rakoczy 
& Tomasello, 2011, 2012; Schleihauf, Graetz, Pauen & Hoehl, 2017). The task has 
been used to clarify the function of imitation in pre-schoolers, but it remains to be seen 
how children react to multiple models at later stages in childhood.  
The present study set out to collect data on a large age range to measure 
children’s imitation between the ages of 2 to 12 years using a successive-models 
paradigm. The design of the task was similar to that used by Nielsen and Blank (2011): 
one model demonstrated a functional action (F), such as opening a lid to move a toy, 
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and another model demonstrated an arbitrary action2 (A; see Nielsen, Kapitány & 
Elkins, 2015)—prior to the functional action (F)—that had no bearing on the goal (e.g., 
brushing the lid in circular motions). Hence, one model showed only action F, whereas 
the other model demonstrated action A prior to action F.  
Unlike in Nielsen and Blank’s study, the two models acted in each other’s 
absence (i.e., one model always left the room) so that children would not encode the 
situation as one adult teaching the other, or interpret their non-interference in the other 
adult’s turn as tacit consent that the task could be done either way. Additionally, and 
again unlike Nielsen and Blank, both models labelled their actions in the same way 
(e.g., “Lopping”). It was important to establish the same context in which the two 
models were presenting their actions, because children, like adults, assume that objects 
exist for a purpose (Kelemen, 1999). But because objects can have different 
affordances, and as such serve a different function for different people, without using 
the same context, this would resolve the ambiguity of what to do in a model’s presence 
(see also Rakoczy et al., 2008). Additionally, children were asked to do the task (e.g., to 
lopp) after each demonstration: Nielsen & Blank, in contrast, had children only watch 
the models. If children only observe the models, they may not be as involved in the 
task: having children imitate each model in turn thus means that children will have 
previous experience of “lopping” when they see M2 attempt to do it in a different way. 
Also, the first model came back again and—without demonstrating any further 
actions—asked the child to do the task a third time thus establishing which of the 
modelled actions the child would reproduce.  
This design will provide insight into how children interpret the actions of the 
two models, and thus reveal the function they attribute to imitation in this setting. If 
children conceive of the task as a learning situation, where the goal is to learn how to 
produce the effect of the functional action, then they should show low imitation of the 
arbitrary action, especially once they have seen the task performed without it. In 
contrast if they conceive of the task primarily in a social way, then they should copy 
both models relatively faithfully regardless of the actions these models use. Due to age 
differences in previous studies, particularly the increase in high-fidelity imitation with 
                                                          
2 The term “arbitrary” rather than non-functional is used because in some of the tasks 
the apparatus was transparent and in others the apparatus was opaque. In the latter cases 
the non-functionality of the action remained unclear, therefore arbitrary better 
represents the status of these actions for the children. 
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age (Hilbrink, Sakkalou, Ellis-Davies, Fowler & Gattis, 2013; Marsh et al., 2014; 
McGuigan, et al., 2011; Nielsen, 2006; Nielsen & Tomaselli, 2010; Yu & Kushnir, 
2014) it is predicted that imitation fidelity for both models will increase with age. 
It was also manipulated how easily the arbitrary action A could be seen to be 
non-functional. Horner and Whiten (2005) observed that, unlike chimpanzees, 3- to 5-
year-old children copied non-functional actions equally regardless of whether they 
could see their effects or not (but not younger children – see McGuigan & Whiten, 
2009). In this study there were some tasks where the arbitrary action A could clearly be 
seen to have no effect on the goal (transparent tasks), and other tasks where its effect 
was unclear (opaque tasks). If children are influenced by the effectiveness of the actions 
to produce a salient effect (e.g. Lyons et al., 2007) then they should imitate arbitrary 
actions less frequently in the transparent tasks. In contrast, if children’s imitation is 
socially motivated, whether or not they see the effect of the arbitrary action A, should 
not matter. 
METHODS 
Participants. The study recruited 105 children from Scottish schools, playgroups and 
nurseries. Two children were excluded for uncooperativeness. The final sample 
consisted of 103 children (Mage = 94 months, SD = 37 months, age ranging from 26 
months to 155 months, 50 male). The sample was divided into six groups: 17 2- to 3-
year-olds (M = 39 months, SD = 5 months, 8 male), 17 4- to 5-year-olds (M = 61 
months, SD = 6 months, 9 male), 17 6- to 7-year-olds (M = 85 months, SD = 6 months, 
9 male), 17 8- to 9-year-olds, (M = 107 months, SD = 7 months, 8 male), 18 10- to 11-
year-olds (M = 128 months, SD = 5 months, 6 male), and 17 11- to 12-year-olds (M = 
143 months, SD = 5 months, 10 male). All children were typically developing for their 
age. At all locations parental consent was granted prior to testing, and ethical approval 
was provided by the University’s Ethics Committee.  
Design. Each child observed four tasks (Lopping, Trepping, Chokking and Mooshing). 
The order of the tasks was counterbalanced in a Latin Square Design. In each task 
children saw two models, one who demonstrated only the functional action (F) and the 
other one who demonstrated the arbitrary action (A) prior to the functional action (F). 
Each child saw two tasks where the first model (M1) demonstrated F and the second 
model (M2) demonstrated AF (Ffirst condition), and two tasks in the reverse order 
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(AFfirst condition). In both conditions children saw one transparent task and one opaque 
task, either in a transparent-opaque-transparent-opaque order or an opaque-transparent-
opaque-transparent order. Different pairs of experimenters collected the data, but all 
experimenters were white females in their early twenties. Experimenter identity was 
counterbalanced.  



















Table 1. Materials and actions used for the games in Study 1. 
Label - Transparency Materials Functional Action (F) Arbitrary Action (A) 
Lopping / Transparent 
 
 
A plastic food 
container, a small dog 
plush toy, a small 
wicker basket and a 
toothbrush. 
Opening the container lid with 
the goal of placing the dog toy 
in the basket 
Brushing the top of the 
container with the 
toothbrush 
Mooshing / Transparent 
 
 
A CD case containing 
marbles, a small 
golden ring and a 
plastic container 
Opening the CD case, with the 
goal of moving a marble into 
the plastic container 
Removing a ring from the 
centre of the CD case 




A cardboard box, a 
small caterpillar toy, a 
plastic container and 
some marbles in a 
green cup 
Lifting the caterpillar out of the 
side of a box with the goal of 
moving it to the container 
Placing a marble in the 
top hole of the box (into a 
separate hidden 
compartment) 




A big plastic jug, a 
plastic wand, some 
marbles in a cup and 
an additional plastic 
cup 
Placing marbles in the jug with 
the goal of pouring them into an 
empty cup 
Using the wand to stir the 
marbles in the jug 
Note. Portrayed are the four different games, their names and transparency as well as 
the respective functional and arbitrary actions. 
 
Children were tested individually in a separate room. At the beginning M1 and M2 
introduced themselves, upon which M2 left the room (M2 was still able to see M1 and 
the child from their position outside the room as the door was left open, however the 
child was always placed with their back to the door). M1 and the child sat down at a 
table, with the child opposite M1 and the materials hidden next to M1 in a box. In the 
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meantime M1 demonstrated the first action sequence, either F or AF, using the novel 
label for that task “OK, we are going to play a game: this game is called [name of task] 
and this is how it goes”.  
Ffirst condition. M1 demonstrated the functional action (F) and said “That is how 
you [name of task]”. They reset the apparatus and performed the task a second time and 
announced “OK, that is how you [name of task]”. M1 reset the apparatus again and said 
“OK, now it’s your go to [name of task].” The child was then allowed to perform the 
action and their behavioural and verbal responses were recorded.  
After the child responded M1 reset the apparatus and left the room, upon which 
M2 entered the room and sat where M1 sat before saying “Now I’m going to [name of 
task], watch carefully”. M2 then performed both the arbitrary action (A) and the 
functional action (F), stating “This is how you [name of task]”. They reset the apparatus 
and performed the actions again, concluding with “That is how you [name of task].” M2 
reset the apparatus and announced “Now it’s your go to [name of task]”. The child was 
allowed to respond and M2 recorded their responses.  
M2 then reset the devices and left the room. M1 returned, sat down and said 
“You know how to [name of task]. Can you do it one more time?” This time M1 did not 
demonstrate any actions. The child’s final response was recorded. Then M1 said “Now 
we’re going to play a new game”. The apparatus was removed and the materials for the 
next task were set up. 
AFfirst condition. The procedure and script were identical to the Ffirst condition, 
except that M1 demonstrated the action sequence containing both arbitrary (A) and 
functional (F) actions, whereas M2 demonstrated the functional action (F) only. 
If a child did not respond during their turn then the model waited 5 seconds 
before saying “go on, it’s your turn, you can have a go”. If the child still did not 
respond the model said “I will show you the game again, OK?” before demonstrating 
the solution a third time and resetting the apparatus. This occurred once for two of the 
2- to 3-year-olds.  
Scoring. Children gave 12 responses overall (three for each of the four tasks) which 
were recorded during the testing sessions. For reliability purposes, both M1 and M2 
recorded the child’s responses. Both models kept an individual scoring sheet d – M1 
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had theirs next to the table for data collection and M2 had theirs next to their waiting 
spot outside of the room (from which they could see the child). Both models recorded 
children’s responses to M1, M2 and M1rep and then were able to compare their notes 
after each child. There were no disagreements between the models.  
Children received one point if they demonstrated the action used by the model present. 
By omitting part or all of that model’s action sequence or doing something unrelated the 
child was considered not to have imitated and received a score of 0. To identify how 
often children copied each model an overall score for each model was computed. The 
M1 score thereby refers to how often children copied the first model across all four 
tasks (M1max= 4). The M2 score refers to how often children copied the second model 
across the four tasks (M2max= 4), and the M1rep score refers to how often children 
demonstrated M1’s action upon her return (Mrepmax= 4). 
To distinguish between instances when children omitted arbitrary actions versus 
doing something incomplete or unrelated, each child’s individual response patterns 
were identified. This allowed determining whether children copy M1 on all three trials 
(M1-M1-M1 pattern), whether they switch between M1 and M2 consistently (M1-M2-
M1 pattern) or whether they prefer copying M2’s actions once they have seen them 
(M1-M2-M2 pattern).  
As previous successive-models paradigms like the one used here have been used 
to assess children’s normative understanding (Keupp, Behne & Rakoczy, 2013) a 
protest score was calculated for each child. Based on Keupp et al. (2013) different types 
of protest were coded: If children used explicit normative language to rebuke the adult 
(“No, you must do it like this”) they were deemed to have displayed normative protest 
and received a score of 3. If they told the model to do/not do something in a certain way 
it was coded as imperative protest and received a score of 2. If children used commands 
(“No!”) or tried to correct the adult physically this was coded as a hint of protest and 
was given a score of 1. No protest received a score of 0.  
RESULTS 
Preliminary analysis. There was no difference for the imitation scores M1, M2, and 
M1rep between the four different tasks, Cochran’s χ2 all ps > .25. The sum imitation 
scores M1, M2 and M1rep were also similar for boys and girls, t-tests all ps > .43. 
Children did not preferentially imitate either of the experimenters in any of the pairs for 
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M1, M2 or M1rep scores, all ps > .5. As none of these analyses revealed significant 
effects, data was collapsed across these variables and not analysed further. 
Imitation scores. A mixed factorial repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted on the 
imitation scores with model (M1, M2, M1rep) and transparency (transparent vs opaque) 
as within subject factors and condition order (Ffirst or AFfirst) and age-groups (6 levels) 
as between subject factors. There was a main effect of model, F(2, 182) = 54.83, p < 
.001, partial η2=.38, such that M1 was copied without deviation (M = 2.0, SE = .0). In 
contrast, M2 (M = 1.45, SE = .04) and M1rep (M = 1.51, SE = .06) were copied at equal 
rates (Within-Subjects contrast, F(1, 91) = .46, p = .46), but less faithfully than M1, 
F(1, 91) = 288.09, p < .001. Neither transparency (F(1, 91) = .73, p = .40, partial 
η2=.008) nor order of conditions, Ffirst or AFfirst, (F(1, 91) = .09, p = .76, partial η2=.001) 
affected imitation scores.  
As predicted, age affected imitation scores to a great extent, F(5, 91) = 27.64, p 
< .001, η2=.60. With increasing age children copied more faithfully overall, r = .75, p < 
.001. Bonferroni corrections were applied to LSD post-hoc tests to control for the 
increased number of comparisons between the 6 age groups: the adjusted significant p 
value was .0033 (given that there were six age groups and fifteen comparisons to be 
made between them). The post-hoc tests revealed that the 2- to 3-year-olds, 4- to 5-
year-olds and 6- to 7-year-olds had similar imitation scores overall (highest Mdif = -
.218, SE = .072, p = .046) but they were all less accurate imitators than the 10- to 11-
year-olds and the 11- to 12-year-olds (smallest Mdiff = .366, SE = .069, p > .001). The 
8- to 9-year-olds had significantly higher imitation scores than the 2- to 3-year-olds and 
4- to 5-year-olds (smallest Mdiff = .363, SE = .072, p > .001), but the 6- to 7-year-olds 
and 8- to 9-year-olds did not have significantly different imitation scores, p = .654. The 
8- to 9-year-olds had significantly lower imitation scores than the 11- to 12-year-olds 
(Mdiff = -.276, SE = .071, p = .0027) but not the 10- to 11-year-olds, p = .031. Finally 
the 10- to 11-year-olds and 11- to 12-year-olds did not imitate significantly differently 
from one another, p = 1. Figure 1 displays the sum imitation scores for M1, M2 and 
M1rep split up for the 6 age groups. The results from both the figure and the post-hoc 
analyses suggest that there were several distinct steps in children’s imitation: M2 
imitation scores were not as high as M1 scores until after age 5, and M1rep scores only 
reached ceiling levels for children above 9 years. 
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While the effect of condition order (Ffirst or AFfirst) was not significant in the 
analysis, Table 2 displays the imitation scores for the FFirst and AFFirst conditions for the 
6 different age groups to clarify the data in more detail. As can be seen, the only 
apparent difference between the FFirst and AFFirst condition was for the 4- to 5-year-olds. 
In this age group children imitated M2 more in the FFirst condition than in the AFFirst 
condition, and also imitated M1rep less in the FFirst condition than in the AFFirst 
condition. This means that the 4- to 5-year-olds preferred to copy the arbitrary action 
once they had seen it, leading to them copying either M1’s actions throughout in the 
AFFirst condition or switching to M2’s action in the FFirst condition. However the 
conditions were not significantly different in the main analysis, and no other age groups 
had different scores between the two conditions. 
 
Figure 1. Mean M1, M2 and M1rep imitation scores across all tasks between age groups. 

































Model 1 Model 2 Model 1rep 
F First AF First F First AF First F First AF First 
2- to 3-year-olds 2 (0) 2 (0) .24 (.54) .12 (.49) 1.94 (.24) 2 (0) 
4- to 5-year-olds 2 (0) 2 (0) 1.65 (.79) .12 (.49) .41 (.8) 1.88 (.49) 
6- to 7-year-olds 2 (0) 2 (0) 1.77 (56) 1.71 (.59) .82 (.95) .88 (.99) 
8- to 9-year-olds 2 (0) 2 (0) 1.94 (.24) 1.94 (.24) 1 (.91) 1.12 (.93) 
10- to 11-year-olds 2 (0) 2 (0) 2 (0) 1.94 (.24) 1.84 (.5) 1.78 (.55) 
11- to 12-year-olds 2 (0) 2 (0) 2 (0) 2 (0) 1.88 (.49) 2 (0) 
 
Table 2. Mean M1, M2 and M1rep imitation scores for all six age groups in both the 
FFirst and AFFirst conditions. Figures in brackets are standard errors.  
Age also interacted with the model scores M1, M2, M1rep, F(10, 182) = 26.87, p 
< .001, partial η2=.60. M1 was imitated perfectly by children of all ages. However M2 
and M1rep imitation scores varied with age. A simple linear regression confirmed that 
M2 imitation scores increased with age, F(1, 101) = 207.56, p < .001 with an R2 of .67, 
thereby increasing imitation accuracy by .035 points for every month. Therefore as 
children aged they became more likely to imitate M2. For M1rep scores the data 
appeared u-shaped, so a hierarchical multiple regression, using age in months in Block 
1 and age in months squared in Block 2 was conducted. Age in months did not explain 
any of the variance, F(1, 101) = 1.17, p = .28. However, when age in months squared 
was added as a predictor (b = 3.013, p < .001) the regression equation was significant, 
R2 = .311, F(1, 100) = 22.56, p < .001.This confirms that the youngest children 
reproduced M1’s actions more precisely on her return than did pre-school aged 
children, but imitation fidelity for M1rep increased again in pre-adolescence.  
Response Pattern. If a child demonstrated M1’s actions on all three trials within a task, 
it was coded as M1-M1-M1. If a child demonstrated what M1 did on the first round, but 
then demonstrated M2’s actions for the following two rounds it was coded as M1-M2-
M2. Finally, children who demonstrated actions of whichever model was present in the 
room were coded as M1-M2-M1. Figure 2 displays the occurrences of the different 
response patterns in each age group. Overall children replicated M1’s actions on all 
three turns (M1-M1-M1 pattern) 92 times (28%). This pattern was only shown by 2- to 
3-year-olds (n = 60) and 4- to 5-year-olds (n = 32). The model-dependent imitation 
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(M1-M2-M1 pattern) was shown 174 times (52%), and was mainly present from 6 years 
onwards with increasing frequency (2- to 3-year-olds: n = 4; 6- to 7-year-olds: n = 18; 
8- to 9-year-olds: n = 28; 10- to 11-year-olds: n = 58; 11- to 12-year-olds: n = 66). 
Finally, copying M1 but then switching to M2 (M1-M2-M2 pattern) was observed 66 
times (20%). It was present from 4 years onwards with decreasing frequency (4- to 5-
year-olds: n = 26; 6- to 7-year-olds: n = 20; 8- to 9-year-olds: n = 16; 10- to 11-year-
olds: n = 2; 11- to 12-year-olds: n = 2). The age-groups differed in frequency for all 
three patterns (M1M1M1: Kruskal-Wallis χ2 (6) = 85.67, p < .001; M1M2M2: Kruskal-
Wallis χ2 (5) = 33.04, p < .001; M1M2M1: Kruskal-Wallis χ2 (5) = 78.30, p < .001). As 
children got older, the M1M1M1 pattern decreased, r = -.812, p < .001, while the 
M1M2M1 pattern increased in frequency, r = .744, p < .001. The M1M2M1 pattern 
also decreased with age, but marginally significantly, r = -.192, p = .052. 
 
Figure 2. Frequencies for different response patterns occurring in each age group. 
Protest. Explicit protest was rare, with only nine incidents of normative protest (e.g. 
“No, you need to do this”). There were, however, 15 instances of imperative protest 
(where the child told the adult to do something/not do something) and 43 instances of 
hints of protest (where the child only said “No!” or corrected the adult physically). 
Figure 3 displays the occurrences of different types of protest within each age group. 
Protest occurred exclusively on M2 trials. Six instances of normative protest occurred 
































imperative protest occurred for the 2- to 3-year-olds, 7 for the 4- to 5-year-olds and two 
occurred for the 10- to 11-year-olds. 
 
 
Figure 3. Frequencies of protest occurrences within each age group. 
The protest scores for the Ffirst tasks were subtracted from the protest scores for 
the AFfirst tasks. This produced a protest difference score for each participant: if it was 
positive then the participant protested more when M2 omitted an action. If it was 
negative then the child protested more when M2 added an action. The 2- to 3-year-olds 
(M = .41, S.D. = 1.37), the 6- to 7-year-olds (M = -.12, S.D. = .33), the 8- to 9-year-olds 
(M = 0, S.D. = 35), the 10- to 11-year-olds (M = .28, S.D. = .75) and the 11- to 12-year-
olds (M = .06, S.D. = .9) responded very similarly in the two conditions, as indicated by 
a one-sample t-test with the chance value set at 0, all ps > .13. In contrast, 4- to 5-year-
olds protested significantly more when M2 omitted an action than when she added an 
action (M = .88, S.D. = 1.2), t(16) = 2.99, p = .009, which is consistent with the finding 
that they preferred to imitate M2 when she added an action.  
DISCUSSION 
Study 1 investigated how children’s imitation of successive models changed 
with age. Two adults demonstrated the same functional action (e.g., opening a lid to 
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the lid in circular motions). In some conditions the arbitrariness of the added action was 
transparent, while in others it was not.  
The results show that the youngest group, aged 26 to 47 months, copied 
whatever M1 did without deviating from this solution even after having observed a 
different way of attempting the task by another model. This will be referred to as 
perseverative imitation, as children persevered with the actions demonstrated by M1 
rather than switching to M2’s actions. In contrast, children aged 4 to 5 years copied the 
second model when she added an arbitrary action, but not when she omitted it. This 
meant that they always preferred the longer solution once they had seen it and protested 
against omitting an action. The 6- to 7-year-olds and the 8- to 9-year-olds were more 
likely to copy the second model, compared with the younger age groups, regardless of 
the condition (i.e., whether the model added or omitted an action), but they were 
equally likely to demonstrate M1’s or M2’s actions upon M1’s return (M1rep). In 
contrast, the oldest children, aged from 10 to 12 years, imitated whoever was present in 
the room, displaying what will be termed model-dependent imitation. They thereby 
obtained near ceiling imitation scores for all trials, making them so-called “super-
imitators” (Custance, Prato-Previde, Spiezio, Rigamonti, & Poli, 2006). Overall, 
imitation fidelity increased with age, a finding in line with previous studies (e.g. Marsh 
et al., 2014; McGuigan et al., 2011, Nielsen, 2006).  
A study supporting these findings in pre-schoolers has recently been published 
by Schleihauf, Graetz, Pauen and Hoehl (2017, Experiment 1) who investigated 
imitation in 5-year-olds. In a similar design to the present study, children observed two 
models demonstrate different ways of retrieving a marble from an apparatus and were 
given two opportunities to retrieve these marbles, once after each model’s turn. Unlike 
the current study, however, models were not present for the children’s turns and 
children were not given a third turn. Overall Schleihauf et al. found that once children 
had imitated a model’s arbitrary actions whilst obtaining a marble, they did not 
subsequently omit this arbitrary solution even when they saw the other model do so. 
This finding mirrors the results for the AFfirst condition in the current study, in which 
the 4- and 5-year-olds continued using arbitrary actions even after having observed a 
model use the functional action only. Also mirroring the present results, Schleihauf et 
al.’s Experiment 2a had M2 demonstrate the arbitrary action (i.e., Ffirst condition) and 
children were marginally significantly more likely to perform arbitrary actions once 
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they had observed them (this difference became significant when data were combined 
with Experiment 2b).  
The findings from the current Study 1 can be examined using predictions made 
by existing theories of imitation. Firstly, consider the automatic causal encoding theory 
(Lyons et al., 2007). If children copy arbitrary actions faithfully because they assume 
every intentional action is causally relevant to achieve a goal then they should only 
copy the functional action once they have seen it done alone. No age groups exhibited 
this response, indicating that a distorted causal belief does not seem to be directing 
children’s imitation in this set-up. This is further supported by the absence of 
differences between the opaque and transparent tasks. Previously some studies did 
report a difference between transparent and opaque set-ups (e.g., Lyons et al., 2007; 
Gardiner, 2014), but other studies have not (e.g., Horner & Whiten, 2005; Kenward et 
al., 2011; McGuigan & Whiten, 2009; McGuigan et al., 2007). In the present study the 
tasks were described as games: in such cases causality is not always the most important 
concern, and an element of arbitrariness is always present in games and conventions 
(Wilks et al., 2016). Given that the tasks in Study 1 were described as games, children 
may not have focussed on achieving the effect in the most efficient way possible.
 Another account of children’s imitation emphasises the importance of 
normativity and conventions (Rakoczy et al., 2008; Wilks et al., 2016). Previously 
successive-models paradigms have often shown that children will not imitate a deviant 
model who attempts to perform a known task in a novel way – pre-schoolers will 
perform the task in the way performed by the first model (an adult), and protest against 
a puppet who does the task in a different way (Rakoczy et al., 2008; Keupp et al., 
2013). The current Study 1 extended these findings by examining how children imitated 
successive models who were both adults. A preference for M1’s actions was observed in 
pre-school aged children, as they imitated M1’s actions more than M2’s actions. In 
particular the very youngest children, aged between two and 3 years, imitated M1 on all 
three turns. These children may have interpreted the actions of M1 as normative, the 
“correct” way of performing the task. The vast majority of incidents of protest towards 
M2 also occurred for children under 5 years, which according to Rakoczy and 
colleagues suggests that these children viewed M2’s actions as “incorrect”, implying a 
normative understanding of the task. It could therefore be argued that children under the 
age of 5, and particularly the 2- to 3-year-olds, viewed M1’s actions as normative, and 
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imitated M1 more than M2 because M1 was considered to have demonstrated the 
“correct” way of playing the game. 
A caveat with this interpretation however is that children’s rule understanding is 
flexible enough to produce different responses on the same stimuli by this age: Zelazo 
and Frye (1998) presented evidence that 3-year-olds can use two rules to sort cards 
provided these rules are not incompatible (e.g. “if the card is red, it goes in this pile, if it 
is blue, it goes in this pile”). In line with this, 3-year-olds protest against a puppet’s 
mistakes when these mistakes are made in a context where the rules apply (“This is how 
to dax”), but not in the context in which these rules do not apply (Rakoczy et al., 2009). 
This shows that by age 3 children may use rules like “if in context A, you do this; if not 
in context A, you don’t have to do this”. In the current study, 3-year-olds could 
therefore have been able to use the rule, for example, “if M1 is present, do F; If M2 is 
present, do AF”. This would seem especially likely as, unlike previous successive-
models studies (Rakoczy et al., 2008, 2009; Keupp et al., 2013), the two models in 
Study 1 were of equal status (i.e. two adults, neither of whom was presented as making 
silly mistakes). Children would thus have no reason to assume that one model was more 
likely to be correct than the other. Such an interpretation should have led children to 
copy M1 and M2 faithfully. As children under 5 years did not present such normative 
flexibility, it seems less likely that their imitation of M1 over M2 was due to rigid 
normative understanding.   
Given that children’s low imitation of M2 was unlikely to be due to a rigid 
understanding of norms, the role of other factors should be considered. One possibility 
is that children’s imitation on this task may have been constrained by the fact that the 
two models referred to their actions with the same novel label (e.g. “lopping”). Brandl 
et al. (2015) argued that one factor driving children’s protest towards deviant models in 
successive-models tasks is because the two models typically use the same label to refer 
to their actions, and children may dislike this. More specifically children may protest 
against the fact that M2 says they will do some action labelled F, and then perform a 
different action AF. This would not necessarily require an understanding of 
normativity, as protest towards a deviant model can be about their deviance from a 
statistical expectancy or from a constitutive rule, without entailing the punitive action 
that follows breaking social norms (Brinck, 2015). Children are sensitive to the labels 
and contexts models use for describing their actions and modulate their protest 
accordingly: pre-schoolers protest more against a puppet’s deviant actions if the puppet 
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attempts their new action in the context associated with a known action than when the 
puppet performs deviant actions in a neutral context (Rakoczy, Brosche, Warneken & 
Tomasello, 2009). In the present study the two models referred to their actions by the 
same label and used the same materials, which may have made the young pre-schoolers 
less likely to imitate M2’s actions. 
There is another interpretation that can explain the imitation pattern for the 
children under 5 years. Rather than being inflexible in their understanding of labels, the 
youngest children in Study 1 may have simply found it difficult to imitate the two 
models’ actions on the same task. Imitation is driven by one’s own action experience: 
whether children will imitate depends on their experience performing the action in 
question (Hunnius & Bekkering, 2014; Paulus, Hunnius, Vissers & Bekkering, 2011; 
Gampe, Prinz & Daum, 2015). The IMAIL and ASL accounts of imitation stress that 
imitation is driven by action experience, which forms associations between an observed 
effect and the movements producing that effect (Catmur, Walsh & Heyes, 2009; Paulus, 
2014). Having experience of doing an action oneself will make it easier to imitate that 
action (Gampe et al., 2015). In Study 1, children observed M1 and then imitated M1’s 
actions. Their lack of imitation of M2 may therefore have been due to the fact that they 
could not inhibit performing M1’s actions. This would also explain why imitation of 
M2 increased between the ages of 2 and 5 years, as motor inhibition abilities improve 
during this period (Carlson, 2005). Such an explanation would be predicted by 
generalist accounts of imitation which stress that imitation is subserved by the general 
processes of action control, rather than specialised matching mechanisms (Brass & 
Heyes, 2005; Paulus, 2014). Given that the youngest children’s other cognitive abilities 
were still developing, they could not override previous action experience which led to 
poor imitation of M2, particularly when this meant that one had to omit the arbitrary 
action. The design of Study 1 does not suggest which explanation (inflexible use of 
labels vs poor motor inhibition) underlies the pre-schoolers’ poor imitation of M2. This 
will be one of the research questions of Chapter 3.  
A third theory of high-fidelity imitation in children is the affiliation account: this 
theory suggests that children focus on copying the present model, regardless of the type 
of action that is performed by that model. The aim is to match the movements of the 
model faithfully, to affiliate with them (Nielsen & Blank, 2011; Over & Carpenter, 
2012; 2013). In the current study children above the age of 6 years copied both M1 and 
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M2 faithfully, regardless of what actions the models performed, but were at chance as to 
who to copy on M1rep. In contrast by the age of 10 years children faithfully imitated 
whichever model was present, displaying model-dependent imitation. The presence of 
M1 did not encourage faithful imitation of M1 on M1rep for younger children. Marsh et 
al. (2014) argue that the drive to copy a model’s actions for social reasons (i.e. to 
affiliate with the model rather than to cause an effect) increases between the ages of 5 
and 8 years. In their study children aged between 5 and 8 years replicated clearly 
arbitrary actions and grew more likely to do so with age: the authors suggest that this is 
evidence that by mid to late childhood children imitate to affiliate with the model, and 
this tendency increases with age. This explanation would also predict the findings from 
Study 1: as children aged they focussed more on imitating the present model rather than 
on performing the task in a certain way.  
One question is why children become more likely to copy for social reasons as 
they get older. Children may become more sensitive to pressure to conform: in 
ambiguous situations (where there is no clear indication that one solution is better than 
another) children’s conformity increases between the ages of three and 10 years (Haun, 
van Leuwen & Edelson, 2013). The game context in the present study is an example of 
such an ambiguous situation. Children had no reason to prefer one of the model’s 
actions, as it was not made clear if one solution was better than another. Children’s 
growing experience with social situations where they need to copy other people may 
explain why the assumption that they need to faithfully imitate each model becomes 
more automatic with age. After the age of 5 years children are in full-time education 
where they are encouraged to learn from teachers and to interact with peers – they are 
also sensitive to the threat of social exclusion and conform to majority judgments in 
public at this age (Haun & Tomasello, 2011; Over & Carpenter, 2009). Learning to 
imitate the actions of the model faithfully may become second-nature with age, as 
children become more exposed to situations where conformity is encouraged or where 
non-conformity is punished by social exclusion. Children may become more likely to 
automatically assume that they should copy the present model with age: this would 
explain why high-fidelity imitation increases throughout childhood and even into 
adulthood (McGuigan et al., 2011; Whiten et al., 2016). This would also explain why 
high-fidelity imitation increases with age even when children are not explicitly told to 
imitate the present model faithfully (Moraru et al., 2016). 
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It can be pointed out that some of the 8-year-olds, approached after the study, 
said “I liked that game – you just had to copy each one, right?”, indicating that the goal 
of copying each model was spontaneously inferred by children above the age of 8 years. 
Children under 6 years did not infer the social goal of copying the present model, and 
instead focussed on reproducing the task a certain way. Given that there were no real 
cues as to one solution being more appropriate than the other (e.g. no reassurance from 
a third party, no negative consequences from either solution), the pre-schoolers were 
often at chance as to which solution to use after they had seen both. Wood, Kendal & 
Flynn (2013b) observed that once 5-year-olds had seen two solutions of performing the 
same task, they were at chance as to using either solution. This matches the data from 
the current findings in that children under 6 years did not show a preference for 
demonstrating M1 or M2’s actions on M1rep. The social goal of copying the present 
model was inferred more by the older children than the younger children, suggesting 
that matching the movements of the present model becomes a more prevalent goal for 
children throughout childhood, particularly above the age of 6 years. An important 
point to note is that, if imitation fidelity for the successive models was indeed related to 
growing action control capabilities under the age of 6 years, and to growing social 
motivation above the age of 6 years, then this would suggest that imitation is a 
composite ability. Rather than a single, specialised imitative ability, children’s imitation 
is driven by their own action control capabilities and by their growing social experience 
(amongst other things), meaning that multiple abilities determine imitative fidelity 
(Subiaul, Patterson, Schilder, Renner & Barr, 2014). The type of goal children infer 
from social learning situations will also determine the way they imitate, and this process 
of goal inference changes with age. The following chapters will examine how multiple 
abilities affect imitation in the preschool years, to further investigate how distinct 
abilities may underlie children’s copying behaviour. 
In summary Study 1 shows that children’s imitation of successive models 
undergoes significant changes between the ages of 2 and 12 years. Under the age of 5 
years children imitated the first model more than the second: this could be due to their 
poor inhibitory skills or to their inflexible use of labelling. Above the age of 6 years 
children began to copy both models faithfully, but were at chance as to who to copy on 
a third turn. By the age of 10 years children copied the present model faithfully on all 
turns. This increase in model-dependent imitation reflects children’s growing tendency 
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to assume that copying the present model is an important part of social learning 
situations. This may be driven by their own growing experience in explicit educational 
settings and related to their increasing tendency to conform on ambiguous tasks. The 
changes in successive-models imitation observed in this study suggest that imitation is a 
composite ability affected by multiple abilities, which will be examined in further detail 
in the ensuing chapters. In particular Chapter 3 will determine whether imitation is 
modulated by inflexible labelling or action inhibition, and whether imitation can be 
affected by social factors under the age of 5 years. Chapter 4 will focus on the role of 
goals in imitation, and examine how changing the perceived goal of an action can affect 
the fidelity with which it is imitated by pre-schoolers. Taken together these chapters 
will provide stronger evidence for concluding that imitation is a composite ability 
which is affected by both low-level mechanisms of action production and by higher-




















In Chapter 2 children aged between 2 and 12 years saw two models, M1 and 
M2, demonstrate different versions of the same game (e.g. “lopping”). One of the 
models only used functional actions to play the game, whereas the other model included 
arbitrary actions in their demonstrations. Children were given the chance to play the 
game once after each model, and once more after both demonstrations, with M1 present 
again. 
There was a substantial effect of age. Children under 3 years would consistently 
demonstrate the first action sequence they saw by M1 on all three turns, regardless of 
whether M1 included the arbitrary actions or not. Children under 5 years would copy 
M2 and M1rep at chance levels. Children above 6 years began to copy each model in 
turn, and this tendency increased with age, reaching ceiling levels after 9 years. With 
age children got more accurate at imitating on all three turns: in particular, children 
under 5 years showed much lower imitation of M2 than the other age groups, and M1rep 
scores were still at chance until the age of 10 years.  
The results from Chapter 2 suggest that there may be developmental milestones 
in children’s imitation occurring before the age of 6 years and at 9 years. To clarify 
what caused the first milestone I conducted a series of follow-up studies looking at 
ways to improve imitation of multiple models for children under 5 years. This would 
show what abilities are guiding children’s imitation and would therefore help explain 
why imitation changes before the age of 6 years.  
There were a number of potential explanations to consider for children’s lower 
imitation of M2. One initial factor that I considered was the use of the same novel label 
by M1 and M2. Successive-models tasks usually show two models, M1 and M2, 
demonstrating different versions of playing the same new game by using the same label 
(e.g. “daxing”; Rakoczy et al., 2008). Children under 5 years typically imitate M1’s 
solution and protest against M2’s deviant actions. However children at this age are 
sensitive to context: Rakoczy et al. (2009) looked at how pre-schoolers reacted to 
deviant models playing a game (e.g. “daxing”) in a “wrong” way. Children protested 
less against the deviant model’s actions when this model was playing with objects in a 
neutral context than when they were playing with objects in an area specifically marked 
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for playing the game “daxing”. It was argued that pre-schoolers therefore understand 
the context relativity of rules: what counts as a mistake in one context does not count as 
a mistake in another. This was replicated in a further study by Keupp, Behne, Zachow, 
Kasbohm and Rakoczy (2015).  
Other studies have also suggested that labels may be important in guiding 
children’s understanding of deviant models. Brandl et al. (2015) have argued that 
children’s protest towards deviant models in successive-models paradigms may be due 
to the fact that children dislike the mismatch between what a model says they will do 
(“I’m going to dax”) and what they actually do (i.e., actions that the child has not seen 
before for as daxing). Such an argument is related to the mutual exclusivity bias in 
children’s language acquisition: pre-schoolers tend to avoid using a known word for a 
novel object, and will assume that a novel object requires a new word (e.g. Diesendruck 
& Markson, 2001; Markman, Wasow & Hansen, 2003). With reference to the findings 
from Chapter 2, it is possible that children under 5 years would not imitate M2 as 
faithfully as M1, because M2 used the same novel label as M1 (e.g. “lopping”) but used 
a clearly different action sequence. If this is the case, then if the models used different 
labels to describe their actions, the children should be more likely to imitate both 
models, as the conflict created by the use of the same label is resolved. This was the 
aim of Study 2. 
STUDY 2 
Study 2 tested the possibility that young children’s less frequent imitation of M2 was 
related to their dislike of M2 calling their action by the same name as M1 but then 
acting differently. Three- to 5-year-olds were assessed on a successive-models imitation 
task. The study was identical to the procedure described in Chapter 2, except that I 
added a control condition for labels. In the Test condition M1 and M2 used the same 
novel label to describe their actions, as had been the case in Study 1. In the new Control 
condition M1 and M2 referred to their action sequences by different labels (e.g. 
“lopping” vs “daxing”). It is predicted that, if children do not accept the use of the same 
label for two different actions, then they should imitate M2’s actions more faithfully in 
the Control condition (different condition) than in the Test condition (same condition). 
In contrast if children’s imitation is not affected by the use of alternate labels then there 
should be no difference between the same label and alternate label conditions. An adult 
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control was included to highlight any age differences that would occur on M1rep 
imitation beyond the age of 5 years.  
METHODS 
Participants. This study recruited 45 children from local nurseries and playgroups in 
the Stirlingshire area. The age range was from 34 to 61 months (Mage = 49.5 months, 
S.D. = 8 months, 22 male). Children were randomly allocated to the ‘same’ condition 
(Mage = 49.4, S.D. = 8 months; N = 25; 15 male) and the ‘different’ condition (Mage = 
49.6, S.D. = 9 months; N = 20; 7 male), with mean age being similar across the two 
conditions, t(43) = 0.044, p = .97. Additionally, 10 adults between 21 and 52 years were 
recruited through opportunity sampling (Mage = 26.6, S.D. = 9.24 months; 6 male). The 
study received ethical approval from the University of Stirling Ethics Committee and 
parental consent was obtained for all children prior to testing. Debrief forms were 
provided to parents and the nurseries at the end of data collection. 
Design. Study 2 used essentially the same design as that of Study 1. One difference was 
that one group of children received the study in the ‘same’ condition (as in Study 1) 
while the other group of children received it in the ‘different’ condition, where M1 and 
M2 used a different label (i.e., lopping and daxing; trepping and challing; chokking and 
sedding; mooshing and bebbing). Order, Ffirst or AFfirst, was manipulated within 
subjects. Adults received the study as a within-subjects design and were given two Ffirst 
and two AFfirst tasks, one of each in a ‘same’ and in a ‘different’ condition. 
Materials & Procedure. Study 2 used the same materials as Study 1. The procedure 
was also identical to that of Study 1, aside from the different labels used in the 
‘different’ and ‘same’ conditions.  
Scoring. Children and adults were scored on how well they imitated the present model 
on each of the three turns for each game (M1, M2 and M1rep). They were coded as either 
imitating the model (giving them a score of 1 for that model) or not imitating (which gave 
them a score of 0) using the same criteria as Study 1. The maximum score for each model 
M1, M2 and M1rep was 4. For reliability purposes, both M1 and M2 recorded the child’s 
responses in a manner identical to Study 1. Both models kept an individual scoring sheet 
for recording their responses. As the task progressed they each recorded the child’s 
responses on their own sheets and then were able to compare their notes after each child. 
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Both experimenters were blind to the hypotheses, and agreement between experimenters 
was perfect. 
If children did not respond on one task, their data was not included in the 
analyses for tasks of that type. This occurred for two children in the FFirst tasks and one 
child in the AFFirst tasks. Thus analyses for these tasks were conducted on the remaining 
43 and 44 children respectively. To distinguish between cases where children did not 
imitate the model because they were using the other model’s solution and times when 
they were doing something different than what was shown by either model, children’s 
responses were also coded using the response patterns set out in Study 1. For instance if 
children copied M1’s actions on all three turns they were coded as “M1-M1-M1”. If 
they copied each model they were coded as “M1-M2-M1” and if they switched to M2 
the pattern was coded as “M1-M2-M2”. Because transparency did not affect results in 
Study 1 this factor was not analysed here. I also did not collect protest data due to its 
low occurrence in Study 1. 
RESULTS 
Adult Controls. For the adult participants, the labelling condition had a noticeable 
effect on their imitation scores. Specifically, adults were more likely to imitate M2 and 
M1rep in the different condition than in the same condition. A repeated-measures 
ANOVA with model (M1, M2, M1rep) and condition (same or different) as within 
subject factors was conducted. There was a main effect of condition, F(1, 18) = 14.05, p 
= .005, partial η2=.61, and a main effect of model, F(2, 18) = 4.33, p = .029, partial 
η2=.33. There was also a significant interaction between condition and model, F(2, 18) 
= 6.21, p = .009, partial η2=.41. Imitation accuracy for M2 was marginally significantly 
higher in the ‘different’ condition (M = 1.9, SE = .10) than in the ‘same’ condition (M = 
1.6, SE = .10), t(9) = 1.96, p = .08, but significantly higher for M1rep (different: M = 2.0, 
SE = .0; same: M = 1.0, SE = .26), t(9) = 3.87, p = .004). Thus using different labels 
particularly enhanced M1rep imitation in adults, but not M2 imitation, presumably due 
to an overall high level of imitation accuracy. 
Children’s imitation 
Preliminary analysis. There was no difference for the M1, M2, and M1rep imitation 
scores between the four different tasks, Friedman test all ps > .24. The sum imitation 
scores M1, M2 and M1rep were also similar for boys and girls, t-tests all ps > .06, and 
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there was no effect of model order, all ps > .28. The data was collapsed on these 
variables and they were not analysed further. 
Imitation scores. As observed in Study 1, children imitation varied between the three 
turns (M1, M2 and M1rep). However, going against the predictions (and the results for 
the adult participants) label condition had no effect on children’s imitation, as can be 
seen in Figure 4. A 2*2*3 mixed factorial repeated-measures ANOVA with label 
condition (same vs different) as between-subjects variable and order (FFirst vs AFFirst) 
and model (M1, M2 and M1rep) as within-subjects variables. The main effect of model 
was significant, F(1.6, 65.2) = 26.5, p<.001, partial η2 = .398 (Huynh-Feldt correction). 
There was also a significant interaction between model and order, F(1.45, 57.8) = 11.2, 
p<.001, partial η2 = .219 (Greenhouse-Geisser correction). No other main effects or 
interactions were significant, p>34. Therefore label had no effect on children’s 
imitation of the models. The interaction between model and order suggested that there 
were differences between the FFirst and AFFirst games, therefore separate analyses were 
conducted for the two game types. Figure 4 shows children’s M1, M2 and M1rep 
imitation scores for the FFirst and AFFirst games, with the label conditions combined.  
 
Figure 4. Imitation scores for M1, M2 and M1rep on the FFirst and AFFirst tasks. Bars 
indicate standard errors. 
FFirst tasks. To analyse children’s scores on the FFirst tasks, a 2*3 mixed factorial 
ANOVA was run with label condition (same vs. different) as a between-subjects 
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labelling condition children were in had no effect on their imitation. The main effect of 
model was significant, F(1.49, 61.2) = 30.45. p<.001, partial η2 = .426, showing that 
children imitated M1, M2 and M1rep at different rates. M1 scores were significantly 
higher (M = 1.88, SE = .07) than M2 (M = 1.49, SE = .102) and M1rep scores (M = .698, 
SE = .122), p = .003 and p<.001 respectively. M2 scores were also significantly 
different from M1rep scores, p<.001. This matches the performance of children in this 
age range for Study 1, as children under 5 years in Study 1 also imitated M1 more 
frequently than M2 or M1rep. 
AFFirst tasks. A similar 2*3 mixed factorial ANOVA was conducted for children’s 
imitation scores on the AFFirst tasks. There was again no significant main effect of label 
condition, p = .322. Children imitated M1 more than they imitated M2 or M1rep, as there 
was again a main effect of model, F(1.6, 67.3) = 13.02, p<.001, partial η2 = .237 
(Huynh-Feldt correction). M1 scores (M = 1.77, SE = .072) were significantly greater 
than M2 scores (M = 1.14, SE = .101) and M1rep scores (M = 1.23, SE = .107), all 
ps<.001. This time M2 scores were not significantly different from M1rep scores, p = 
.585. When comparing FFirst and AFFirst games, M2 scores were significantly higher on 
the FFirst games than on the AFFirst games, t(41) = 2.65, p = .012 and M1rep scores were 
significantly lower on the FFirst games than on the AFFirst games, t(41) = -3.6, p<.001.  
Given the significant effect of age on imitation in Study 1 correlations between 
age in months and M1, M2 and M1rep scores were conducted. There was a moderately 
strong positive correlation between age in months and M2 imitation scores on the 
AFFirst tasks, r = .482, p = .001. Like in Study 1, older children were more likely to omit 
M1’s arbitrary action and imitate M2. There were no significant correlations for other 
scores on the AFFirst tasks or on the FFirst tasks, all ps > .23.  
Response patterns. Following the coding system set out in Study 1, if a child 
demonstrated M1’s actions on all three trials within a task, it was coded as M1-M1-M1. 
If a child demonstrated what M1 did on the first round, but then demonstrated M2’s 
actions for the following two rounds it was coded as M1-M2-M2. Finally, children who 
demonstrated actions of whichever model was present in the room were coded as M1-
M2-M1. Unlike in Study 1, the majority of children in Study 2 switched between the 
two games of each type, resulting in a large number of children displaying a “mixed” 
pattern (20 children for the FFirst tasks and 30 for the AFFirst tasks). However 13 children 
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displayed the M1-M2-M2 pattern for the FFirst tasks, versus only 5 did so in the AFFirst 
tasks. The remaining children were split between displaying M1-M1-M1 (n = 3 for FFirst 
and n = 5 for AFFirst), M1-M2-M1 (n = 4 for FFirst and n = 5 for AFFirst) or other 
nonsense actions and non-responses (n = 5 for FFirst and n = 3 for AFFirst). Study 1 had 
found that the majority of the 4- to 5-year-olds displayed M1-M2-M2 on the FFirst tasks, 
preferring to copy M2’s use of the arbitrary action on M1rep. Whilst this effect was not 
as prevalent in Study 2, the M1-M2-M2 pattern occurred more on the FFirst tasks than on 
the AFFirst tasks, showing that again between the ages of 3 and 5 years children tended 
to copy M2’s arbitrary action once they had seen it.  
DISCUSSION 
The aim of Study 2 was to determine whether the low imitation scores of M2 by 
children under 5 years in Study 1 was due to both models referring to their action by the 
same name. Previous research has suggested that children under 3 years show a marked 
tendency to avoid applying new labels to known objects (Casler, 2014) and some have 
suggested that a similar avoidance of lexical overlap may cause children to protest 
against deviant models in imitation games (Brandl et al., 2015; Brinck, 2015). I 
controlled for the effect of labels in Study 2. Children saw M1 and M2 demonstrate 
different action sequences on the same apparatus. The only difference was whether the 
models referred to their actions with the same label (same condition) or with different 
labels (different condition).  
Adults seeing M1 and M2 use different labels showed higher imitation scores of 
both models than when the models used the same label. They may have been sensitive 
to the implications of the two models’ different labels, presumably enhancing their idea 
of what the game is about (i.e., to copy each model in turn). In contrast, the children did 
not imitate M2 more faithfully in the different condition than in the same condition. 
Moreover, imitative fidelity of M2 did not increase in the same condition between the 
ages of 3 and 5 years, as would be predicted if children became more flexible in their 
use of labels. Thus, imitative fidelity on the successive-models task is not driven by 
children’s use of labels to constrain what is acceptable (Brandl et al., 2015). Pre-school 
age children have been shown to be sensitive to whether a model’s actions constitute a 
mistake depending on contextual factors: 3-year-olds use context to decide whether a 
puppet’s actions are allowed or incorrect (Rakoczy et al., 2009). However, in Rakoczy 
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and colleagues’ study children evaluated whether a puppet’s actions were correct using 
location (e.g., whether they performed action A in location A and action B in location 
B) rather than label. In the type of successive-models task used here, the use of two 
distinct labels used by the two models does not seem enough for pre-schoolers to 
encourage faithful imitation of both solutions on the same apparatus. Therefore 
children’s low imitation of M2 in Studies 1 and 2 must have been driven by a factor 
other than labelling.        
Children between the ages of 3 and 5 years tended to copy M2 more in the FFirst 
tasks than in the AFFirst tasks (as evidenced by their higher M2 scores and lower M1rep 
scores). This replicates the finding from Study 1 that children prefer to copy M2 when 
they are adding an action, even when this action may be seen as arbitrary (although the 
effect was less strong in Study 2). As children aged, they also became more likely to 
imitate M2 on the AFFirst tasks in Study 2, showing that they were more likely to omit 
M1’s arbitrary action to copy M2’s actions. This was not observed in this age range for 
Study 1: although M1rep scores increased between with age on the AFFirst tasks, this 
increase was not significant between the ages of 3 and 5 years. 
I investigated another factor that may explain the results observed in Study 1. 
The finding to be explained is that children under 5 years showed less imitation of M2 
than M1 on a successive-models task – in particular younger children in Study 1 
imitated M1 on all three turns of the task (displaying the M1-M1-M1 pattern). It is only 
with age that children began to copy M2 as much as M1. One reason younger children 
may show low M2 imitation scores is their immature inhibition abilities. Under the age 
of 3 years children display “perserverative errors” (Best & Miller, 2010), where they 
continue to demonstrate a previously correct response even after the task demands have 
changed, making that response now incorrect. Consider children’s performance on the 
Dimensional Change Card Sorting task: in this game children have to sort a pile of 
cards using one of two dimensions. One is colour: e.g. “all red cards go in this pile, all 
the blue cards go into this one; the other dimension is shape “all boats go in this pile, all 
dogs go in this pile”. Children start off by sorting the cards according to one dimension, 
for instance colour. After a few turns they are then told that the rule changes and they 
must now sort the cards with a different dimension, shape. This means that cards which 
previously went into one pile must now be sorted into a different pile (e.g. blue cards 
which went into the blue pile must now go into the red pile because the shape matches 
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that of the other cards in that pile). On the classic version of the task 3-year-olds can 
sort the cards by either dimension in the pre-switch phase but they then perseverate with 
the first rule in the post-switch phase (Zelazo & Frye, 1998; Zelazo, Carter, Reznick & 
Frye, 1997). 
In the successive-models paradigm used in the above studies, when children 
perform M1’s solution on the object it may be providing them with motor experience of 
how to perform the task in question, but they may struggle to switch to a different set of 
action under changed circumstances. According to the ideomotor theory of action 
production, when an action is performed an action-effect link is formed, consisting of 
the sensory perception of an action’s effect and the motor program associated with it 
(Hommel, 2009; Paulus, 2014). This link is bidirectional, such that seeing the effect 
performed primes the observer to perform the action they have seen associated with that 
effect. Seeing M1 manipulate the object, and then manipulating the object themselves to 
produce the same effect, allows children to form a motor program between M1’s 
actions and the effect. It is possible that when young children are given the opportunity 
to imitate M2, they cannot inhibit the motor program formed during M1’s turn. M2 uses 
the same object as M1, and objects can be used to remind observers of the actions 
performed with them (the “affordances” of the object, Gibson, 1986). M2 also uses one 
of the same actions as M1 and the child, as both models used the functional action. 
Accordingly, young pre-schoolers’ imitation of M1 over M2 may be due to their poor 
inhibitory skills, by being unable to stop performing M1’s actions. This would explain 
why they succeed in adding M2’s action, but not omitting M1’s action. If this is the 




In Study 3 I conducted the same successive-models imitation paradigm as in Studies 1 
and 2. However in this study I investigated the effect of motor inhibition by varying 
whether children were allowed to copy M1 and M2 after their turns. Half of the children 
were allowed to copy M1 and M2 after their turns (copy condition), and half of the 
children would just observe (no copy condition). All children were given the 
opportunity to perform the actions at the end in the presence of M1rep. According to 
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ideomotor theories of imitation (ASL, Catmur et al., 2009; IMAIL, Paulus, 2014) action 
experience helps form a link between an action’s effect and the motor program 
associated with that action. Therefore, by removing action experience (i.e., by not 
letting children copy M1), children should be less likely to perform the action in the 
initial way demonstrated by M1 on M1rep, as the link between the action’s effect and the 
motor program will be less strong. In contrast, children who copy M1 should be more 
likely to produce M1’s actions on M1rep. If other factors aside from motor inhibition are 
constraining children’s imitation of M2 at this age, then there should be no difference 
between the copy and no copy conditions. 
To further control for children’s inhibitory ability, I included an executive 
function assessment called the Bear/Dragon task (B/D task, Reed, Pien & Rothbart, 
1984). The B/D task is a Simon Says game where children must perform actions when 
told to do so by the bear and ignore commands given by another, the dragon. It is a 
measure of children’s ability to inhibit their movements and switch between two 
contradictory responses (“copy” and “not copy”, Carlson, Moses & Breton, 2002). In 
Study 3 children were asked to follow simple instructions, for instance, to touch their 
nose when it is said by the ‘nice’ bear, but not to follow these instructions when said by 
the ‘naughty’ dragon. Children improve on the B/D task between the ages of 3 and 4 
years (Carlson, 2005) which is also an age range where children show marked changes 
in their imitation (e.g. Yu & Kushnir, 2014; Moraru et al., 2016). If children’s inhibitive 
ability is related to their imitation then, as children age, there should be parallel 
improvement in children’s ability to imitate both models flexibly and their performance 
on the B/D task. 
Finally I included an additional control of the effect of labels following the null 
result observed in Study 2. In Study 2 labelling had no effect on the fidelity with which 
children imitated M2 – but it has yet to be investigated whether children’s imitation is 
affected by the simple presence of a novel label in the first place. Keupp et al. (2015) 
found that children imitated arbitrary actions more faithfully when a novel label was 
used to highlight the conventionality of the action (e.g. “daxing”) as opposed to when 
the action is framed within the context of an end goal (e.g. “find the puzzle piece”). 
Keupp et al. (2013) found that pre-schoolers also protested more when a novel label 
was used. The presence of a novel label may thus encourage faithful imitation of a task 
and constrain deviant actions once it has been used. To clarify whether the presence of a 
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novel label in comparison to no label affects children’s imitation at this age, I controlled 
for whether the models referred to their actions using labels or whether they simply 
referred to their actions as “playing the game”. Previous work by Keupp and colleagues 
(2013, 2015) suggests that the presence of a novel label can encourage faithful imitation 
of arbitrary actions and protest towards deviant models. Therefore if children’s dislike 
for copying M2 is related to M2 referring to their action with M1’s novel label, then 
children should be more likely to imitate M2 if the models do not use labels. 
METHODS 
Participants. The study recruited 39 children from local nurseries and playgroups in the 
Stirlingshire area. Four children were excluded from the study for uncooperativeness. 
The final sample consisted of 35 children whose age ranged between 35 to 62 months 
(Mage = 47.6, S.D. = 8 months; 20 male). Children were randomly allocated to the 
‘copy’ condition (Mage = 48.06, S.D. = 8.3 months; N = 16, 8 male) and the ‘no copy’ 
condition (Mage = 47.17, S.D. = 7.8 months; N = 19; 12 male), with mean age being 
similar across the two conditions, t(32) = 0.33, p = .74. Additionally, half the children 
in each condition received the task with a novel label (Mage = 46.56, S.D. = 7.6 months; 
N = 19; 12 male) and the other half with no label (Mage = 48.75, S.D. = 8.1 months; N = 
16; 8 male). Again these two groups were comparable in age, t(32) = 0.82, p = .42. The 
study received ethical approval from the University of Stirling Ethics’ Committee and 
parental consent was obtained for all children prior to testing.  
Design. The same design as Studies 1 and 2 was used for Study 3. One difference was 
that half of the children saw the two models describe their actions with the same novel 
label (like the ‘same’ label condition in Study 1) while the other group of children saw 
the models demonstrated their actions without using any label. Children also either 
received the task in the ‘copy’ condition, where they were allowed to have a go after 
each model or in the ‘no copy’ condition in which they watched the demonstrations 
without being allowed to have a go themselves. This resulted in four different 
conditions ‘copy/label’, ‘copy/no label’, ‘no copy/label’ and ‘no copy/no label’. The 
order of the models (who was M1 and M2) was maintained constant throughout all four 
games. Order, Ffirst or AFfirst, was manipulated within subjects. All children additionally 
received a Bear/Dragon task at the end of the session. 
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Materials & Procedure. Study 3 used the same materials as those used for Studies 1 
and 2. The procedure was the same, apart from some groups receiving the task either 
with a novel label or without a label and some groups either being allowed to copy or 
not being allowed to copy the present model. Additionally I included a Bear/Dragon 
task (Reed et al., 1984) to measure children’s inhibitory strength. A bear hand puppet 
and a dragon toy were used for this task. 
Children were introduced to both models in the nursery, brought individually to 
the testing location by both experimenters and sat down at a table, with the first model 
(M1) sitting opposite them. Once the child was sat down M2 excused herself and left 
the room.  
Copy + Novel Label. This condition was identical to the procedure for the ‘same label’ 
condition in Study 2. Children observed M1 and M2 demonstrate different methods of 
performing the same novel game which they referred to by the same label (e.g. 
“lopping”). Children were asked to play the game after M1’s turn, then after M2’s turn 
and then once more at the end by M1.  
Copy + No Label. The procedure was the same as for the Copy + Novel Label condition 
except that now the games were not referred to by their novel names. Instead at the 
beginning of the session M1 said “Now I’m going to show you how to play a new 
game. This is how the game goes”. After that both models always referred to their 
actions with “And that’s how you play the game” and “Now I’m going to play the 
game”. When M1 returned they asked the child “Now you know how to play the game. 
Can you do it one more time?”  
No Copy + Novel Label. In the No Copy conditions the children were not given the 
opportunity to play the game until after they had seen both models perform the task and 
M1 returned. Like in the copy conditions, M1 and M2 both demonstrated their action 
sequence twice, but children were not given the opportunity to imitate the task after 
their solutions. In the label condition they referred to the game with a novel label.  
No Copy + No Label. In this condition the procedure was exactly the same as in the No 
Copy + Novel Label condition, except that in this condition the tasks were not referred 
to with their novel labels. Therefore as in the Copy + No Label condition both models’ 
prompts referred to “playing the game”. 
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Bear/Dragon task. After all four imitation games were completed and the materials 
cleared away, the male experimenter said “Right, now we’re going to play a new game. 
Now in this game, you have to copy me.” They then modelled ten simple body 
movements, naming the movements as they performed them (e.g. “Can you touch your 
nose? Touch your tummy? Stick out your tongue?”). After these warm-up rounds (at 
which all children succeeded) the experimenter said “Very good! Now we’re going to 
play this game again, but we’re going to play it with some friends of mine”. They then 
reached into the boxes and brought out the Bear and Dragon toys. The experimenter 
placed the Bear toy on their right hand and said “Now this is Nice Bear – he’s very 
nice. So when he tells us to do something, we’ll do what he tells us to do”. When saying 
Nice Bear’s name the experimenter took on a high-pitched voice, and used this voice 
for all of the Bear’s instructions during the task. Next the experimenter held the Dragon 
in their left hand and said “Now this is Naughty Dragon – he’s naughty. So when he 
tells us to do something, we won’t do what he tells us to do”. When saying Naughty 
Dragon’s name the experimenter took on a deep voice, and used this voice for all of the 
Dragon’s instructions. 
After this the practice phase began. In this phase, children were given ten 
instructions, five from the Bear and five from the Dragon, beginning with the Bear and 
alternating between the two puppets. During this practice phase, if a child made a 
mistake, that is, not doing what the Bear said or following the Dragon’s instructions, 
they were reminded of the rules. The experimenter said “Whoops! Remember the 
rules!” and then re-read the instructions for the toys from the start of the game. If a 
child made 5 mistakes in a row (n = 9), they were encouraged to sit on their hands and 
listen to a sixth set of instructions. Regardless of how the child did on this final sixth 
turn, they received no feedback and they moved to the test phase of the task. Once the 
child correctly reacted to one instruction from both puppets they were praised with 
“That’s right! Good!” and the test phase of the task began. The test phase again 
included the same ten body movements as in the previous phases of the task and 
proceeded in the same way as the practice phase, except that the child did not receive 
any feedback. The child had three seconds to respond to or ignore every instruction. 
Once all ten instructions had been given, the child was praised effusively, thanked for 
their help and escorted back to the nursery.  
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Scoring. For reliability purposes, both M1 and M2 recorded the child’s responses in the 
same way as in Studies 1 and 2. Both models kept an individual scoring sheet for 
recording the child’s responses – M1 had theirs next to the table for data collection and 
M2 had theirs next to their waiting spot outside of the room (from which they could see 
the child). As the task progressed they each recorded the child’s responses on their own 
sheets and then were able to compare their notes after each child. There were no 
disagreements between the models.  
During the imitation games children were defined as either copying the present model 
or not. Children who imitated the model needed to touch the object(s) used by the 
model and use them in the same way to bring about the same goal. This resulted in a 
binary coding score where children who demonstrated the solution used by the present 
model received a score of 1, and children who did not received a score of 0.  
Children’s response pattern (M1-M1-M1, M1-M2-M2 and M1-M2-M1) was 
only analysed for the ‘copy’ condition, as children in the ‘no copy’ condition could only 
copy on the final turn, so their responses were only coded for M1rep.  
B/D data was recorded by the experimenter not involved in the task. The coding 
scheme used was that laid out by Carlson et al. (2002): children were scored on each of 
the actions during the five dragon trials. Scores ranged from 0 to 3: 0 = a full 
commanded movement, 1 = a partial commanded movement, 2 = a wrong movement, 3 
= no movement (Maxcorr= 15). 
RESULTS 
Preliminary analysis. There was no difference for the M1, M2, and M1rep imitation 
scores between the four different tasks, Friedman test all ps > .19. The sum imitation 
scores M1, M2 and M1rep were also similar for boys and girls, t-tests all ps > .33, and 
there was no effect of model order, all ps > .13. The data was collapsed on these 
variables and they were not analysed further.  
Imitation scores. 
Label conditions. I investigated whether children in the ‘copy’ condition were 
affected by the presence/absence of novel labels on the three model imitation scores. 
There was no effect of label: children who saw the tasks presented with novel labels did 
not imitate differently from children who saw the tasks presented with no label at all. A 
76 
 
mixed factorial repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted on the imitation scores with 
model (M1, M2, M1rep) and order (Ffirst vs AFfirst) as within subject factors and 
condition (label or no label) as between subject factor. Replicating previous results, 
there was a main effect of model, F(2, 28), = 8.35, p = .001, partial η2 = .37. M1 scores 
were highest (M = 1.97, SE = .03), while M2 scores (M = 1.19, SE = .16) and M1rep 
scores (M = 1.34, SE = .15) were significantly lower but similar to each other. No other 
main effects or interactions were found. Thus, using a novel label (M = 1.52, SE = .07) 
or no label (M = 1.48, SE = .07) in the copy condition did not affect their overall 
imitation scores (p = .66).  
Copy conditions. I ran analyses to see whether children’s imitation of M1rep was 
affected by whether or not they were allowed to copy M1 and M2. I compared 
children’s M1rep scores on the FFirst and AFFirst tasks (within-subjects factor) between 
the four conditions (Copy + novel label; No copy + novel label; Copy + no label; No 
copy + no label). B/D task scores were included as a covariate to control for inhibitory 
ability. Overall, there were no main effects and no significant interactions of copy or 
labelling, all ps>.18. There was however a significant main effect of B/D task scores, 
F(1, 30) = 5.68, p = .024, partial η2 = .159. Figure 5 shows the mean M1rep imitation 






























Novel label No Label
77 
 
Figure 5. M1rep imitation scores between the four conditions. Bars indicate standard 
errors.  
Response patterns. Looking at the copy condition, children replicated M1’s actions on 
all three turns (M1-M1-M1 pattern) 21 times (33%). The M1-M2-M1 pattern was 
shown 19 times (30%), and copying M1 but then switching to M2 (M1-M2-M2 pattern) 
was observed 21 times (33%). This matches findings from Study 2: children do not 
show a preference for one response pattern over another. The response pattern data for 
Studies 2 and 3 differ from that of Study 1 which found clearer response pattern 
preferences in children this age. 
Bear/Dragon scores. Children’s performance on the B/D task increased with age, as 
has been found for children aged between 3 and 4 years (Carlson, 2005). With age 
children were increasingly able to inhibit copying the Dragon’s actions, r = .64, p < 
.001. Additionally, the B/D score correlated negatively with M1rep, r = -.37, p = .03, but 
with no other score. When children were allowed to copy M1’s arbitrary actions, they 
were more likely to omit them on M1rep’s turn if they had good inhibitory control (r = -
.53, p = .04). But inhibitory control had no effect on M1rep in the ‘no copy’ condition (p 
= .53). In the ‘copy’ condition, age was also positively correlated with M2 scores on the 
AFFirst tasks, r = .47, p = .06, as well as negatively correlated with M1rep scores on the 
AFFirst tasks, r = -.64, p = .008. This means that when children were allowed to imitate 
M1’s arbitrary action, like in Study 1, only older children omitted the arbitrary action 
on M2’s turn and would continue to omit it for M1rep’s turn.  
DISCUSSION 
The aim of Study 3 was to investigate whether children’s imitation of successive 
models was related to their inhibitory ability. I conducted the same imitation task as in 
Study 2 – but in this study half of the children were allowed to imitate M1 and M2 after 
their turns, and half were only allowed to perform the task on M1rep. A B/D task as a 
measure of children’s inhibitory ability was also included and one group of children 
saw the task with a label while the other group saw it without a label. 
Firstly, replicating the results from Study 2, there was no effect of label on 
imitation. Children’s copying of M1, M2 or M1rep was not affected by whether the 
models used novel labels to refer to their actions or no labels. This provides more 
evidence that labelling does not affect 3- to 5-year-old children’s imitation of 
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successive models in a game-like context. Secondly, going against the predictions, there 
was also no effect of copy condition on children’s imitation. Children in the copy 
condition did not imitate M1rep more than children in the no copy condition. Thus, 
although it may have had an effect on younger children, if 3- to 5-year-old children 
received motor experience during M1 and M2’s turns, this did not make them more 
likely to produce a specific solution on M1rep’s turn. Children’s imitation of M1rep was 
not affected by whether or not they had copied M1 and M2, which is what would have 
been expected if children’s perseverative imitation of M1 was due to their having 
formed a motor program of M1’s actions on M1’s turn. A more stringent test of action 
experience could be applied, for instance by varying which model returned on the final 
go. Children who had imitated M1 may be more likely to use M1’s actions rather than 
M2’s actions on the final turn, even if M2 was present on this final turn. But if this is 
not the case, then merely observing the two models use different action sequences on 
the same object could be enough to reduce imitation to near-chance levels. 
While whether children were allowed to copy or not had no effect on their 
imitation on M1rep, there was however a link between children’s B/D scores and their 
imitation. Children with higher B/D scores tended to receive lower M1rep scores, but 
only in the copy condition. This means that children who were better at inhibiting their 
actions were also more likely to omit M1’s arbitrary action after having seen M2 
perform the task without it. In the no copy condition there was no such relationship. Yet 
in both the copy and no copy conditions, there was a strong positive correlation 
between age in months and B/D scores, showing that while children’s inhibitory ability 
was just as strong in the no copy condition, it did only affect their imitation in the copy 
condition.  
In the AFFirst tasks of the copy condition, there was also a positive correlation 
between age and M2 scores and a negative correlation between age and M1rep scores. 
Like in Study 2, as children aged, they became more likely to omit M1’s arbitrary 
action and only use M2’s functional action on M2 and M1rep’s turns. Given the 
correlation between age in months and B/D scores, it is possible that this effect is driven 
by children’s growing inhibitory abilities, as children become more likely to be able to 
inhibit their actions with age. 
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In the no copy condition, where children did not imitate M1 and M2, their 
inhibition ability did not affect the likelihood of imitating either model on M1rep. This is 
to be expected, as ideomotor theory would argue that it is only when one is experienced 
with an action that the automatic action-effect link will interfere with action production 
(Paulus, 2014). When children merely observed M1 perform their actions they did not 
form a strong action-effect link, which therefore did not need to be overcome when 
imitating M2 and M1rep. Inhibition is thus not required to imitate either model when 
children have not had to copy M1 and M2. Study 3 shows that children’s responses on 
successive-models imitation tasks can be affected by the general action control process 
of motor inhibition. If children copy M1, only children who have the ability to inhibit 
actions can omit parts of this first action sequence when that model returns on M1rep. 
This is what would be predicted by generalist accounts of imitation (such as ASL, 
Catmur et al., 2009; and IMAIL, Paulus, 2014) which argue that imitation shares 
general action processes used in non-imitative action production. Imitation fidelity is 
modulated by general action control characteristics (such as inhibition or whether the 
action is feasible for the child to do, Paulus et al., 2011). 
It should however be noted that inhibitory ability had no effect on whether 
children would include the arbitrary action: neither B/D scores nor age in months were 
related to children’s imitation scores for M2 on the FFirst tasks, where M2 added the 
arbitrary action. Other theories of imitation (affiliative and normative accounts) do not 
predict that children should react differently to a deviant model omitting versus adding 
actions. The social affiliative account would predict that children should copy the 
deviant model’s actions equally regardless of what they are, and the normative account 
predicts that children should not imitate a deviant model regardless of whether they add 
or omit from the original action sequence. It is possible that generalist accounts of 
imitation may predict this, as they state that imitation is always imitation of a specific 
action: rather than requiring specialised imitative mechanisms (such as the active 
intermodal matching system, Meltzoff, 1995) imitation involves general processes of 
action control, of which inhibition is one. Omitting an action may simply be harder than 
adding an action on the type of task used here, which is the only reason why older 
children could do so (as their inhibitory skills were better than the younger children).  
 Study 3 showed that 3- to 5-year-old children find it harder to omit arbitrary 
actions than add them in, as only children with higher inhibition scores omitted M2’s 
80 
 
arbitrary action on M1rep in the copy condition. Children’s inhibitory abilities may thus 
not be fully developed under the age of 5 years, which would explain why in Study 1 
only children above 6 years could imitate the models on their turns. However, it may be 
possible to encourage children’s imitation of M2 under the age of 5 years by varying 
another factor which has been shown to enhance children’s imitation. One such factor 
from previous research on successive-models tasks is model reliability. Previous studies 
using successive-models tasks (Rakoczy et al., 2008; Keupp et al., 2013) typically have 
an adult as M1 and a puppet as M2. In such studies children prefer to imitate the actions 
of the adult M1 over the deviant puppet M2. Rakoczy et al. (2010) found that adults 
were imitated more faithfully than children in a successive-models task, regardless of 
whether the adult is M1 or M2. Wood, Kendal and Flynn (2013b) argue that adults as a 
social group are typically seen by pre-schoolers as more reliable models than peers. In 
Studies 1 to 3, M1 and M2 appear as equally reliable models, as they are similarly aged 
adults and no practice phase establishes one model as less reliable than the other (as is 
the case in other studies, Rakoczy et al., 2008; Keupp et al., 2013). Children thus have 
no reason to prefer one model’s actions over the other. However if one of the models 
was a puppet, then children may avoid copying them and will always prefer to imitate 
the actions of the adult. 
The next study, Study 4, investigated a potential model identity effect to see 
whether it could encourage the inhibitory skills identified in Study 3. In a similar 
successive-models task to Studies 1 to 3, 3- to 5-year-old children observed M1 and M2 
demonstrate different methods of performing the same action. Here, unlike previous 
studies, one of the models was an adult and the other was a puppet. Previous studies 
(Keupp et al., 2013; Rakoczy et al., 2010; Wood et al., 2013b) would predict that 
children will prefer to imitate the actions of the adult over the actions of the puppet. 
This model identity bias may interact with inhibitory skills, and thus may show that 
younger pre-schoolers can imitate M2 (even when this require omitting a known action) 
if the two models are distinct. If so, this would be evidence that, despite lower 
inhibitory skills, children are capable of omitting an action, even if they have previously 
copied that action. It is possible therefore that children’s imitation of successive models 




The research question of Study 4 was whether children’s imitation on a successive-
models task would be affected by varying model identity between M1 and M2. The 
same design as Studies 1 to 3 was used: children observed M1 and M2 demonstrate 
different methods of performing the same novel game (e.g. “lopping”). Children were 
allowed to copy after each model and then once more in the presence of M1. One model 
was an adult, whereas the other model was a hand-puppet – I varied which model was 
M1 and which was M2. On the basis of the findings from Study 3, it is predicted that 
children should find it harder to imitate M2 when M2 is omitting the arbitrary action. 
However when M1 is a puppet and M2 is an adult, children should also be more 
motivated to copy M2 (as adults are typically seen as more reliable than puppets). If 
children therefore show greater imitation of M2 when M2 is an adult omitting an action, 
this would be evidence that children’s inhibitory skills are sufficiently developed to let 
them copy both models, but they required an additional distinction between the models 
to imitate M2. Similarly, if model identity affects imitation, then children should be 
more likely to copy M2 adding the arbitrary action when M2 is an adult than when they 
are a puppet. If children show lower imitation of M2 (omitting an action) regardless of 
model type, then inhibition is the main reason children did not copy M2 as much as M1 
in Studies 1 to 3.  
METHODS 
Participants. This study recruited 32 children from a Scottish nursery aged between 41 
and 60 months (Mage= 50.6 months, SD = 5.9, 17 male). This sample was randomly 
divided into a group that saw the puppet as M1 (N = 16, Mage = 50.8 months, SD = 5.1, 
6 male) and a group that saw the adult as M1 (N = 16, Mage = 50.4 months, SD = 6.8, 11 
male) which were not significantly different in age, p = .86. Children were 
predominantly from a middle-class background and took part if they had written 
parental consent and if they volunteered on the day of testing. Ethical approval for this 
study was obtained from the Psychology Ethics Committee at the University of Stirling 
and debrief forms were given to the parents and the nursery involved. 
Design. Study 4 used the same general design as Study 1. The only difference was that 
one adult model was replaced by a puppet model. Half of the children (N = 16) saw the 
Puppet as M1, and the other half saw the Puppet as M2. All children saw two Ffirst and 
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two AFfirst tasks, whereby the order, F-F-AF-AF or AF-AF-F-F, was varied between 
children (8 children saw either order in both the Puppet M1 and Puppet M2 conditions). 
Materials & Procedure. Study 4 used the same materials as the previous studies. 
Additionally, the study used a lion hand puppet as the puppet model.  
To avoid the possibility that children would be confused by seeing an adult manipulate 
the puppet, the male experimenter who controlled the puppet was hidden from view 
from the child at all times. To ensure this, testing was conducted at a table upon which 
was set a wooden stage-like frame with a curtain. The male experimenter was blocked 
from view by a wooden partition around the stage. When the experimenter stuck their 
arm through the curtain only the puppet was visible to the child. Figure 6 provides a 
description of the set-up used in Study 4.  
 
Figure 6. View of the set-up used in Study 4 seen from above. 
Children were brought to the table by a staff member from the nursery. The male 
experimenter always manipulated the puppet - a female experimenter always played the 
role of the adult model. Children were tested individually in a separate room of the 
nursery. At the start of the testing session the puppet, named Bill, and the adult model, 
named Maria, introduced themselves to the children. The children were invited to sit at 
a desk which had the curtain set up on it. Then M2, either the puppet model or the adult 
model, left. In the case of the puppet model, this meant that the puppet retreated behind 
the curtain; the adult model left the testing area and disappeared from view. M1 then 
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began the script for either the Ffirst tasks or the AFfirst task. The procedure and the scripts 
followed those of Study 1. Like in Study 1, if after any of the demonstrations children 
did not respond, then after 5 seconds the model said “Go on, you can have a go, it’s 
fun!” If the child still did not respond for 5 seconds then the model said “Would you 
like me to show you again?” after which they repeated their lines and actions for their 
demonstration.  
Coding. Coding was conducted in the same way as Studies 1 to 3. For reliability 
purposes, both M1 and M2 recorded the child’s responses. Both models kept an 
individual scoring sheet for recording their responses – M1 had theirs next to the table 
for data collection and M2 had theirs next to their waiting spot outside of the room 
(from which they could see the child). As the task progressed they each recorded the 
child’s responses on their own sheets and then were able to compare their notes after 
each child. One of the experimenters was blind to the hypotheses of the study. There 
were 3 cases of disagreement between the experimenters but these were resolved 
through discussion.  
RESULTS 
Preliminary analyses. There was no difference for the imitation scores M1, M2, and 
M1rep between the four different tasks, Cochran’s χ2 all ps > .57. The sum imitation 
scores M1, M2 and M1rep were also similar for boys and girls, t-tests all ps > 16. There 
was also no effect of action order (FFirst vs AFFirst), p = .11. These variables were 
therefore not analysed further.  
Imitation scores. A mixed factorial ANOVA was conducted on children’s imitation 
scores, with model (M1, M2, M1rep) and game (FFirst vs AFFirst tasks) as within-subjects 
factors and model order (Puppet M1 vs Puppet M2) as a between-subject factor. As in 
Studies 1 to 3 the children imitated M1, M2 and M1rep at different rates, as there was a 
main effect of model, F(1.18, 32.9) = 21.25, p<.001, partial η2 = .431 (Greenhouse-
Geisser correction). Consistent with previous research there was also a significant main 
effect of model order, F(1, 28) = 4.52, p = .043, partial η2 = .139 and a significant 
interaction between model and model order, F(1.18, 32.9) = 4.18, p = .043, partial η2 = 
.13 (Greenhouse-Geisser correction). No other effects were significant, p > .08. 
Children were significantly more likely to copy M2 when M2 was an Adult (M = 3.1, 
SE = .23) than when M2 was a Puppet (M = 1.93, SE = .25), t(28) = 3.36, p = .002, d = 
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1.22. There were no other differences on other model scores, p = .165 and p = .359 for 
M1 and M1rep. Figure 7 gives the M1, M2 and M1rep scores between the Puppet M1 
and Puppet M2 conditions. 
 
Figure 7. Model imitation scores between the Puppet M1 and Puppet M2 conditions. Bars 
indicate standard errors. 
In the Puppet M1 condition of the AFFirst tasks, age was positively correlated 
with M2 scores (r = .56, p = .02) and marginally negatively correlated with M1rep scores 
(r = -.46, p = .08). So when children saw the adult omit the puppet’s arbitrary action, 
only the older children would omit it. In the Puppet M2 condition no such correlations 
were found (ps > .27): older children were not more or less likely to imitate the Puppet 
(M2) than younger children. Hence, when the puppet omitted an action, children of all 
ages were less likely to omit the action themselves. In contrast, when the puppet was 
M1 and the adult was M2, only older children were more likely omit the puppet’s 
arbitrary action. The younger children did not make such a difference. 
Response Pattern. Children replicated M1’s actions on all three turns (M1-M1-M1 
pattern) 49 times (38%). The model-dependent imitation (M1-M2-M1 pattern) was 
shown 25 times (20%). Copying M1 but then switching to M2 (M1-M2-M2 pattern) 
was observed 50 times (39%). This matches findings from Study 2 and 3, in that 

























Puppet M1 Puppet M2
85 
 
The aim of Study 4 was to see if children’s imitation on a successive-models task was 
influenced by the identity of the models. Children were allowed to imitate two models 
performing different versions of the same novel task: one of the models was a puppet 
and the other was an adult. As in Studies 2 and 3, whilst performance on the FFirst tasks 
did not change with age, with increasing age children became more likely to imitate M2 
on the AFFirst tasks. However in Study 4 this effect was only present when M2 was the 
adult, as when M2 was a puppet children’s age was not related to their imitation of M2. 
Children were also more likely to imitate an adult as M2 regardless of whether the adult 
was omitting or adding an arbitrary action. Therefore model identity interfered with the 
age effect observed in previous studies: older children tended not to omit arbitrary 
actions if the model doing so was a puppet.  
The results of Study 4 suggest that children were more likely to imitate actions 
that were modelled by the adult and would not imitate the puppet as much. These 
findings match on to previous studies showing that children seem to prefer actions 
modelled by adults over those modelled by puppets (Rakoczy et al., 2008) or children 
(Rakoczy et al., 2010). The findings also suggest that even though older children could 
omit the arbitrary action used by M1 in order to copy M2 (as they did when M2 was an 
adult), they did not do so when M2 was a puppet. As age was shown to be correlated 
with inhibitory ability in Study 3, it is possible that children’s inhibition was modulated 
by the identity of the model. Following the IMAIL account of imitation (Paulus, 2014), 
children are better at imitating actions that are in their own “motor repertoire” (Paulus 
et al., 2011; Hunnius & Bekkering, 2014). One of the reasons children did not imitate 
puppet as much may have been because they have less experience in imitating puppets: 
but this would have predicted that children should also have shown less imitation of M1 
if M1 was a puppet, which was not found.  
Another possibility is that the distinctness between the two models helped 
children dissociate the two action sequences. In Studies 1 to 3, where M2 is consistently 
imitated less than M1 by 3- to 5-year-olds, the two models are adults of equal 
reliability. In Study 4 the two models were very distinct: one is an adult and the other is 
a toy, manipulated in a pretend context. Three- to 5-year-olds have been shown to be 
sensitive to changes in context when imitating (Rakoczy et al., 2009), so the change in 
context may have allowed children to decide that they could imitate a different model. 
If the context between two models remains too similar, then children may not imitate a 
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deviant model’s solution if they are attempting to do the same task as the previous 
model.       
The findings from Study 4 suggest that successive-models studies which 
compare a puppet and an adult should take into account the model-based biases pre-
schoolers show at this age. In particular children may have the ability to successfully 
imitate a new action sequence, but may not do so if the model demonstrating it is less 
reliable than the original model. Alternatively, children can deviate from M1’s 
previously demonstrated action sequence to copy M2 if M2 is more reliable than M1 (as 
shown by Rakoczy et al., 2010). Children do not do so if the two models are seen as 
equally reliable (as was the case in Studies 1 to 3, where M1 was imitated more than 
M2).  
So far, the studies in this chapter have tested several aspects of the successive-
models task to determine why children imitated M2 and M1rep less than M1. Labelling 
has no effect on children’s imitation in the type of task used here: Study 2 showed that 
children did not imitate M2 more faithfully if the two models used different labels, and 
Study 3 showed that children did not M2 more faithfully if neither model used labels to 
describe the task. However, children’s ability to deviate from M1’s actions was related 
to their inhibitory ability, but only when this involves omitting arbitrary actions they 
had previously performed (Study 3). Finally Study 4 showed that children imitate M2 
more faithfully if they appear to be a more reliable model than M1 (as indicated by 
model identity). However there is another factor that remains to be investigated: the fact 
that M1’s object is always present during M2’s turn and that M1 and their object is 
present during M1rep.   
In Studies 1 to 4, a consistent finding is that 3- to 5-year-olds are at chance as to 
who to imitate on M1rep. M1 and M2 always demonstrated their action sequences on the 
same object, which means that when children imitate on M1rep, they perform their 
action on the object used by either model. This could explain why they are at chance as 
to what action to do, as they have seen the object used for either action. By the age of 2 
years children understand objects as being “for” certain purposes. Casler and Kelemen 
(2005) presented evidence that after seeing a model demonstrate actions with novel 
tools, 30-month-olds see novel tools as “for” that specific function (similar results have 
been found in 2- and 4-year-olds, DiYanni & Kelemen, 2008; Casler, 2014). Gibson’s 
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theory of affordances (Greeno, 1994) would suggest that objects remind learners of the 
actions associated with them. This would explain why actions on objects tend to be 
imitated earlier than actions on bodies (Christie & Slaughter, 2009; Kim et al., 2015) as 
objects, unlike body movements, can be associated with salient effects (Paulus, 2014). 
The object serves as a cue to remind children of the actions they observed. If this 
explanation can account for why children are at chance as to who to copy on M1rep, then 
one way of encouraging imitation of M1rep would be to provide the two models with 
different objects. This way, children will not have seen the same object used for both 
actions. On M1rep, children should therefore be more likely to imitate the only action 
they have seen the object used for.  
A further variable to control for is which model returns on the final turn. In 
Studies 1 to 4, M1 was always present for children’s third turn, which means that it is 
unclear how children would respond if M2 was present instead. Nielsen and Blank 
(2011) conducted a successive-models task where M1 and M2 demonstrated two 
different action sequences on the same object to 4-year-olds. After seeing the two 
models demonstrate their action sequences, children had a go at the task themselves, in 
the presence of either M1 or M2 (the other model left the room). In contrast to other 
studies (Rakoczy et al., 2008; Keupp et al., 2013) children did not show a preference for 
always copying M1’s action, but were more likely to imitate the action sequence of 
whichever model was present. In Nielsen and Blank’s study (2011) the two models used 
the same object, which may have had an effect on the results. M1 and M2 also 
demonstrated their actions in each other’s presence, which may have been interpreted 
by children as a cue that they could imitate either action sequence (as opposed to 
Studies 1 to 4 in this thesis where M1 and M2 were not present during each other’s 
turns). 
Study 5 thus controlled for both model presence and the object used by either 
model. Using another successive-models paradigm, children participated in five 
conditions. One condition, used as a control, had children observe two models 
demonstrate different action sequences on the same object (as in Studies 1 to 4). 
However in the other conditions, M1 and M2 demonstrated their different action 
sequences on two differently-coloured versions of the same object (e.g. on red and 
yellow cylinders). When it came to the child’s own turn to play, they were either in the 
presence of M1 or M2, using either their own object or that used by the other model. 
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This set-up will help tease apart the effects of the combination of model and object 
presence, to see if children’s imitation is affected not only by who is present, but by 
what they have previously seen the object used for. 
STUDY 5 
The aim of Study 5 was to investigate how children imitate when the actions 
cued by the model and by the object were mutually exclusive. A similar successive-
models task to the previous studies in this chapter was used: 3- to 5-year-old children 
saw M1 and M2 demonstrate different methods of playing the same game (e.g. 
“zerping”) with some novel objects. One of the models only used a functional action 
(e.g. pushing a button to turn on a light) whereas the other model would also include an 
arbitrary action (e.g. lifting the box and placing it on its side first). Given that model 
presence affects imitation when children do not copy each model in turn (Nielsen & 
Blank, 2011), like in Study 3 (no copy condition) children only imitated once, after 
having seen both models’ demonstrations. This also removed the potential confounding 
effect of a lack of inhibition, as Study 3 showed that pre-schoolers find it difficult to 
omit actions they have previously performed in this type of successive-models task.  
There were five conditions in all: in the control condition, children saw M1 and 
M2 perform their actions on the same object. This matched the previous studies used in 
this chapter and would allow for comparison with these studies, which is important as 
Study 5 used different materials to see whether the results of Study 1-4 could be 
replicated in a non-game-like context. In the other four conditions, two factors were 
varied: whether the model returning used their own object or that used by the other 
model, and whether the returning model had used the functional action only, or the 
arbitrary action as well. In the Functional Own condition, children were asked to 
perform the task by the model who had previously used only the functional action (the 
other model was absent): the functional model gave the child the object they themselves 
had used (for the functional action). This means that children were asked to perform the 
action in the presence of the model who did the functional action, and were given the 
object used for the functional action to do so, In the Functional Other condition the 
object the children used had been previously manipulated by the other model with the 
arbitrary action. In the Functional and Arbitrary Own condition, the present model on 
the child’s turn had used both the functional and arbitrary actions and gave the child 
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their own object to imitate with. Finally in the Functional and Arbitrary Other 
condition, children imitated in the presence of the model had used both the functional 
and arbitrary actions, but the children used the object used by the other model for only 
the functional action. 
The set-up of Study 5 will help tease apart the effects of model presence and 
experience with an object. If children are most sensitive to the presence of the model, 
they should copy the action associated with the present model regardless of the object 
that is being used. This would indicate that their primary motivation in the setting is to 
imitate the present model (Over & Carpenter, 2011). The social function of imitation 
becomes prevalent during the second year of life and particularly after the age of 2 
(Kim et al., 2015; Nadel, 2002) and children grow more sensitive to social cues such as 
eye contact with age (Marsh, Ropar & Hamilton, 2014). It is possible that as children 
get older the model might become a more important cue in guiding children’s imitation. 
Older children in this sample may therefore be more likely to copy the present model 
regardless of the present object.  
In contrast if children are more sensitive to the object being used then they 
should copy the action associated with the present object, regardless of who asks them 
to have a go. This would be expected if children’s expectancies with objects is the main 
cue guiding their imitation. Observational experience can allow infants to predict action 
outcomes (Hunnius & Bekkering, 2014); seeing salient effects paired with a movement 
on an object can prime infants to perform that action if they see the effect (Paulus, 
Hunnius & Bekkering, 2013). The presence of an object associated with a salient effect 
may make children more likely to focus on reproducing that effect, if their imitation is 
still mainly being driven by action-effect binding as it is in infancy.  
An additional factor controlled for was the effect of inhibitory ability. Whilst 
Study 3 showed that inhibitory ability had no effect on children in the no copy 
condition, it was always M1 who returned on the final turn of the task (M1rep). Here the 
order of the model returning after both models’ demonstrations was varied, so that it 
was sometimes M1(M1rep) and sometimes M2 (M2rep). Inhibitory ability may be 
required to demonstrate different actions to the ones used by the present model. In 
addition it may also require greater inhibitory ability to demonstrate the action used by 
M1 when M2 has just demonstrated their action and asks the child to do the same 
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(M2rep) as this action sequence may be easier for children to recall and perform. To find 
out, children also participated in the B/D task used in Study 3. If their inhibitory ability 
allows them to perform the actions of the model who is not present then there should be 
a relationship between children’s imitation scores and their B/D scores. If not, then this 
will further support the claim that inhibition is only required for imitation in certain 
contexts, and is not involved when children have no motor experience of the task in 
question.  
METHODS 
Participants. Children were tested at three nurseries across the central belt of Scotland. 
All nurseries were located in middle-class areas, but this was not controlled for data 
recruitment. Fifty-nine children were tested for this study, but one girl was excluded for 
uncooperativeness. The final sample consisted of 58 children with a mean age of 45.6 
months (SD = 9 months, ranged from 25 to 70 months, 28 male). Parental consent was 
received before testing began, debrief forms were given to the nurseries after data 
collection and the study was approved by the General University Ethics Panel at the 
University of Stirling. Only children who agreed to help the experimenters on days of 
data collection participated in the study.  
Apparatus. Five pairs of custom-made objects were used (see Table 2): the two objects 
in each pair were identical but painted in different colours. The objects were used for 
five different games, each referred to by a novel made-up word. For the “Daxing” 
game, there were two sealed cardboard tubes containing three bells each. The 
“Trepping” game used two sealed cardboard tubes each containing a handful of dried 
peas. The “Zerping” game had two boxes, both of which had LED push lights attached 
to the top and right sides of the boxes. The lights were activated by pushing the lights 
in. The “Lobbing” game used two more boxes, but these had two switches located on 
the top of the box. One of the switches was white and the other was black. For the 
“Mooshing” game there were two boxes which could be opened. A handle was on the 
top of each box to make opening the lid easier, and inside were many coloured stickers 
of faces. As mentioned above the two models used different actions on the two versions 
of the object. Table 3 shows the functional actions and the arbitrary actions performed 
on each pair of objects. 
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For the Bear-Dragon (B/D) task, children saw two hand puppets, a brown bear and a 




Table 3.  Materials and actions used in Study 5. 
Name Materials Size Functional action Arbitrary action 
Daxing 
 
3 ½ x 3 ½ inches 
Turn the object on its side 
and shake it from side to 
side, producing a noise  
Hold the object upright 
and move it anti-
clockwise in a circle twice 
Trepping 
 
3 x 10 inches 
Turn the object on its side 
and shake it from side to 
side, producing a noise 
Rotate the object forward 
one full turn  
Zerping 
 
4 ½ x 4 ½ x 4 ½ 
inches 
Turn on the side light and 
then the top light 
Lift the box and place it 




4 ½ x 4 ½ x 4 ½ 
inches 
Press the black switch in and 
then the white switch in 




4 ½ x 3 ½ x 9 
inches 
Turn the box right side up 
and open the lid 
When the box is on its 





Design. The study was a mixed design including both between-subjects and within-
subjects variables. The first task for all children was the B/D task. The two female 
experimenters each manipulated one of the puppets: the model manipulating the Bear 
puppet was then M1 for all of the following five imitation games. Model order was 
counterbalanced between children but consistent across all of the games.  
There were five imitation games for children to play. The first was always the 
control task, in which M1 and M2 performed their action sequences on the same object, 
after which M1 asked the child to have a go at playing the game with that object 
(similar to Study 1 but with different materials). The order of the other games was 
counterbalanced between children using a Latin Square Design. The order of the action 
sequences demonstrated by the two models was also varied. For half of the children M1 
would always demonstrate only the functional actions on all five games, and M2 would 
always display both the functional actions and the arbitrary actions. For the other half 
action order was reversed. 
Procedure. Children were tested individually at the different nurseries. Children were 
introduced to the two female experimenters who sat opposite them, one on their right 
and one on their left. The B/D task was always demonstrated first: at the start of the 
testing session children were introduced to the two puppets, a “nice bear” and a 
“naughty dragon”. They were then instructed by M1 (holding the bear) to copy the 
actions instructed by the bear, and not to copy the actions instructed by M2 (holding the 
dragon). There was a practice phase during which the bear and the dragon each gave 
instructions for four actions, e.g. “touch your head”, alternating between them (bear – 
dragon – bear – dragon …). After each instruction the child was given 4 seconds to 
respond. If children responded incorrectly they were immediately reminded of the rules, 
after which the game would resume. If children made three consecutive incorrect 
responses they were encouraged to sit on their hands for the remaining practice trial. 
Regardless of how children performed on the four practice trials, after these were done 
children were given four test trials. Again the bear and dragon gave four instructions 
each. No acknowledgment was made of mistakes during the test trials. The results for 
each action were recorded by the alternating model during the other’s turn. After the 
B/D task was complete, M2 left the room and M1 told the child that they would play 
some new games. 
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Control condition. In the control condition M1 brought out materials from a box behind 
them and placed them on the table. In the control condition only one object was used 
for both models. M1 announced that they would show the child how to play a new 
game, referring to it by its label: “Now I’m going to show you how to play zerping. 
Watch this!” M1 then demonstrated their action sequence on the object three times. 
After the demonstration M1 excused themselves and left the room whilst M2 returned 
and sat at the table with the child. M2 also announced that they would play the game: 
“I’m now going to play zerping. Watch this!” M2 demonstrated their action sequence 
three times, and this was always the alternative action sequence to what M1 had done. 
After demonstrating their action sequence M2 also excused themselves and left the 
room whilst M1 came back. M1 said “Would you like to play zerping now? Can you 
show me zerping?” and proffered the object to the child. In the control condition 
children saw M1 and M2 show their actions on the same object, but were always asked 
to demonstrate the actions in the presence of M1.  
The other four games all included a similar procedure to the control game, but in 
these four games M1 and M2 demonstrated their actions on differently coloured 
objects. Further to this, it was varied whether M1 or M2 came back and asked the child 
to play the game once more. 
Functional Own task. On the Functional Own task, the model who had 
demonstrated the functional action (M1 or M2) was present on the child’s final turn. 
They offered the child the object that they themselves had used. Therefore when asked 
to have a go, children were in the presence of both the model and the object that had 
previously been used for the functional actions only.  
Functional Other task. On the Functional Other task, children were again asked 
to play the game by the model that had used only the functional action. However they 
gave the child the object that had been used by the other model to demonstrate the 
arbitrary and functional actions.  
Functional and Arbitrary Own task. The procedure was identical to the 
Functional Own condition, but instead of the child being asked to play the game by the 
model who had done the functional action only, they were asked to do so by the model 
who had performed both the functional and arbitrary actions.  
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Functional and Arbitrary Other task. On this task, children were asked to play 
the game by the model who had previously shown them the functional and the arbitrary 
actions. But the object they gave the child had been used by the other model who had 
demonstrated only the functional action. 
After playing all five games, children were thanked for their participation and 
returned to their nursery class. 
Scoring. On the B/D task the same scoring system was used as in Study 3: scores 
ranged from 0 to 3: 0 = a full commanded movement, 1 = a partial commanded 
movement, 2 = a wrong movement, 3 = no movement. In this study however due to 
time constraints only 4 bear trials were administered to children. This mean that 
children’s scores on the B/D task could range from 0 to 12 (Maxcorr= 12). A higher 
score indicated better inhibitory skills. 
Children’s imitation was scored separately for the functional and arbitrary 
actions on each task. For both of these actions, children could score 0, 1 or 2. A score of 
0 meant that they did not produce the action at all. A score of 1 meant that they 
performed part of the action but not all of it, and a score of 2 meant that they performed 
the full action. In the analysis the control condition was looked at separately to the other 
four imitation games, to compare it with the same condition from Studies 2, 3 and 4 
where M1 and M2 used the same object and M1 would return, but children were 
allowed to copy each of them. The other four conditions will be used to examine the 
effect of the presence of the object and the model. 
For reliability purposes, both M1 and M2 recorded the child’s responses. Both 
models kept an individual scoring sheet for recording their responses – M1 had theirs 
next to the table for data collection and M2 had theirs next to their waiting spot outside 
of the room (from which they could see the child). As the task progressed they each 
recorded the child’s responses on their own sheets and then were able to compare their 
notes after each child. There were no disagreements between the two models. 
The imitation scores do not give us the specific responses made by each child. 
Therefore children were also coded on whether or not they copied the actions displayed 
by the present model on the imitation tasks. If children copied what the present model 
had done they received a coding of “copying the present model”. They received this 
coding regardless of whether they performed full or partial imitation of the present 
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model’s actions. If they did not copy what the model had done, but displayed the action 
sequence displayed on the object, they were coded as “copying the object”. If children 
did not respond or performed another action that was not either of the models’ actions 
they received a coding of “other”.  
 
RESULTS 
Preliminary analysis. Gender did not affect children’s imitative behaviour on any of 
the five imitation tasks, all ps > .16. Therefore this was not analysed further. 
In the control condition M1 and M2 demonstrated their actions on the same 
object and M1 was always present during the child’s turn. To investigate whether using 
the same object affected children’s copying behaviour, I compared the control condition 
with another condition in the study in which M1 and M2 used different objects and M1 
returned with her own object. A mixed factorial repeated-measures ANOVA with 
action type (functional vs. arbitrary) and condition (same vs. different object) as within 
subject factors and action order (FFirst vs. AFFirst) as between subject factor was 
conducted.  
The ANOVA found a main effect of action type: functional actions (M = 1.59, 
SE = .07) were imitated more often than arbitrary actions (M = .62, SE = .09), F(1, 56) 
= 162.8, p < .001, η2=.74. Action type interacted significantly with action order, F(1, 
56) = 6.75, p = .012, η2=.107: functional actions were imitated at equal rates regardless 
of action order, but arbitrary actions were more often imitated, when they were shown 
by M1 present on the child’s turn (M = .88, SE = .13), than when they were shown by 
M2 who was not present on the child’s turn (M = .36, SE = .1). Surprisingly, no main 
effect of condition was found (p = .79), indicating that children’s imitative behaviour 
was not affected by whether M2 used the same or a different object than M1. 
Imitation scores. After having looked at the control condition, I looked at how 
children’s imitation varied between the other four test conditions. The mean scores for 
functional and arbitrary actions are summarised in Figure 8. A mixed factorial repeated-
measures ANOVA was conducted on the four test imitation scores with model present 
(functional model vs. arbitrary + functional model), object present (present model’s 
object vs. other model’s object) and action type (functional vs. arbitrary) as within 
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subject factors and action order (FFirst vs. AFFirst) as a between subject factor. The main 
effect of action type observed in the control tasks was also present for these tasks, F(1, 
56) = 310.22, p < .001, partial η2=.847. Functional actions were imitated more 
accurately (M = 1.68, SE = .05) than arbitrary actions (M = 0.70, SE = .06). There was 
also a main effect of model presence, F(1, 56) = 4.91, p = .031, partial η2=.081, such 
that models performing the arbitrary actions were imitated more often (M = 1.28, SE = 
.07) than models who performed only the functional actions (M = 1.10, SE = .06). There 
was no main effect of object type (own vs other, p = .73) or action order (functional 
first vs arbitrary + functional first, p = .31).  
Interestingly, model presence interacted with objects significantly, F(1, 56) = 
9.90, p = .003, partial η2=.15. In the presence of the model who had used the functional 
action, arbitrary action scores where higher when this model used the other model’s 
object (i.e., the object that was associated with the arbitrary action). Conversely, in the 
presence of the model that had demonstrated the arbitrary action, arbitrary action scores 
were higher when this model used her own object. Taken together, these findings show 
that children preferred to copy the longer action sequence, and would imitate it more 
faithfully if the model used the object seen with that action sequence. Upon including 
inhibition as a covariate this interaction and the effect of model presence disappeared 
(all ps > .39) suggesting that inhibitory skills played a crucial role in children’s 
preference to copy longer action sequences over shorter ones.  
Finally, there was an interaction between model presence and action type, F(1, 
56) = 5.44, p = .023, partial η2=.09. Regardless of the model, children were highly 
likely to show the functional action, but in the presence of the model that had also 
presented the arbitrary action, children were more likely to also show this additional 




Figure 8. Imitation scores for Functional and Arbitrary actions on the Own and Other 
tasks. Bars indicate standard errors. 
Figure 9 shows children’s responses on the Other tasks: as can be seen children 
did not have any preference for copying either the action of the model or that of the 
object on the Other tasks.  
 
Figure 9. Children’s responses on the Other tasks. 
DISCUSSION 
In Study 5 three- to 5-year-olds were shown two models, M1 and M2, 




















































Children imitating the Model's action Children imitating the Object's action
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different action sequences on two different versions of the same object. Both models 
produced a functional action leading to a salient effect, but one of the models also 
produced an arbitrary action that had no effect. Children were then given the 
opportunity to play the game themselves: in some cases the model gave the child the 
object they themselves had used (e.g. M1 gave the child M1’s object). In other cases 
however the model gave the child the object used by the other model (e.g. M1 gave the 
child M2’s object).  
Overall, children imitated functional actions at much higher rates than the 
arbitrary actions: this is not surprising given that M1 and M2 both demonstrated the 
functional actions. Children are sensitive to frequency information from infancy 
(Paulus, Hunnius, Wijnegaarden, Vrins, van Rooij & Bekkering, 2011). The fact that 
children saw the functional actions twice as often as the arbitrary actions (they were 
shown by both models and on both objects) could have caused higher rates of functional 
action imitation. The level of imitation of the functional actions also did not vary 
greatly between the different game types (i.e., which model and which object was 
present).  
However the likelihood of children producing the arbitrary action was 
significantly affected by the model/object combination. When children imitated in the 
presence of the model who gave the child their own object, they were significantly 
more likely to copy the action used by that model. This led to higher arbitrary action 
scores in the Functional + Arbitrary Own task and lower arbitrary action scores in the 
Functional Own task. Children’s arbitrary action scores were higher in the Functional 
Other and Function and Arbitrary Other conditions than in the Functional Own task. 
This suggests that children’s preference to copy the arbitrary action was enhanced 
through the presence of the object on which that arbitrary action had been demonstrated 
previously. Both the object and the model that had previously been used for the 
arbitrary action encouraged imitation of that arbitrary action.  
As in the other conditions, children were more likely to imitate the arbitrary 
action in the control condition when M1 (present during the child’s turn) had also used 
it. This reflects findings from Nielsen and Blank (2011) who also found that children 
were more likely to imitate arbitrary actions when the model who had produced them 
was present during the child’s turn. The presence of the model was enough to 
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encourage imitation of that model’s actions – this showed that in the absence of motor 
experience, children’s imitation was affected by the presence of the model.  
Study 5 shows that children’s imitation can be affected not only by the way they 
have seen an object manipulated, but also by the combination between the object and 
the model present during the child’s imitation. The finding that children imitated 
arbitrary actions more on the Functional + Arbitrary Other task than on the Functional 
Own task suggests that seeing an object used for an arbitrary action is enough to 
encourage imitation of that action. On the Other tasks, children did not have a clear 
preference for displaying either the action used by the model, or the action associated 
with the object, as evidenced by the equal number of children copying the actions of the 
object and the model in Figure 8. However if the model and object present on the 
child’s turn had both been seen demonstrating the same action, children were more 
likely to imitate that action. It is the combination of cues that heightens imitation of a 
specific action rather than one cue over the other.  
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Successive-models paradigms have been used to study how children react to 
seeing two models demonstrate different methods of performing the same task. How 
children imitate both models shows how they conceive of the actions of either model, 
and therefore can be determine what factors drive pre-schoolers’ imitation. In Chapter 2 
of this thesis I conducted a successive-models task with children aged 2 to 12 years. 
Age was shown to have a large effect on imitation of successive models: children under 
3 years would only copy what M1 had done and not copy M2 at all. It was not until the 
age of 6 years that children began to imitate both models. As children aged they became 
more likely to copy M1rep and M2 on their respective turns. The aim of the current 
chapter was to isolate different variables that may have explained why children under 5 
years were less likely to copy M2 than older children. Studies 2 to 5 looked at these 
factors to help isolate what is driving children’s imitation at this age.   
The type of labels used by the models to describe their actions had no effect on 
imitation – Studies 2 and 3 found that children under 5 years did not copy M2 more 
when they used a different label to M1. Similarly Study 3 found that children did not 
imitate more faithfully if the models referred to their actions using a novel label, as 
opposed to with no label at all. Children’s copying behaviour under the age of 5 years 
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was not affected by the labels used by the model to describe their actions. Pre-schoolers 
will use labels in a mutually exclusive way to determine what labels and facts can be 
associated with objects (Casler & Kelemen, 2005; Casler, 2014; Diesendruck & 
Markson, 2001). However 2-year-olds do not show this mutually exclusivity for artefact 
functions: they will use known objects for new purposes rather than believe that they 
cannot be used for multiple goals (Casler, 2014). Schmidt et al. (2011) also found that 
labels are not necessary to encourage high-fidelity imitation (and protest towards 
deviant models) in pre-schoolers. In the type of game task used here, labelling did not 
affect the way children imitated the models: labelling therefore was not the main factor 
explaining why children under 5 years showed lower imitation of M2.  
Another consistent finding in Studies 2 to 4 was that children’s tendency to copy 
M2 increased with age particularly on the AFFirst tasks. As children got older, they were 
more likely to omit the arbitrary action used by M1, and use the shorter action sequence 
demonstrated by M2 on both M2’s turn and on M1rep’s turn. Study 3 suggests that this 
age difference may have been due to children’s growing inhibitory abilities – the better 
children were at inhibiting their actions on a version of the B/D task, the better they 
were at omitting M2’s arbitrary actions on M1rep’s turn. However this was only the case 
if children had imitated M1 themselves: if children had not copied M1’s arbitrary action 
then omission of an arbitrary action was not related to their inhibitory ability. If 
imitation involves omitting an action that children have already performed, this will 
only be possible for children who can inhibit their own actions. However motor 
inhibition ability was not the only factor affecting children’s imitation. In the no copy 
condition of Study 3 there was no relationship between children’s B/D scores and their 
imitation: inhibitory ability is thus only required when children need to omit an action 
they have themselves already performed.  
Other factors aside from motor experience also affect imitation in pre-schoolers. 
Study 4 showed that children preferred to copy certain models over others. Pre-
schoolers were more likely to copy M2 if M2 was an adult than if M2 was a puppet, 
regardless of whether M2 added or omitted an arbitrary action. This fits with previous 
research showing that adults tend to be imitated more faithfully than children between 
the ages of 3 and 5 years (Rakoczy et al., 2010; McGuigan et al., 2011). Children’s 
avoidance of imitating the puppet actually interfered with the inhibition effect 
mentioned earlier: if M1 was an adult and M2 a puppet, then children did not become 
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more likely to omit M1’s arbitrary action after seeing M2 do so. Children’s inhibition 
can thus be modulated by their evaluations of the model they are imitating. The distinct 
effects of children’s inhibitory ability and their model evaluations can interfere with one 
another, which further suggests that imitation is a composite of multiple abilities.  
Study 5 investigated whether children under 5 years were more influenced by 
actions they had seen a model do or by the way they had seen an object being used. 
Children tended to copy the action sequence of whichever model was present: this 
effect was enhanced when the model was present with their own object. The arbitrary 
action was also more likely to be performed if one of the present cues (the object or the 
model) had previously been seen using the arbitrary action. Children’s encoding of 
actions is thus sensitive to the identity of the model present during their turn and the 
actions they have seen associated with the object in question. If one wishes to 
encourage children to learn multiple ways of performing tasks in different ways, 
dissociating the context between them seems to encourage their imitation of multiple 
solutions (as context is an important factor determining imitation, Hunnius & 
Bekkering, 2014). Dissociating the context can be done by varying the presence of the 
model and the presence of the object (see also Rakoczy et al., 2009).  
The results from Studies 4 and 5 show that model identity and object 
associations both influence children’s imitation under the age of 5 years. Children are 
more likely to copy actions demonstrated by an adult if the alternative model is a 
puppet – in particular children will not omit an adult’s arbitrary action if the model 
demonstrating such an omission is a puppet. Similar findings come from Keupp et al. 
(2013) – in their study 3- to 5-year-olds who had imitated an adult model M1 would not 
deviate from their solution after seeing a deviant puppet model M2, and continued to 
display arbitrary actions at much higher rates than chance. The identity of the model 
can thus be used to counter children’s growing tendency to omit arbitrary actions as 
their inhibitory ability grows. In the absence of motor experience with a task, the 
presence of a model encourages children to imitate those model’s actions. Under the 
age of 5 years children’s imitation is therefore not only guided by factors such as action 
inhibition, but is also affected by the associations they make about objects and models.  
The results from this set of studies suggest that the identity and presence of a 
model may in fact encourage or discourage children to inhibit their actions. Studies 2 to 
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4 found that children’s tendency to omit arbitrary actions increased between the ages of 
3 to 5 years. But Schleihauf et al. (2017, Experiment 1) found that 5-year-olds would 
not omit arbitrary actions once they had performed them, even if they saw a second 
model perform the same task without the arbitrary actions. A crucial difference 
however with the present studies was that in Schleihauf et al.’s study, models were not 
present for the child’s turn. Model presence and interactivity has been shown to 
enhance children’s imitative fidelity of arbitrary actions (Nielsen et al., 2008; Marsh et 
al., 2014), therefore model presence may have encouraged children to inhibit their 
actions. Thus children may not lack the ability to inhibit their actions (as children at this 
age could do to some extent in Studies 2 to 4 of this chapter), but require the presence 
of a deviant model to encourage them to inhibit certain actions. This would explain why 
children became more likely to omit M2’s arbitrary actions with age in the studies from 
this chapter and yet 5-year-olds did not in Schleihauf et al.’s study (2017). Model 
presence may therefore encourage both the omission of arbitrary actions and their 
production (as was observed in Studies 4 and 5). 
The results from Chapter 3 suggest that under the age of 5 years children’s 
imitation is guided by internal, low-level action production mechanisms, expectancies 
about object use and social cues such as the presence and identity of the model. 
Furthermore characteristics of the social learning situation can affect the extent to 
which low-level factors like action inhibition are employed in imitating successive 
models. The ASL and IMAIL accounts of imitation (Catmur et al., 2009; Paulus, 2014) 
suggest that higher-order cognitive processes can modulate the basic mechanisms of 
action production, for example by inhibiting the priming of a motor response. This 
chapter finds evidence for such influences here: model presence and a bias for copying 
adults over puppets can both encourage inhibition or production of actions children 
have previously performed. Sensitivity to model identity grows throughout the 
preschool years as children become more sensitive to the potential reliability of 
different models (Wood et al., 2013b; Bernard et al., 2015). Children also seem to 
become more aware of the social consequences of their actions after the age of 2 years 
(Kim et al., 2015), and 2-year-olds are more likely to imitate a model who can interact 
with them (Nielsen et al., 2008). These biases will modulate the existing mechanisms of 
action-effect binding that help foster imitation in infancy (Paulus 2012, 2014). Higher-
order cognitive capabilities also imitate automatic imitation beyond childhood: 
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attributing intentions to a model has been found to enhance both automatic imitation 
effects (Liepelt et al., 2008) and automatic eye gaze following (Teufel et al. 2010) in 
adults. Children’s imitation will thus be modulated throughout childhood as their 
cognitive abilities encourage different responses and these affect the basic action 
matching processes involved in infancy. 
Taken together, the findings from Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 suggest that imitation 
is affected by the development of several abilities throughout childhood. Faithful 
imitation of successive models requires a certain level of inhibition if it involves 
overcoming one’s own motor experience. This ability develops between the ages of 3 
and 5 years (Study 3) and suggests that one of the reasons children did not imitate M2 
as faithfully as they had M1 was because they could not inhibit their previously formed 
response of performing M1’s actions. However a key point consistently found across 
Studies 1 to 4 was that once the 3- to 5-year-olds had seen M1 and M2’s action 
sequences they were at chance as to which one to copy on M1rep. Similarly in the 
control condition of Study 5 children’s imitation of the arbitrary action did not rise 
above chance level. The use of the same object by the two models thus caused a 
conflict, with the object becoming an ambiguous cue. Similarly when the model and the 
object have been associated with different actions, there is a dilemma and children 
cannot decide which one to imitate (as in the Other conditions of Study 5). Between the 
ages of 3 and 5 years children did not show a strong preference for displaying either 
action sequence on M1rep. Once having seen two models manipulate the object in a 
certain way, children used either action sequence rather than being committed to one. 
This matches findings by Wood et al. (2013b): 5-year-olds who acquire two ways to 
open a box either through personal exploration or direct instruction show no preference 
for either solution and demonstrated either solution equally often.  
Whilst 3- to 5-year-olds imitated M1rep (and to some extent M2) at chance 
levels, Study 1 showed that children above the age of 6 years were just as likely to 
imitate M2 as M1, and children above 10 years were more likely to imitate M1rep as M1 
and M2. The social pressure to imitate the present model may only affect older pre-
schoolers: children grow more sensitive to social cues between the ages of 5 and 8 years 
(Marsh et al., 2014) and more sensitive to conformity for reproducing ambiguous 
actions between the ages of 3 and 10 years (Haun et al., 2013). The results from Study 3 
further support the argument made in Chapter 2 that children above 5 years could have 
105 
 
imitated M1rep on the final turn, but they did not interpret this as the goal of the task. 
Rather it was only above the age of 6 years that children began to automatically assume 
that the goal of the game was “copy the model that is present”. 
The way children interpret the goal of the task may thus be an important factor 
determining how children imitate successive models. Chapter 4 will investigate the role 
that goal understanding plays on children’s imitation: I will review the evidence that 
goals affect the way children copy other people’s actions. I will then conduct some 
studies to show that children’s imitation will change depending on the way they 
interpret the goal of the task. This will provide further evidence that the change 
observed in children’s imitation of successive models at the age of 10 years was due to 
an increased desire to copy the present model over performing the task a certain way. 
To summarise, Chapter 3 provides evidence that children’s imitation in 
successive-models paradigms is guided by both low-level action mechanisms and by 
higher-order social learning biases. In line with Chapter 2, it is shown that children do 
not automatically imitate successive models, but are influenced by the identity of the 
model, the object the models use, and the children’s own previous experience with the 
task. I have shown in Chapter 2 that children seem to infer social goals (i.e. “copy the 
present model”) towards mid- to late-childhood in successive-models tasks, whereas 
children under 5 years will use either action sequence on this type of task once they 
have seen it performed by two models. Finally, imitation, whilst involving only basic 
mechanisms of action-effect binding, can be influenced in a top-down manner by 
children’s evaluations of the identity of the model, their object associations and their 
goal within the learning situation. In Chapter 4, I extend this concept of goals to see 
how children’s perceptions of the goals of actions affects their imitation, and whether it 











For many years researchers have been interested in why children demonstrate 
high-fidelity imitation, particularly when this compromises efficiency. For example, 
why would a child faithfully copy tapping a box with a stick, when directly opening the 
box without tapping it would also get them the reward (e.g., Nielsen & Blank, 2010)? 
Do children interpret the tapping movement as deliberate (i.e., the agent has a good 
reason for doing what they do) and thus mistakenly deem it causally necessary to 
achieve the goal (Lyons et al., 2011; Lyons et al., 2007)? Or do they regard these 
movements as normatively prescribed, such that this is what one ought to do (Kenward 
et al., 2010; Kenward, 2012; Keupp et al., 2013, 2016)?  
Chapters 2 and 3 investigated how imitation changes throughout childhood, and 
helped determine what influences children’s imitation of arbitrary actions at different 
ages. Under the age of 5 years children’s imitation depends on the type of movement 
that is to be performed: if it requires children to overcome a previous motor response 
then only children with sufficient inhibitory skills can imitate multiple models (Study 
3). Pre-schoolers’ imitation on this type of task is also affected by the identity of the 
model (if that model is deemed reliable – Study 4) and by the model-object combination 
(Study 5). And whilst the ability to imitate successive models on the same game is in 
place by the age of 6 years, children at this age show no preference for either model’s 
solution once they have seen both. In contrast, 10-year-olds and older children had a 
clear preference for copying M1 on her return. One possible explanation for this 
difference (besides that of changing low-level mechanisms) is that children’s 
interpretation of the task changed: the social goal of copying the present model became 
more important for older children (Marsh et al., 2014).  
Two theories reviewed in Chapter 1 (GOADI, and the theory of direct 
perception) also suggest that the way an action is imitated is related to the goals (in the 
goal-oriented sense, Perner & Doherty, 2005) that children associate with that action. In 
particular children reproduce the actions that are associated with goals if those goals are 
explicit or emphasised (Elsner & Pfeifer, 2012). Known goals are associated with 
known motor patterns which allow action prediction and imitation (Gampe et al., 2015). 
Whilst goal inference is not necessary for imitation to occur (Leighton et al., 2010; 
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Rumiati & Tessari, 2002) inferring the goal of an action can modulate one’s imitation 
of that action in a top-down manner. Froese and Leavens (2014) suggest that perceiving 
the goal of an action biases one’s perception and imitation of that action, for instance by 
making the learner focus on reproducing the same end goal as the model, at the expense 
of reproducing the model’s exact movements. 
Children’s imitation appears to be biased by their understanding of action goals 
from very early on in their development. Infants as young as 15 months prefer to 
reproduce a model’s presumed outcome over reproducing the model’s exact 
movements. In a seminal paper by Meltzoff (1995) infants observed an adult attempted 
to pull a dumbbell apart, but failed to reach that goal. Quite reliably 18-months-olds 
pulled the dumbbell apart, despite not ever having seen the dumbbell disassembled. 
Reproduction of the presumed goal of failed actions has been replicated for 18-months-
olds (Bellagamba & Tomasello, 1999) and for 15-months-olds, but not for 12-months-
olds (Johnson, Booth, & O’Hearn, 2001). Eighteen-months-olds are also more likely to 
reproduce intentional actions marked with “There!” than accidental actions, marked 
with “Whoops!” (Carpenter et al., 1998) Finally, 14- and 16-months-old infants 
reproduce actions more often if they are relevant to a goal (e.g., remove a Velcro latch 
from a lid the child is trying to open) than actions which are non-functional to that goal 
such as removing the latch from a different, unrelated box (Bauer, 1992; Brugger, 
Lariviere, Mumme, & Bushnell, 2007). Despite these actions being virtually identical 
infants in their first year of life copy them in a distinct fashion depending on the 
context.  
The findings from Brugger et al.’s study (2007) show that infants prefer to 
reproduce actions that lead to salient effects over actions performed without salient 
effects. Similar findings come from Kim et al. (2015) who observed that 18-month-olds 
would prefer to copy actions on objects that led to salient effects than actions that led to 
no effect. Jones (2007) has also observed that infants do not reliably imitate arbitrary 
actions (that is, actions that do not lead to salient effects) until the second year of life. 
According to IMAIL theory, salient action effects guide imitation of behaviour by 
becoming associated with the motor program used to bring about that effect (Paulus, 
2014). Actions without salient effects are imitated later in development because it is 
only with age that children learn to form associations between actions and less salient 
effects. Kim et al. (2015) noted that social consequences of a child’s actions (such as a 
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person looking where the child has pointed) do not encourage repeated imitation of 
those actions as much as salient object effects (such as a light turning on at the push of a 
button). Under the age of 2 years, infants focus primarily on bringing about salient 
effects. 
In contrast to infants, older pre-schoolers show an increase in their tendency to 
copy actions performed without salient effects (Hilbrink et al., 2013; Marsh et al., 2014; 
McGuigan et al., 2011; Nielsen & Tomaselli, 2010; Nielsen, 2006; Xu & Kushnir, 
2013). For example, if an adult taps a box with a stick before opening the lid, by 
preschool age children reliably copy the tapping movement before opening the box 
themselves, and this tendency increases with age (Horner & Whiten, 2005; Keupp et al., 
2013; McGuigan & Graham, 2010; McGuigan et al., 2011; Moraru et al., 2016; Nielsen 
& Blank, 2011; Whiten et al., 2016). Different theories explaining such faithful copying 
have been proposed: some have argued that children at this age believe all actions are 
causally relevant to achieve the end-state (Lyons et al., 2011, 2007); others suggest that 
children imitate to affiliate with the model ((Nielsen & Blank, 2011; Over & Carpenter, 
2012a, 2012b); whilst again others have suggested that children interpret the arbitrary 
actions as normatively prescribed in the context of the game (Keupp et al., 2013, 2016; 
Rakoczy et al., 2009).  
Older children’s imitation has also been shown to vary according to the context. 
Specifically, children imitate movements more faithfully if these movements are 
performed in the absence of a plausible external goal. For example, Bekkering et al. 
(2000) had 3- to 6-year-olds observe an adult moving their hands towards either two 
dots on the table (context present) or towards two unmarked locations (context absent). 
Children copied the model’s exact hand movements (i.e. the model reached to their 
right with their left hand, crossing their midline in a contralateral movement) more 
faithfully in the context absent conditions than in the context present conditions. 
Gleissner et al. (2000) reported a similar finding for manual gestures, whereby 3-year-
olds copied gestures more accurately when demonstrated near a body part (e.g., 
grasping air next to the ear) than when the gestures were demonstrated on the body part 
(e.g., touching the ear). Carpenter et al. (2005) also found that 12- to 18-months-olds, 
who had witnessed a mouse being hopped across the table, would copy the hopping 
movement less often when the mouse was put into a house than when it was simply 
placed at an unmarked location on the table.  
109 
 
Recently, a theory of imitation was proposed by Schachner and Carey (2013) 
that explains both imitation of arbitrary actions, and why actions are imitated more 
faithfully when they are performed without context. The argument is that, because 
children cannot attribute an external goal to arbitrary actions, they assume that the 
movement itself is a goal. Broadly speaking, adults naturally assume that movements 
are means to an end (e.g.: Blum & McHugh, 1971; Baker, Goodman & Tenenbaum, 
2009; Lombrozo, 2010; Schneider, Slaughter & Dux, 2017). For example, pressing the 
button of a coffee maker achieves the goal of getting a coffee. Adults thus interpret the 
actions of others as having goals (Froese & Leavens, 2014). Some movements, 
however, lack clear goal-directedness. Watching somebody repeatedly jump up and 
down may trigger speculations about the underlying goal. When adults watch an 
animate agent perform actions without any relevant context (e.g. jumping up and down 
and from side-to-side), they are more likely to infer that the movements themselves 
were the goal than when the same actions are performed in a relevant context (e.g. 
knocking coloured balls into colour-matched boxes; Schachner & Carey, 2013). This 
could explain why children and adults copy movements that are not essential to a final 
goal, a behaviour sometimes referred to as “over-imitation”, “super-copying” or “high-
fidelity imitation” (McGuigan et al., 2011): they interpret these actions as a separate but 
valuable goal. Schachner and Carey (2013) proposed that replication of arbitrary actions 
may be an instance of “movement-based” goal emulation. 
Schachner and Carey’s account could also explain why infants and children 
copy identical actions selectively depending on the context: they infer external goals 
when a context is present (e.g. the goal is to put the mouse in the house) and are less 
likely to focus on replicating the model’s exact movements (or movements unrelated to 
that external goal, as in Brugger et al., 2007). In contrast infants infer movement-based 
goals when a context is absent (e.g. the goal is to hop the mouse), leading them to copy 
the movement itself more faithfully. In high-fidelity imitation studies, pre-schoolers 
interpret the arbitrary actions as having movement-based goals, leading them to imitate 
them faithfully.  
The aim of this chapter was to determine whether high-fidelity imitation in pre-
schoolers is affected by varying the type of goal children associate with the actions of 
the model. Studies 6 and 7 set out to extend the findings of Schachner and Carey (2013) 
using a similar study design to Carpenter et al. (2005) and Gleissner et al. (2000). The 
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objective of Study 6 was to see whether previous findings could be replicated, with 
movements without context being imitated more faithfully than movements performed 
with a relevant context. After replicating findings from the previous literature, Study 7 
investigated whether children’s high-fidelity imitation of arbitrary actions could be 
modulated by providing the model’s arbitrary actions with a secondary external goal, 
rather than just being an arbitrary action performed without context.  
STUDY 6 
In Study 6, 2- to 5-year-olds saw object- and body-related actions either in the 
context of an external goal or without such a context. For instance in one object-based 
task coloured coins were hopped (Movement Style) either towards a box and slotted in it 
(Context, C) or towards pre-defined locations on the table (No Context, NC). By 
Schachner and Carey’s (2013) reasoning, movement-based goals should be inferred to a 
greater extent in NC because the hopping movement does not directly achieve an 
external goal. Children should therefore replicate the hopping movement more often in 
NC than in C. Similarly, in the body-related tasks the experimenter performed a 
movement in a distinctive way (e.g. crossing her arms and lifting them to shoulder 
height) that either had a visible goal or did not. In C the experimenter touched her 
shoulders and rubbed them, while in NC she performed the rubbing action without 
touching her shoulders whilst holding her arms crossed. Because the action achieved an 
external goal in C but not in NC, children were expected to infer a movement-based 
goal for the model’s action more in NC than in C. If this occurs, then it is predicted that 
children will replicate contra-lateral arm movements more often in NC than in C. So in 
both object- and body-related actions children were expected to copy the distinctive 
action style more in NC than in C, because children will infer movement-based goals 
more in NC than C. 
Each imitation task was introduced with a novel label (e.g., “wubsing”) to 
decrease children’s focus on external goals and to ensure that they would pay attention 
to all elements of an action sequence (e.g. Keupp et al., 2013). The British Picture 
Vocabulary Scale (2nd edition) was also administered to children as previous research 
found a close connection between imitation and communication skills (De Giacomo et 
al., 2009; Stone, Ousley, & Littleford, 1997).  
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Another variable that has been argued to affect children’s imitation of other 
people’s actions is their perspective-taking abilities. According to Perner and Doherty 
(2005) one can understand actions as either goal-oriented (as done to bring about an 
effect in the world) or as goal-directed (where one understands that the action is done 
by an agent who has that goal in mind); the latter understanding requires a grasp of 
intentions and a certain level of mind-reading. The GOADI account (Wohlschläger et 
al., 2003) would argue that children understand actions as goal-directed, whereas I have 
argued in Chapter 1 that most findings in children’s imitation can be explained using a 
goal-oriented understanding. Thus, if movement-based goals can be understood without 
a grasp of intentions, then this provide evidence that pre-schoolers can understand 
movement-based goals without needing to understand that the model had that goal in 
mind (as an intention). To assess whether children’s perspective-taking abilities was 
related to their imitation accuracy I administered a false belief task (Perner, Mauer, & 
Hildebrand, 2011; Wimmer & Perner, 1983). The false belief task was chosen as it is an 
assessment of children’s grasp of other people’s mental states, and children typically 
pass the standard version of this task around the age range we were testing (between 3 
and 5 years). This would determine whether children who can reason about mental 
states in the false belief task are more able to infer movement-based goals.   
METHODS 
Participants. In total 30 children (Mage= 47 months, SD = 12 months) participated in the 
study. The children were split into two age groups: 2- to 3-year-olds (N = 15, 7 male, 
Mage = 38 months, SD = 5 months, range: 26 – 47 months), and 4- to 5-year-olds (N = 
15, 6 male, Mage = 56 months, SD = 8 months, range: 48 – 70 months). The catchment 
areas for the schools, playgroups and nurseries differed socio-economically, however 
this variable was not analysed in this study. All parents gave written consent prior to 
their children participating in the study and debrief forms were provided. Ethical 
approval was granted by the Psychology Ethics Committee of the University of Stirling. 
Materials. Children were given four object tasks (see Table 1A), each consisting of toys 
custom-made for the study. Children were also shown four body tasks (see Table 1B), 
consisting of everyday actions chosen based on previous studies (Gleissner et al., 2000; 
Stone et al., 1997; Zmyj, Aschersleben, Prinz, & Daum, 2012). Table 1 details the 
materials and actions involved in each of the tasks of Study 6 and Study 7. Children’s 
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verbal mental age was assessed using the BPVS-II flipchart. Their perspective-taking 
abilities were assessed using a standard false belief task (Perner et al., 2011; Wimmer & 




Table 4. Descriptions of the actions and materials for the object games in Studies 6 and 7 
Game Materials Action 1 Action 1 movement 
style 
Action 2 
Gilbing / Filling the cup 
 
 
Both conditions: cut-out shapes 
of triangles and squares, a cup. 
C condition only: a larger 
triangle and square 
C condition: moving the cut-outs from 
their pile to their corresponding shape 
NC condition: moving the cut-outs to 
unmarked places on the table 
Zigzagging the shapes 
across the table towards the 
locations  
Placing the cut-outs into 
the cup  
Teebing / Ringing the bell 
 
 
Both conditions: bell in a 
wooden tripod 
C condition only: a piece of A4 
paper and a pen 
NC condition only: no paper and 
a stick replaces the pen 
C condition: drawing a circle on the paper 
with the pen 
NC condition: moving the stick around in 
a circle on the table  
Dragging the pen/stick 
across the table 
Ringing the bell with the 
pen 
Yemsing / Threading the 




Both conditions: wooden beads 
and a wire necklace 
C condition only: three plastic 
prongs 
C condition: placing the wooden beads 
onto each of the prongs in a circle 
NC condition: hopping the bead around in 
a circle 
Sliding the wooden beads 
across the table on their 
side 
Threading the beads onto 
the wire necklace 
Wubsing / Slotting the 
coins into the box 
 
 
Both conditions: set of red and 
yellow coins and a slotted box 
C condition only: larger red and 
yellow circles 
C condition: sorting the coins by colour 
onto the corresponding shape 
NC condition: moving the coins onto the 
unmarked locations 
Jumping the coins across 
the table in a hopping 
motion 





Table 5. Descriptions of the actions for the body games in Studies 6 and 7. 
Game Action 1 Action 1 movement style Action 2 
Qulling / Rubbing hands C condition: scratching one’s 
face 
NC condition: moving one’s 
hand up to one’s face 
Holding one’s hand in a claw-
like position 
Rubbing one’s hands 
Lupping / Squeezing your 
nose 
C condition: patting one’s 
head 
NC condition: moving one’s 
hand up and down above 
one’s head 
Raising the arm from the front 
to the back till it is raised 
above the head 
Squeezing one’s nose 
Zerping / Clapping hands C condition: rubbing one’s 
shoulders 
NC condition: moving one’s 
arms up and down above 
one’s shoulders 
Holding one’s arms 
contralaterally 
Clapping one’s hands 
Daxing / Rubbing tummy C condition: rubbing one’s 
earlobes 
NC condition: rubbing one’s 
fingers together above one’s 
ears 







Design. Each child participated in eight tasks: four object tasks in which the actions were 
performed on objects, and four body tasks, in which the actions were performed on one’s 
own body. To introduce each game we used novel labels, for example “lupping” or 
“wubsing”. The most important factor, which varied within subjects, was the context in 
which the action was presented: In the context-present condition (C) movements (e.g. 
hopping coins) had a clear external goal (slotting into the box), while in the context-absent 
condition (NC) the coins were hopped towards a pre-defined, unmarked location on the table. 
Overall each child saw two NC object tasks, two NC body tasks, two C object tasks and two 
C body tasks. The order of task type (body tasks first versus object tasks first) was 
counterbalanced between children. The order of C and NC was counterbalanced using a Latin 
Square Design. The British Picture Vocabulary Scale was administered between the body and 
the object task sets. The false belief task was administered at the end of the session.  
Procedure. Each child was tested individually in a separate room from the playgroup/nursery.  
Body tasks. For the body tasks the experimenter said: “Now I am going to show you 
something - this is how I lupp”. In C she presented the action in a clear context, such as 
rubbing one’s shoulders, whilst in NC the context was absent. Instead of rubbing one’s 
shoulders the model moved her arms up to shoulder height and moved her hands in a rubbing 
motion, but did not touch her shoulders. After demonstrating the actions the experimenter 
said “Now I will show you again” before demonstrating the action a second time. Then she 
said “One more time” before demonstrating the action a third time. All three demonstrations 
were performed in less than 30 seconds.  
In both C and NC the action had a specific movement style. This was a particular 
way of performing the action: for example, the experimenter crossed her arms. This 
movement style was identical in C and NC. After the three demonstrations, the experimenter 
said to the child: “That was how I lupp. Now it’s your turn to lupp”. The child was given 30 
seconds to imitate the gestures. The same procedure was repeated for all body tasks. 
Object tasks. For the object tasks the experimenter began by saying: “Now I am going 
to show you something - this is how I wubs”. The experimenter demonstrated the action with 
a specific movement style (e.g. hopping). In C the action had a clear context, such as slotting 
coins into a box, whereas in NC the same movement was used without such a context: The 
coins were hopped towards a pre-defined, unmarked location. After the first demonstration 
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the experimenter reset the apparatus and repeated the demonstration two more times using the 
same procedure as for the body tasks. 
British Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS). The BPVS-II edition flipchart was used as a 
measure of children’s verbal mental age. The experimenter said “Now I’m going to show you 
some pictures” and then read the standardised instructions as well as the demonstration and 
practice round. 
False Belief Task. A false belief task was presented on a laptop as a PowerPoint animation, 
while the story was narrated by the experimenter (Perner et al., 2011). The animation showed 
a girl named Lisa putting her teddy into a red basket and then leaving the room. Whilst she 
was out her brother, Tom, moved the bear from the red basket to the yellow basket and then 
left. Once the room was empty the child was asked some comprehension questions to check 
their understanding of the story. If they answered any of these incorrectly the story was 
repeated. Lisa was then shown re-entering the room and the child was told that she wanted to 
play with her teddy, asking the child "Where will Lisa search first for her teddy?” Then Lisa 
was shown how she in fact looked in the red basket and the child was asked “Why did Lisa 
search for her teddy in the red basket?”  
Coding. If the child performed the movement style (e.g. jumping the coin; crossing arms 
contra-laterally) they would receive a score of 1, and if they did not replicate the movement 
style they would get a score of 0. Children were coded by the experimenter during the testing 
sessions. 
To calculate children’s verbal mental age scores, we followed the guidelines of the 
BPVS-II handbook.  
For the false belief task answering the prediction question “Where will Lisa search 
first for her teddy?” with “red” would score the child one point, while “yellow” would score 
zero. The child’s answer for “Why did Lisa search for her teddy in the red basket?” was given 
full points (2 points) if it made explicit mention of mental states, e.g. “Lisa thought it was still 
in there” or “she didn’t know”. Whereas an answer that gave a relevant story fact, such as 
“she put it there”, would be given 1 point. If the child replied with irrelevant story facts, such 
as “it’s in the yellow basket”, or desires, such as “she wanted to look there”, the child would 
score zero (Perner, Lang, & Kloo, 2002; Priewasser, Roessler, & Perner, 2013). For the 





Preliminary Analyses. There was no effect of task type order (object tasks first vs. body tasks 
first) on body or object movement style imitation, all ps > .33. There was also no effect of 
context order (C first vs. NC first), all ps > .51. Girls and boys imitated at similar rates on all 
scores, all ps > .18. These variables were not considered further. 
Movement Style Imitation. A mixed factorial repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted on 
the imitation style scores (e.g. hopping) for task type (object vs. body) and context (C vs. NC) 
with age group (2 levels: 2- to 3-year-olds and 4- to 5-year-olds) as between subject factor. 
As seen in Figure 10 context significantly affected movement style imitation, F(1, 28) = 
24.03, p < .001, η2=.46. As predicted children imitated movement style more faithfully in NC 
(M = 1.53, SE = .10) than in C (M = 0.87, SE = .13). Children also imitated movement style 
more faithfully on the object tasks (M = 1.42, SE = .10) than on the body tasks, (M = 0.98, SE 
= .13), F(1, 28) = 11.21, p = .002, partial η2=.29, although the difference between body and 
object task imitation was smaller in C (Mdiff = 0.28) than in NC (Mdiff = 0.60), F(1, 28) = 4.80, 
p = .037, partial η2=.15. The older age group (M = 1.43, SE = .13) also imitated movement 
style more faithfully than the younger children (M = 0.97, SE = .13), F(1, 28) = 6.61, p = 
.016, partial η2=.19. 9 In passing it can be noted that children imitated the action end goal of 
the action sequences at equal rates regardless of condition. 
 
Figure 10. Movement style imitation scores split for context-present (C) and context-absent 































2- to 3-year-olds 4- to 5-year-olds
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Upon entering children’s BPVS raw score as a covariate the main effect of context (C 
vs. NC), F(1, 27) = .674, p = .42 and its interaction with task type (body vs object), F(1, 27) 
= 2.34, p = .14, fell below significance. When controlling for false-belief understanding, the 
main effect of task type was marginally significant, F(1, 25) = 3.90, p = .059, while its 
interaction with context fell below significance, F(1, 25) = 1.82, p = .19. The main effects of 
age group and context remained significant. 
DISCUSSION 
The prime objective of Study 6 was to replicate findings that children reproduce 
different elements of an action sequence depending on the context (Bekkering et al., 2000; 
Carpenter et al., 2005; Gleissner et al., 2000). Consistent with previous studies, children 
copied movement styles (e.g., hopping) more accurately when an external goal was absent. 
Another finding was that children with greater verbal ability imitated the model’s body 
movements more faithfully than children with lower verbal ability. A link between language 
skills and imitation of body movements has been previously found (De Giacomo et al., 2009; 
Stone et al., 1997) and was interpreted in terms of children’s communicative development. 
Before children can verbally express their needs and desires, they use their body to 
communicate and convey information (Nadel & Fontaine, 1989; Nadel, 2002; 2014). Only 
gradually do they swap gestures for words which may explain the close link between body 
movements and verbal abilities.  
Movement styles were copied with greater accuracy in the object tasks than in body 
tasks, which is also in line with previous studies (Christie & Slaughter, 2009; Kim et al., 
2015; Stone et al., 1997). Kim et al. (2015) found this difference even when the actions 
involved were identical between body and object tasks. Salient external effects (e.g. pushing 
a button causes a light to turn on) increased object-related imitation in their study. In the 
present study too, object movements produced a salient effect (tapping coins on the table), 
which could explain why they were copied with increased accuracy. Salient target objects 
may also direct children’s attention to the observed action, facilitating action encoding and 
retrieval (Elsner, 2007). Indeed, even infants remember actions associated with objects (Bhatt 
& Rovee-Collier, 1996; Borovsky & Rovee-Collier, 1990; see Paulus, 2014) and they 
reproduce observed actions with said objects when given the chance (Yang, Bushnell, 
Buchanan & Sobel, 2013).  
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False-belief understanding had no effect on the difference between NC and C – this 
suggests that children’s ability to infer movement-based goals was unrelated to their 
perspective-taking abilities. This could be taken as evidence that children understand 
movement-based goals in the goal-oriented sense, rather than the goal-directed sense which 
would require an understanding of that agent has having that goal in mind. Whereas GOADI 
would argue that imitation and goal understanding require a grasp of intentions, generalist 
theories would claim that intentions are not always necessary to imitate. The current findings 
support this latter view, as movement-based goal inference was unrelated to false-belief 
understanding in Study 6.  
Finally, there is converging evidence that over the course of development children 
copy actions more faithfully, particularly when those actions do not lead to an obvious 
external goal (Hilbrink et al., 2013; Marsh et al., 2014; McGuigan et al., 2011; Nielsen & 
Tomaselli, 2010; Nielsen, 2006; Xu & Kushnir, 2013). In the present study too, with 
increasing age children copied movement styles more accurately in body and object tasks. 
Thus, Study 6 fully replicates several previous findings, providing a good foundation to 
investigate the primary aim of this chapter: whether children would still imitate arbitrary 
actions if they were presented as fulfilling a second external goal rather than a movement-
based goal.  
Bekkering et al. (2000) speculated that the inability to track multiple goals may limit 
action imitation in younger children. If, as Schachner & Carey (2013) propose, arbitrary 
actions are interpreted as movement-based goals and movement-based goals are ranked lower 
in the hierarchy of goals (Baker, Saxe, & Tenenbaum, 2009), then younger children in 
particular, who may only be able to track one goal, would be more inclined to imitate external 
goals. This would explain the difference in infants’ imitative performance for actions 
with/without context: In C they infer an external goal (i.e., slotting coins) while in NC, due to 
the lack of an external goal, they infer a movement-based goal (i.e., hopping), giving rise to 
selective imitation. If infants observe an action sequence which leads to a clear effect, they 
will be most likely to imitate actions that led to that effect and omit arbitrary actions that did 
not lead to that effect (as was found by Brugger et al., 2007). As children’s cognitive 
capacities become more powerful, they may be able to consider both types of goals, giving 
rise to faithful imitation of arbitrary actions. In Study 7 therefore the number of external goals 
in the model’s action sequence was increased from one to two, to see whether this would 




Previous studies have shown that children copy actions more faithfully when they are 
performed without context (i.e. when no plausible goal can be attributed to the action). Study 
7 investigated whether this would still be the case when, rather than appearing as simply 
arbitrary, actions had a secondary external goal unrelated to the main external goal of the 
task. This is important as it establishes whether there is a difference between cases where the 
movements can be related to clearly different external goals, and cases where there is only 
one external goal, but the movements achieve it in a clearly inefficient way (as is the case in 
over-imitation studies, e.g.: Horner & Whiten, 2005; Keupp et al., 2013; Nielsen & Blank, 
2011). If children are more likely to infer movement-based goals in the latter case (when 
there is only one external goal) then it would provide evidence that arbitrary actions are 
interpreted as movement-based goals in over-imitation studies. 
Study 7 used the same games and set-up as Study 6. To investigate whether the 
number of goals would affect movement style imitation an extra external goal was added in 
both NC and C. In C in the object tasks for instance the coins were hopped towards colour-
matched plates, before being slotted into the box. In this case, it was possible to extract two 
external goals, (1) sorting coins onto plates and (2) slotting coins into a box. In NC the coins 
were hopped towards a blank, predefined location, but they were eventually slotted into a 
box. Importantly the hopping action was never directed towards the box, but to the side away 
from the box such that the movement style did not directly lead to the external goal of 
slotting. While in NC the hopping action did not directly lead to an external goal, in C the 
coins were sorted onto colour-matched plates, thus building a context around the hopping 
movement. 
NC of Study 7 closely resembles classic over-imitation tasks, which typically include 
an action (hopping coins towards pre-defined locations) that does not have an observable 
effect on the end-goal (slotting coins into a box). As Schachner and Carey (2013) pointed out, 
movement-based goals should also be inferred for arbitrary actions when they bring about an 
external goal in a clearly inefficient way. If this is indeed the case, children in Study 7 should 
imitate movement-styles (e.g., hopping) more faithfully in NC than in C. In contrast, if 
particularly younger children, like infants (Hauf, Elsner, & Aschersleben, 2004), prefer to 
copy actions with salient effects (e.g., slotting coins), then they should imitate the movement 
style (hopping) at equal rates in both conditions.  
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In Study 6, children imitated the end goal of the action sequences at equal rates 
between the NC and C conditions. However, now that there were two actions demonstrated 
by the model in C, it was possible that children would not imitate the actual end goal of the 
action as much as in NC. Therefore in addition to recording children’s imitation of movement 
styles, children’s actual reproduction of the end goals was recorded.  
Study 7 also looked at the effect of labels on children’s imitation pattern. Previously, 
Herrmann et al. (2013), revealed that imitative fidelity of 3- to 6-year-olds was lower when 
they stated the end-goal (e.g. “she gets pegs up”), in comparison to a convention-oriented 
condition (“she always does it this way”). Keupp et al. (2013) investigated this effect further 
by either naming the game after its effect (e.g. “ringing the bells”) or with a novel label (e.g. 
“daxing”). In their study, children protested against the omission of arbitrary actions more in 
the novel label condition. Thus, framing the game in terms of a novel label encouraged 
children to pay attention to actions that were not causal in bringing about the final goal. 
Elsner and Pfeifer (2012) also observed that pre-schoolers were more likely to reproduce an 
action’s end goal at the expense of copying the model’s movement faithfully if that end goal 
was verbally emphasised by the model. In Chapter 3 of this thesis, labelling was not found to 
have an effect on children’s imitation in a successive-models task. Given these mixed 
findings, labelling was included as a variable in this study to see if it would affect imitation 
on a different type of copying task. In the present study the model either called the task by its 
end-state (e.g., “slotting the coin into the box”) or by a novel label (e.g., “wubsing”) to see 
whether this affected movement style imitation. Given the effects found in Study 6 the 
BPVS-II and the false belief task were also included. 
METHODS 
Participants. Participants were 58 children aged between 31 and 71 months (Mage = 49 
months, SD = 11 months) from British nurseries, playgroups and schools. An additional child 
was excluded due to uncooperativeness. Children were randomly assigned to either the novel 
frame (N = 30, 12 males, Mage = 48 months SD = 10 months range: 31 - 67 months) or the 
end-state frame (N = 28, 16 males, Mage = 50 months SD = 11 months range: 34 – 71 
months).The final sample was split into two age groups: children aged 2 to 3 years (N = 29, 
15 males, Mage = 40 months; SD = 5 months, range: 31 - 48 months) and children aged 4 to 5 
years (N = 29, 14 males, Mage = 58 months SD = 7 months, range: 48 – 71 months). The 
catchment areas for the schools, playgroups and nurseries differed socio-economically, 
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however this variable was not coded in this study. All parents gave written consent, debrief 
forms were provided after the study and the procedure was approved by the Psychology 
Ethics Committee of the University of Stirling. 
Materials. Study 7 used the same materials as Study 6. Additional custom-made materials 
were used for the new external goal (e.g., coloured plates). Table 1 details the materials and 
actions involved in each of the tasks. Children’s verbal mental age was assessed using the 
British Picture Vocabulary Scale (second edition) flipchart and their perspective taking 
abilities were assessed with a standard false belief task (Wimmer & Perner, 1983).  
Design. As in Study 6 each child participated in four object tasks and four body tasks. One 
group of children received the tasks using novel names, for example “lupping” or “wubsing”, 
while the other group received the tasks naming the effect of the last action in the sequence, 
for example “clapping your hands” or “slotting coins into the box”. Context type, context-
present (C) and context-absent (NC), was again varied within subjects, so each child saw two 
NC object tasks, two NC body tasks, two C object tasks and two C body tasks. The order of 
task type (body tasks first versus object tasks first) was counterbalanced between children. 
The order of context (C vs NC) was counterbalanced using a Latin Square Design. The 
British Picture Vocabulary Scale was administered between the body and object task sets and 
the false belief task was administered at the end of the session.  
Procedure. Each child was tested individually in a separate room from the playgroup/nursery.  
Body tasks. For the body tasks the experimenter said: “Now I am going to show you 
something - this is how I lupp/clap my hands”. The experimenter then demonstrated the same 
body actions as in Study 1, but finished with an additional external goal, for example, by 
clapping the hands.  
Object tasks. For the object tasks the experimenter began by saying: “Now I am going to 
show you something - this is how I wubs/slot the coins into the box”. The experimenter then 
performed an action with a specific movement style (e.g. hopping). In C the first action had a 
clear context, such as sorting coloured coins onto corresponding coloured plates, whereas in 
NC the same sequence of movements was used without such a context (e.g. the plates were 
absent). In both conditions the coins were finally slotted into the box.  
Coding. Children were coded on whether they imitated the final action (e.g., sorting) in each 
task. Children could receive three possible scores. If they brought about the goal, they 
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received a score of 1; if they did not, they received a score of 0. If they attempted the goal but 
did not complete it they received a score of .5. Scores were coded separately for body tasks 
and object tasks and could range between 0 and 4 (as there were four body and four object 
tasks each). Children were also assessed on whether they imitated the specific movement 
style. If children performed the movement style for the action in question they received a 
score of 1; if they did not perform the movement style they received a score of 0. Scores were 
again coded separately for object and body tasks, so for each type of task children received a 
movement style imitation score that could range from 0 to 4.  
RESULTS 
Preliminary analyses. There was no effect of gender, context order or game order (the order 
in which the individual games appeared) on imitation scores, all ps > .19. Consequently, 
these variables were not considered further.  
External goal imitation. A mixed factorial repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted on the 
external goal imitation scores for each task type (object vs. body) and context (C vs. NC) 
with age group (2 levels: 2- to 3-year-olds and 4- to 5-year-olds) and verbal frame (2 levels: 
novel vs. end-state) as between subject factors. There was a statistically significant main 
effect of task type, F(1, 54) = 16.68, p < .001, partial η2=.24. As can be seen in Figure 11A, 
children produced the external goal (i.e., sorting coins) demonstrated by the model more on 
the object tasks (M = 1.89, SE = .03) than on the body tasks (M = 1.51, SE = .09). There was 
however no main effect of context type or age group for the imitation of the external goal.  
However, age interacted significantly with context. While older children (M = 1.74, 
SE = .07) did not differ from the younger children (M = 1.71, SE = .07) in NC, in C older 
children (M = 1.78, SE = .08) imitated more accurately than their younger peers (M = 1.58, 
SE = .08), F(1, 54) = 4.12, p = .047, partial η2=.071. There was also an interaction between 
action type (body vs object) and context, F(1, 54) = 4.46, p = .039, partial η2=.076: on the 
object tasks the younger children copied the action more faithfully in NC (M = 1.93, SE = 
.041) than in C (M = 1.67, SE = .1), but there was no such difference on the body tasks. No 










Figure 11. Imitation scores split for context-present (C) and context-absent (NC) condition 
for both age groups. 11A: End-goal imitation scores. 11B: Movement style imitation scores. 
Bars indicate standard errors. 
Movement style imitation. A mixed factorial repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted on 
the movement style scores (e.g., hopping) for task type (object vs. body) and context (present 
vs. absent) with age group (2 levels: 2- to 3-year-olds and 4- to 5-year-olds) and verbal frame 
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style was imitated more faithfully in NC (M = 1.42, SE = .07) than in C (M = 0.93, SE = .07), 
F(1, 54) = 43.73, p < .001, η2=.45. So when the secondary action appeared to have an 
unrelated external goal (in the C condition) children imitated that action significantly less 
than when it appeared to have no plausible external goal (in the NC condition). Movement 
style imitation was also greater for object tasks (M = 1.35, SE = .06) than for body tasks (M = 
1.00, SE = .09), F(1, 54) = 11.23, p = .001, partial η2=.17 (see Figure 11B). Older children (M 
= 1.35, SE = .08) imitated more accurately than the younger children (M = 0.99, SE = .08), 
F(1, 54) = 10.17, p = .002, partial η2=.16. There was no effect of verbal frame, F(1, 54) = .19, 
p = .67. These findings replicated those of Study 6, and the effects can be seen in Figure 10B. 
When BPVS scores were entered as a covariate into the above analysis, only the effect of task 
type fell below significance, p = .253. All other effects remained significant, ps < .05. When 
false-belief task scores were entered as a covariate all effects remained significant, all ps < 
.043. This replicates the finding from Study 6 that false-belief understanding was not related 
to children’s imitation of specific movement styles. 
DISCUSSION 
The aim of Study 7 was to investigate whether preschool-aged children would still 
copy particular movement styles more accurately when the movements in question finished 
with an external goal (i.e., slotting coins) that was unrelated to that action, as opposed to 
when the movement styles had a primary external goal (i.e., sorting coins onto plates) 
additionally to the other unrelated goal. Overall, children copied movement styles (e.g., 
hopping), but not end-goals (e.g., sorting coins vs. hopping coins towards an unmarked 
location), more accurately in the context-absent condition than in the context-present 
condition.  
This supports Schachner & Carey’s (2013) hypothesis that arbitrary actions can be 
interpreted as having movement-based goals. Movement-based goals will be inferred when 
movements do not have an external effect on the environment or when actions only bring 
about goals in clearly inefficient ways. In Study 7, hopping the coins towards colour-matched 
plates could be interpreted as an external goal (i.e. sorting the coins onto the plates) which 
was unrelated to the other external goal of slotting the coins into the box. In this case then 
children should not infer a movement-based goal for the model’s actions of hopping the coins 
and will instead infer that this action is for a primary external goal. In the context-absent 
condition, however, hopping the coins towards unmarked locations did not appear to have a 
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direct external goal. However, it could be viewed as bringing about the external goal of 
slotting the coins into the box in a very inefficient way. Under such circumstances, children 
are more likely to interpret the movement style as being done for the movement’s sake and 
led to children copying the movement style more faithfully when it was performed without 
context.  
The type of verbal frame did not affect children’s imitation of movement styles or 
external goals. In previous studies children protested more against the omission of arbitrary 
actions when the task was framed with a novel name (Keupp et al., 2013) and they showed 
higher imitation fidelity under this condition (Herrmann et al., 2013). Based on this it was 
predicted that children in NC (most closely resembling previous tasks) would copy the 
hopping action more often when the task was framed with a novel label, because using the 
end-state frame should highlight the final goal of the action sequence. Keupp et al. (2013), 
albeit finding a difference in children’s protest, also did not report a difference in imitation 
fidelity, which is in line with our data. However, their result could have been caused by a 
ceiling effect in imitation fidelity overall and as such no definitive conclusion can be drawn. 
A very stable effect was found between object- and body-related actions. Movement 
styles were copied with higher accuracy in the object tasks than in the body tasks. This has 
been found previously (Christie & Slaughter, 2009; Kim et al., 2015; Stone et al., 1997; 
Taneguchi & Sanefuji, 2017). Gibson’s theory of affordances (Gibson, 1986) would suggest 
that objects trigger the action previously associated with them, while the body does not have 
such an effect. Leighton et al. (2010) have proposed that certain body-movements are 
perceptually opaque—observing such movements and executing them result in different 
sensory input, whereas performing movements on objects yield similar sensory effects for 
observation and execution. It may be that differences in sensory input caused children to copy 
body movements less accurately. 
Leighton et al. (2010) have also argued that different visual cues could cause children 
to imitate differently in NC and C. Indeed, while in C the coins were hopped towards a box 
(Study 6) or coloured plates (Study 7), in NC the coins were hopped towards unmarked 
locations in both studies. Generalist accounts of imitation (such as the ASL model, Catmur et 
al., 2009) would argue that imitation in NC may be enhanced because there are less visual 
cues distracting children from the model’s actual movement. Thus, removing these cues 
results in increased imitation fidelity, instead of children viewing the movement as a goal in 
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itself. Moreover Kim et al. (2015) suggest an object could act as an external cue to what one 
is supposed to do (e.g., a box with a slit may trigger slotting). To isolate the effect of such 
visual cues on children’s imitation the results of the C condition of Study 6 and NC of Study 
7 were statistically compared. Both conditions had the same amount of objects present during 
the demonstrations (e.g. a box visible on the table) but while in Study 7 the actions were 
directed away from the end goal in question (e.g. coins were hopped towards an unmarked 
location before being slotted in the box) in Study 6 the actions always were directed towards 
the end goal (e.g. the coins were directly hopped towards the box rather than away from it). 
COMPARISON OF STUDY 6 AND STUDY 7 
The two conditions that were compared were the novel label frame NC condition of 
Study 7 and the C condition of Study 6. Both were identical in terms of the materials 
involved and the labels used however there is an important difference: In C of Study 6, the 
actions were directed towards the end goal of the action sequence, making the specific action 
style appear inefficient. For example the coins were hopped along the table towards the box, 
before being slotted in. The hopping may appear inefficient to the goal of slotting the coin, 
and may thus be copied less frequently. The NC condition of Study7 has a very different feel: 
here the actions are first directed away from the end goal, before eventually completing the 
end goal. For example the coin is hopped away from the box, to be then taken (without 
hopping) and slotted into the box. From an adult perspective it would seem more likely to 
infer a movement-based goal in this condition as the action appears disconnected from the 
external goal: hopping seems more important if the coins are being hopped away from the 
box than if they are being hopped towards it. Hence, if children reproduced the movement 
style more frequently in Study 7 than in Study 6, this would weaken the idea that the 
difference between C and NC is simply caused by differences in visual cues. 
Participants. The comparison used the data of the children allocated to the novel label NC 
condition of Study 7 (N = 30, 15 males, Mage = 48 months; SD = 10 months, range: 31 – 67 
months) and the C condition of Study 6 (N = 30, 13 male, Mage = 47 months, SD = 12 months, 
range: 26 – 70 months). Children’s mean age was not significantly different between the two 
Studies, t(58) = .24, p = .81.  
Results. A mixed factorial repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted on the imitation style 
scores for task type (object vs. body) with age group (2 levels: 2- to 3-year-olds and 4- to 5-
year-olds) and Study (Study 6 vs. Study 7) as between subject factors. As predicted, children 
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in the NC condition (M = 1.48, SE = .11) of Study 7 imitated movement style more faithfully 
than children in the C condition (M = .87, SE = .11) of Study 6, F(1, 56) = 15.51, p < .001, 
η2=.22. When the model demonstrated an action that could not easily be associated with the 
end goal of the action sequence, children imitated that action more faithfully than when the 
action could be easily associated with the end goal of the action sequence. When controlling 
for verbal ability, the main effect of Study remained highly significant, F(1, 51) = 12.38, p < 
.001, η2=.20. The same mixed factorial repeated-measures ANOVA conducted on external 
goal imitation scores did not find a main effect of Study, F(1, 56) = 2.58, p = .11, meaning 
that children demonstrated end-goals at similar rates between the different studies. These 
results suggest that, despite identical visual cues, children copied movement styles more 
faithfully when they were less efficient in bringing about the external goal. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The most important finding from this chapter is that children copied movement styles 
more accurately when said movements did not lead directly, or not at all, to an external goal. 
Most compellingly, children copied movement styles more accurately in NC of Study 7, 
when the coins were sorted to unmarked locations before being slotted, than in C of Study 6, 
in which the coins were directly hopped towards and slotted into the box. Despite an identical 
set-up children’s imitation differed between the two conditions. In line with Schachner and 
Carey’s (2013) analysis it appears that children infer movement-based goals particularly in 
cases in which movements are arbitrary or not functional in bringing about an external goal. 
This finding suggests that cases of high-fidelity imitation or “over-imitation”, in which 
children copy clearly arbitrary actions, could be cases of movement-based goal emulation 
(Horner & Whiten, 2005; Keupp et al., 2013; McGuigan & Graham, 2010; McGuigan et al., 
2011; Moraru et al., 2016; Nielsen & Blank, 2011; Whiten et al., 2016). 
Previously, such findings of context-dependent imitation have been taken to support 
goal-directed theories of imitation (Bekkering et al., 2000; Gattis, Bekkering, & 
Wohlschläger, 2002; Gleissner et al., 2000). According to such theories when we observe 
actions we extract action characteristics, whereby—due to capacity limitations—more 
attention is given to the goal of an action, more than to the precise movements involved. The 
selected action goals subsequently elicit motor programmes with which they are most 
strongly connected (Hommel, 2009). Some of these motor programmes, but not all, match the 
observed movements: when the goal of an action is extracted, this can lead to selective 
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imitation of the precise movements used by the model, if that model had used unusual actions 
to achieve a known goal. Action sequences for which clear goals can be extracted are 
typically copied with less exact fidelity then action sequences for which the goal is 
ambiguous. This is because familiar goals have known motor programmes which bias one’s 
imitation of said goals (Gampe et al., 2015) and identifying the goal of an action sequence 
increases the likelihood of ignoring the specific movements used (Froese & Leavens, 2014). 
Conversely it is when we do not understand the aim of an action sequence, there can be no 
motor programme associated with the goal and thus we are more likely to imitate faithfully.  
The findings from Studies 6 and 7 would suggest that goal inference can indeed have 
an effect on children’s imitation fidelity. However an important caveat is that movement-
based goal inference may only be possible for pre-schoolers. Previous research has shown 
that infants tend to focus on reproducing salient end goals (Kim et al., 2015), and show more 
faithful imitation of end states over arbitrary actions (Jones, 2007; Brugger et al., 2007). They 
may therefore be unable to infer movement-based goals under the age of 3 years. The current 
studies show that by pre-school age children infer movement-based goals about actions, and 
will replicate the same action more or less faithfully depending on the type of goal they 
associate with the model. Movement-based goals encourage faithful imitation of all aspects 
of an action, as the movement is an integral part of the action’s goal (Schachner & Carey, 
2013).  
The findings of Chapter 4 suggest that imitation in pre-schoolers is affected by their 
goal understanding. However the literature review covered in Chapter 1 would stress that this 
does not mean that goal inference is a necessary step in imitation. For example the associative 
sequence learning (ASL) model (Bird et al., 2007; Leighton et al., 2010), assumes a direct 
link between sensory and motor representations of actions. What is being imitated depends on 
general processes related to attention, memory and perception, such as to which parts of the 
object attention is drawn to (Huang, Heyes, & Charman, 2002; Mizuguchi et al., 2011). 
Similarly, ideomotor theories do not assume that imitation necessitates the ascription of 
intentions or goals to somebody else. Instead, by perceiving another person’s action, one’s 
own motor system is activated, which in turn activates associated action representations that 
direct one’s attention to the relevant information (Paulus, 2012b). Such theories are supported 
by findings showing that children’s action understanding and imitation is affected by their 
own action experience (Paulus et al., 2011; Hunnius & Bekkering, 2014). 
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Taken together, psychologists are discordant whether children conceive of actions as 
goal-directed during imitation (i.e., they understand that the modeller had a goal in mind; in 
other words, that the modeller acted intentionally) or whether they view these actions as 
merely goal-oriented (i.e., they represent the external goal without an understanding that 
goals can be represented internally; see Perner & Doherty, 2005, for this distinction). In 
interpreting the data of the current chapter, I argue for a goal-oriented interpretation of 
imitation such that children in these studies were trying to figure out what the goal of the task 
was, but they did not ascribe these goals to the modeller.  
The reasons for this conclusion are twofold: Firstly, the results from Studies 6 and 7 
show that children’s performance on the false belief task minimally affected the results, 
suggesting that children did not take the modeller’s perspective when they imitated. In 
essence, they did not infer what the modeller’s intentions were or what goals this person had 
in mind when observing their actions. Secondly, Roessler and Perner (2015) show that during 
the second year of life children start to display various forms of pro-social behaviours such as 
helping and comforting. Interestingly, it is around this time (14 months) that infants begin to 
imitate arbitrary actions (Brugger et al., 2007; Hauf et al., 2004; Jones, 2007). This move 
from a focus on reproducing only actions with causal effects to reproducing seemingly 
pointless actions may indicate children’s growing understanding of actions being done for a 
good reason.  
Roessler and Perner argue that there is a close connection “between the reasoning 
involved in understanding others’ actions and the reasoning involved in deciding what to do” 
(p. 763). Children’s ability to understand what other people are doing (grasping the goals of 
tasks) thus helps them direct their own action. On Schwier et al.’s task (2006), whether the 
child has good reasons to copy the dog going through the chimney depends on whether 
children believe there was a good reason to put the dog through the chimney. If the door was 
open for the adult’s demonstration, the child will naturally assume that going through the 
chimney is the proper way of doing this task. If the door was locked for the adult, but open on 
the child’s turn, then the adult’s way of doing this task does not apply to the child. In other 
words, children may take certain features of a situation to provide them with reasons to act. 
Such an understanding does not require an understanding of others’ mental states: children 
merely need to understand people as doing things for reasons which then may or may not 
apply to themselves. Very young children particularly focus on the end-state, while pre-
schoolers’ growing action experience with situations where movements are themselves the 
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goal of other’s actions (Hunnius & Bekkering, 2014) means that they see reasons in 
reproducing movement styles accurately. This is further supported by Mizuguchi et al. (2011) 
who show that by 4 years children’s imitation does not focus solely on end states but can be 
modulated to focus on specific movements. 
Children not only develop the ability to infer movement-based goals with age, they 
also appear to emulate such goals more throughout the pre-school years. As mentioned above 
children imitate arbitrary actions by the age of 4 years (Kenward et al., 2011) and do so more 
with age (Marsh et al., 2014). Replicating a movement-based goal could indicate a growing 
motivation on the child’s part to affiliate with the model. Supporting evidence for this comes 
from Nielsen et al. (2015): in their study 4-year-olds saw a model demonstrate how to 
retrieve a toy from a box, including arbitrary actions in their demonstration. Children 
reproduced the arbitrary actions most when directly imitating the present model, and least 
when they were helping a different model who wanted to retrieve the toy from the box. This 
effect was heightened when the arbitrary actions had been demonstrated to the child after the 
box was open, highlighting their inefficiency towards the goal of “opening the box”. Four-
year-olds can thus modulate their imitation depending on whether they want to perform an 
external effect (retrieve a toy) or copy the present model faithfully. Replicating arbitrary 
actions can thus indicate a growing motivation for children to affiliate with the present 
model.  
One potential limitation in Study 4 which could weaken support for the idea that 
movement-based goals are viewed in a goal-oriented manner is the possibility that the false 
belief task is not the best way to assess children’s intention understanding. While false belief 
understanding may be an indicator of the ability to understand that people have incorrect 
mental states, intentions are specific mental states which may be understood at a different 
time than false belief. For instance, Lang and Perner (2002) administered the knee-jerk task 
to 3- to 5-year-olds as a measure of intention understanding. Children would watch as 
somebody would tap their knee with a toy hammer and, when their leg kicked, were asked 
“Look, your leg moved! Did you mean to do this?”. The youngest children in this study 
mistakenly answered that they had indeed meant to kick their leg, and success on this task 
(answering “no”) was associated with both age and success on a standard false-belief task. 
The knee-jerk task may therefore be a more valid assessment of children’s intention 
understanding, and could be used to confirm whether movement-based goals can be inferred 
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without an understanding of intentions. This is something that would be useful to investigate 
in the future. 
The findings from Chapter 4 can be compared with the results observed from 
Chapters 2 and 3. In these chapters even 3-year-olds imitated arbitrary actions if they were 
demonstrated by M1, showing that by this age children copy actions even if they do not have 
salient effects. Thus, children by the age of 3 years do not require salient action effects to 
imitate, presumably because they begin to infer that the goal of an action is the movement 
itself. This would fit with data from Moraru et al. (2016) who find that when 3-year-olds 
observe a model demonstrate actions saying “I will show you how to get the toy out”, they 
copy these actions more faithfully than if the model says “I will show you one way to get the 
toy out”. Cues to the conventionality of an action may encourage the inference of a 
movement-based goal for that action. Wilks et al. (2016) highlight that one of the 
characteristics of ritualistic action is that it is redundant and arbitrary. Therefore if an action 
has no salient external effect, children are more likely to infer that the action in question has 
some conventional status (leading to more faithful imitation of that action). Not all 
movement-based goals will necessarily be interpreted as conventions, but movement-based 
goals seem to form part of ritualistic and conventional action. 
It should be noted that verbal cues signalling conventionality did not enhance 
imitation in children above 4 years in Moraru et al.’s study (2016). Similarly in the current 
study labelling had no effect on encouraging faithful imitation in 3- to 5-year-olds. What this 
may suggest is that, as children age, they require less of a reason to imitate a model’s 
movement-based goals and arbitrary actions (Marsh et al., 2014). As mentioned in Chapter 2 
children get better at imitating multiple models with age – and as I have argued above, one 
reason for this increase may be that children become more socially motivated to reproduce a 
model’s actions with age, and part of this change may be an increasing tendency to copy the 
movement-based goals of actions.  
In conclusion, this chapter argues that children copy movement styles more accurately 
(a) when movements do not bring about an external goal (in comparison to when an external 
goal is brought about) and (b) when movements are clearly an inefficient means to bring 
about an external goal. This difference is unlikely driven by low-level perceptual features 
such as the amount of visual information, but appears to be based on movement-based goal 
inference for actions that are not causal or functional to an intended outcome. This finding 
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expands current attempts to make sense of “overimitation” by providing preliminary evidence 
that high-fidelity imitation of arbitrary actions may be an instance of movement-based goal 
emulation. 
CHAPTER 5 
SUMMARY OF THE PREVIOUS LITERATURE 
The actual processes of action reproduction are low-level, in that they do not involve 
complex cognitive reasoning: perceived actions are associated with specific motor programs 
through experience and associative learning (Paulus, 2012, 2014; Brass & Heyes, 2005; 
Catmur et al., 2009). Once this association is formed, observing a movement’s effect will 
prime reproduction of the same movement. Imitation can be modulated by highlighting 
different parts of the action to be reproduced (Bird et al., 2007; Leighton et al., 2010; 
Mizuguchi et al., 2011) and is constrained by children’s own action experience (Hunnius & 
Bekkering, 2014; Gampe et al., 2015; Paulus et al., 2011). It is therefore not necessary to 
posit the existence of a specialist, goal-inferring mechanism required for all instances of 
imitation (Meltzoff, 1995; Wohlschläger et al., 2003). Imitation can be automatic, feature-
driven without consideration of the goal of an action sequence.  
There are nevertheless cases where imitation is goal-oriented (Perner & Doherty, 
2005). If the goal of an action is emphasised by the model during their demonstration, pre-
schoolers will prefer to reproduce this goal over the exact movements used by the model 
(Elsner & Pfeifer, 2012). If no verbal or conventional cues emphasise the goal of the action, 
children and adults show no preference for copying goals over movements (Leighton et al., 
2010; Mizuguchi et al., 2011). Goals therefore can affect imitation: in particular if a goal state 
is highlighted (by verbal, visible or conventional cues) then imitation of that goal will be 
prioritised over the precise means involved. This fits with Froese and Leavens’ (2014) model 
of direct perception, which argues that intentional actions are primarily evaluated in terms of 
their goals. Attributing a goal to an action sequence means that if the learner desires to bring 
about the same goal as the model, they will focus on reproducing this goal rather than 
copying the model’s exact movements.  
As children age imitation gradually comes to be used for more than merely replicating 
effects produced by the model. During the second year of life children begin to copy 
irrelevant actions (Jones, 2007) and also to spontaneously imitate peers in parallel play 
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situations (Nadel & Fontaine, 1989). Five-year-olds’ imitation can also be heightened by the 
threat of social exclusion (Over & Carpenter, 2009) suggesting that by this age imitation may 
serve a social function of affiliating with a model (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). Imitation can 
be used to indicate likeness with a model or a social group and therefore has social 
consequences beyond reproducing an action’s external effects (Nadel, 2002, 2014). Whereas 
children will prefer to reproduce object-directed actions with external effects by the age of 18 
months, social consequences do not seem to become important reinforcers for imitating 
actions until after this age (Kim et al., 2015). Therefore the social function of imitation, as a 
tool to foster interaction and liking, may begin to be in place after the age of 2 years. 
MAIN GOAL OF THE THESIS 
Previous literature has shown that imitation, whilst not essentially goal-related, is affected by 
children’s inferences of action goals under specific circumstances. It is still however unclear 
how children’s interpretation of goals changes with age. The few studies that investigated 
imitation development throughout childhood (Marsh et al., 2014; McGuigan et al., 2011; 
Moraru et al., 2016) found children’s imitation of arbitrary actions increases with age. The 
main aim of this thesis was (a) to review the literature on imitation, in particular, high-fidelity 
imitation (chapter 1), (b) to investigate how high-fidelity imitation changes throughout 
childhood (chapter 2) and (c) to extract factors that explain this change (chapters 3 and 4). 
Chapter 3 particularly focussed on factors to explain perseverative imitation in young 
children such as misunderstanding that two different actions can be given the same label, 
inhibitory deficits, model identity and object affordances. Chapter 4 focussed on the question 
of whether children perceive arbitrary actions in the context of movement-based goals. 
Schachner and Carey (2013) have shown that when observing actions performed without 
context, adults are more likely to assume that the actions themselves were the goal of the 
model. I investigated whether children’s action imitation changed depending on the type of 
goal that could be attributed to a model’s actions.  
FINDINGS FROM THE CHAPTERS 
One of the primary aims of this thesis was to investigate how children’s 
interpretations of model actions changed with age. A useful paradigm for assessing this 
question has been the successive-models paradigm (Keupp et al., 2013, 2016; Nielsen & 
Blank, 2011) where children observe two models, M1 and M2, demonstrate different ways of 
performing the same task. Children’s reactions to M2 (i.e. whether they will copy them as 
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much as M1, whether they protest against them) reveals whether they felt they could deviate 
from M1’s actions. However previous successive-models studies have only looked at children 
under 5 years. Therefore in Chapter 2 I ran a successive-models paradigm with children aged 
2 to 12 years to see how they reacted to multiple models throughout childhood, and how this 
affected their imitation. Children over 6 years had a tendency to copy whichever model was 
present (displaying “model-dependent imitation”) and this increased with age, reaching 
ceiling performance at age 10. Children under 5 years copied M2 less often than M1 and 
children under 3 years in particular showed a strong tendency to perseverate with M1’s 
actions and would not deviate from them, thus showing “perseverative imitation”.  
In Chapter 3 I controlled for a number of different factors to explain why children 
under 5 years did not copy each model in turn as older children would. Previous work has 
suggested that children’s use of labels may be rather inflexible, and they do not like hearing 
two models use the same word to describe different things (Brandl et al., 2015; Markman et 
al., 2003; Casler, 2014). This is why I hypothesised that when M1 and M2 were using the 
same label, particularly children under 4 years would not accept M2’s action once they had 
seen M1’s action being demonstrated with that label. Unlike adults, children’s imitation was 
however not affected by whether M1 and M2 used the same or a different label for their 
actions. Similarly, when M1 and M2 did not use any label for their actions, children’s 
imitation was unaffected. 
Another hypothesis for why young children may have shown “perseverative 
imitation” was that they would lack the inhibitory strength to refrain from exercising an 
action for which they had motor experience. Previous research indicated that children’s 
imitation is affected by their own action experience (Hunnius & Bekkering, 2014; Paulus, 
2014) and children have difficulty imitating actions that are not in their own motor repertoire 
(Gampe et al., 2015; Paulus et al., 2011). To control for this, children either copied the two 
models directly after each trial, or they only watched the two models before they had a go 
themselves. Additionally, children’s inhibitory skills were assessed with a Bear/Dragon task, 
to investigate if inhibitory skills may interact with children’s motor experience. Indeed, 
children with greater inhibitory ability were better at omitting arbitrary actions performed by 
M1 thus going along with M2’s shorter action sequences. As expected, inhibitory ability had 
no effect when children had simply observed M1 and M2. Inhibition skills thus affected 
imitation when children had motor experience, but only for omitting an action. When adding 
an action, children at different inhibitory levels showed similar performance, indicating that 
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inhibitory control is only relevant when a child wants to refrain from copying a previously 
copied action. This explains partially why younger children may have perseverated on 
copying M1, particularly when M1 had demonstrated the arbitrary action. It does, however, 
not explain why particularly young children did not add an action when M2 demonstrated the 
arbitrary action, as adding an action does not utilise inhibitory control.  
Study 4 therefore looked at whether children’s imitation of M2 could be affected by 
the identity of M2. In previous successive-models paradigms M2 tended to be a puppet to 
encourage children to protest against any deviation (Rakoczy et al., 2008; Keupp et al., 
2013). However children are more disposed to copy certain types of models – one such bias 
is that adults tend to be seen as more reliable than children (Schmidt et al., 2011; Wood, 
Kendal & Flynn, 2013a). I therefore conducted a study using a successive-models paradigm, 
where one model was a puppet and the other was an adult. Children preferentially imitated 
the actions demonstrated by the adult, and this effect heightened their imitation of M2 (if M2 
was the adult) or reduced it (if M2 was the puppet), suggesting that particularly young 
children tend to follow the first model’s demonstration if the second model, who is 
demonstrating the same game slightly differently, is not as trustworthy. 
In the final study of Chapter 3 I investigated whether not only the type of model but 
also the use of the same objects would affect children’s imitation. Pre-schoolers can associate 
objects as being “for” certain actions and purposes (Casler & Kelemen, 2005; Greeno, 1994). 
If children see an object used for a certain action, they will remember the action associated 
with that object, and the object becomes a cue for remembering that action (Paulus, 2012b). 
However, children are also capable of associating actions with certain people: Nielsen and 
Blank (2011) conducted a successive-models task where 4-year-olds saw two models 
demonstrate different actions on the same object. The children would imitate a model’s action 
sequence more faithfully if that model was present, showing that they remembered which 
action sequence was demonstrated by either model. The aim was to see how children would 
imitate if these two cues (object and model) were associated with different actions. Three- to 
5-year-olds saw two models, M1 and M2, demonstrate two action sequences which they both 
called by the same name to create the same context. However the two models displayed their 
actions on two differently-coloured versions of the same apparatus. Children observed the 
two models (without imitating, to avoid an interaction with the motor experience effect 
isolated in Study 3) and were then asked to play the game by one of the models. Sometimes 
the model was present with her own object or with the other model’s object. Of interest was, 
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whether children, would be affected by the object-model discrepancy, or whether they would 
show similar levels of imitation in any the conditions. In the discrepant cases, if children pay 
attention to the object, they have to decide whether to reproduce the action performed by the 
present model, or whether to use the object the way they have seen it used before. The main 
result was that children under 5 years would imitate a model’s actions most faithfully when 
that model was present with their own object. When the model and the object had displayed 
different actions, children’s imitation was reduced. But when the two cues were associated 
with different actions children did not have a preference for copying either action, indicating 
that children under 5 years are equally influenced by both the presence of a model and the 
actions used with an object.  
In short, Chapters 2 and 3 showed that children’s imitation of multiple models 
increases in fidelity with age. One factor affecting this development was children’s motor 
inhibition, but only when children had to omit actions they had previously performed 
themselves. Another factor was the type of model: children preferred to copy adults over 
puppets and trustworthy models enhance children’s ability to omit previously performed 
actions. Moreover, preschool-aged children did not prefer to reproduce actions associated 
with models over those associated with objects. Indeed, when faced with a dilemma, either by 
the models using the same object (Studies 1 to 4) or whether the present model used the 
object demonstrated by the other model (Study 5) children were at chance as to what action 
sequence to use. It was only later in childhood, after around 6 years, that children imitated the 
present model faithfully after seeing the two action sequences (Study 1). The younger 
children thus may have viewed the task about learning to perform different action sequences, 
whereas as children age they may become more likely to automatically assume they need to 
imitate the present model. 
As seen above children’s goals in successive-models tasks change with age, with the 
goal of copying the present model becoming more important above the age of 6 years. 
However an open question from Chapters 2 and 3 is whether it is possible to modulate 
children’s imitation by varying the type of goal children associate with the model’s actions. 
Schachner and Carey (2013) argue that adults are more likely to assume that an action is 
demonstrated for its own sake if it is performed without any context or with no observable 
effect. Adults infer “movement-based goals” (e.g. dancing, ritual) when actions are 
performed without any visible context, and Schachner and Carey (2013) suggest that this may 
also encourage high-fidelity imitation. To see whether actions would be copied more 
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faithfully by children if no obvious goal could be associated with them was the goal of 
Chapter 4. Pre-schoolers were shown a model demonstrate actions either within a context that 
pointed to a clear goal (e.g. slot the coins into the box) or with no such contextual cues. The 
children imitated actions more faithfully when the actions had no clear goal than when there 
was an obvious goal. In Study 7 I increased the number of goals so now the model’s actions 
either had context that could be interpreted as two distinct goals (hop the coins onto the plates 
> slot them into the box) or context indicating only one goal (hop the coins away from the 
box > slot them in to the box). The children imitated the model’s actions more faithfully 
when they could not be attributed to a plausible, secondary goal that is when they were 
performed without context. This effect was still present when the visual information was the 
same between the context and no-context conditions: the same amount of objects and actions 
was present, the only difference was whether the actions could be associated to the same goal 
or not. Thus children’s imitation of a model’s actions is affected by the goals that can be 
attributed to those actions and high-fidelity imitation is encouraged in pre-schoolers by 
suggesting that actions have movement-based goals (i.e. by performing them with no 
context). 
RELATING FINDINGS TO PREVIOUS LITERATURE 
The thesis highlights several findings that contribute to previous research. Successive-
models paradigms have previously been used to investigate how children understand the 
actions of models and how this affects their imitation, but this type of task has not been used 
beyond pre-school age (Rakoczy et al., 2008; Keupp et al., 2013; Nielsen & Blank, 2011). 
Chapters 2 supplemented this gap by investigating how children imitated successive-models 
between the ages of 2 and 12 years. Children began to imitate both models faithfully by the 
age of 6 years, but below this age children would either perseverate on the first model’s 
action (regardless of whether this included an arbitrary action) or they would add an arbitrary 
action to M2’s demonstration but not omit it. At the age of 6 years children began to imitate 
copy the present model on all turns on the task, and this tendency became stronger with age. 
These findings show that children under the age of 5 years do not automatically infer 
the goal of “copy the present model” in the successive-models task used here. However 
previous studies have shown that children under 5 years can infer the goal of “copy the 
present model” in other situations: Horner and Whiten (2005) describe that children in pilot 
testing believed that they needed to copy the present model and wanted to show how well 
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they could copy the experimenter. Similarly Moraru et al. (2016) showed that 4- to 6-year-
olds would imitate a model’s arbitrary actions regardless of the way the model described their 
demonstration, whereas 3-year-olds would imitate arbitrary actions more faithfully if the 
model described these actions using a conventional label (“I will show you how you do 
this…”) as opposed to a label without conventional status (“I will show you one way to do 
this…”). Therefore children under 5 years are not incapable of inferring the social goal of 
“copy the present model”, but they do not do so on successive-models tasks. Rather they use 
either model’s solution at chance once they have seen both models do them (as also observed 
in Wood et al., 2013b). Children under 5 years may view the two models as demonstrating 
equally viable options – acquiring multiple solutions on a known task can be beneficial by 
enabling children to build on previous knowledge (Wood et al., 2013b): they may thus have 
been motivated to learn multiple solutions and thus used them flexibly (as they may have 
been more interested in learning about the task than copying the present model, Over & 
Carpenter, 2012). Children do not infer the goal of “copying the present model” for 
successive-models tasks until above the age of 6 years, and only reliably above the age of 9 
years. It may be harder for children to infer such social goals in situations when multiple 
models are involved.  
Chapter 3 showed that children’s imitation of a deviant model was related to their 
inhibitory ability, but only if imitation of that model required children to omit an action they 
had already performed. Imitation thus requires different abilities depending on the type of 
behaviour that is to be produced. Gampe et al. (2015) showed that imitation of known actions 
involves different processes to the imitation of unfamiliar actions, in line with the dual-route 
model of imitation laid out by Rumiati and Tessari (2002, 2004). Copying another person’s 
actions involves different abilities depending on what needs to be done. Overall this finding 
sits well with generalist accounts of imitation, such as the IMAIL and ASL accounts (Paulus, 
2014; Catmur et al., 2009), as these accounts argue that imitation involves general processes 
of action control and production. Imitation is thus always imitation of a specific task: how 
children copy depends on the type of action that is being done. This is supported by the fact 
that when children do not receive motor experience on a task, they are not primed to 
reproduce only the first action sequence: in this case model presence seems to be a stronger 
cue affecting their imitation (Nielsen & Blank, 2011). Successive-models tasks should 
therefore consider how easily children will be able to imitate the actions of the model; if 
children have experience imitating a model, it may be more difficult for younger pre-
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schoolers to omit actions. If children imitate multiple models (rather than merely observe 
them) then a certain amount of inhibitory ability will be needed for children to be able to 
copy the different models faithfully. 
However Study 4 also showed that imitation in successive-models tasks can be 
modulated by the presence and identity of the model during the child’s turn. Successive-
models studies looking at normativity (Rakoczy et al., 2008; Keupp et al., 2016) use puppets 
as the deviant model who omits part of what the original model did. However children’s 
imitation of a deviant model is dependent on who that model is. Children under 5 years 
imitate adults more than puppets in a successive-models task (Study 4). This effect countered 
the inhibition effect observed previously, as children would not inhibit their performance of 
M1’s arbitrary action if M2, leaving it out, was a puppet. Therefore successive-models 
studies should consider that children may not copy deviant models if they are puppets, 
whereas they may be more likely to do so if they appear as more reliable than the original 
model. Future successive-model studies on normativity should thus consider that lower 
imitation of a deviant model may not be a response to norm violation, but simply due to 
children’s reduced imitation of puppets as opposed to people. Studies that compare the order 
of the models (for instance by having a silly adult as M1 and a reliable puppet as M2) would 
be more stringent tests of children’s model-based biases and normative understanding.  
Model presence also affected children’s imitation: Study 5 showed that children were 
more likely to demonstrate the action sequence demonstrated by the model present during the 
child’s turn. Model presence can also account for why Schleihauf et al. (2017) found that, in 
a successive-model study, 5-year-olds would not deviate from the initial solution they were 
shown. In their study the children kept on demonstrating the first action sequence they were 
shown, but always performed their actions in the absence of any model. In Studies 1 to 5 
presented in this thesis, children imitated with the deviant model present. Whilst the 3- to 5-
year-olds did not imitate the deviant model as faithfully as M1, children would still imitate 
M2 to some extent (and became more likely to do so with age), more so than was found by 
Schleihauf et al. (2017). Nielsen et al. (2015) also showed that pre-schoolers imitated 
arbitrary actions on a box more in the presence of the model who had demonstrated them 
initially than when they were helping a third party (who had never seen the arbitrary actions) 
to open the same box. The current findings thus fit with previous work that social factors 
such as model presence, interactivity and identity encourage imitation fidelity in pre-
schoolers (Nielsen et al., 2008; Nielsen & Blank, 2011; Nielsen et al., 2015; Over & 
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Carpenter, 2011, 2012; Rakoczy et al., 2010; Wood et al., 2013a). In particular, model 
presence can help children inhibit previously performed actions. Imitation is thus a composite 
ability – it is affected by multiple processes (such as sensitivity to model presence, children’s 
own action experience, motor inhibition…) and high-fidelity imitation is thus dependent on 
the interaction between these factors. 
Together Chapters 2 and 3 suggest that low-level factors such as inhibition influence 
children’s imitation. However by pre-school age children’s imitation is also affected by other 
factors that cannot easily be explained without reference to more complex cognitive 
processes than the action-effect binding processes that form the basis for imitation in infancy 
(Paulus, 2014). Whilst older children are affected by such factors as motor inhibition, their 
imitation is also modulated by different factors such as model evaluations, object associations 
and the combination between the object and the model present on children’s turn. 
Furthermore, the findings from Chapter 4 show that by age 3 years children’s imitation is 
additionally modulated by the type of goal they attribute to the model’s actions. If the 
movement is perceived to be the goal of the action, children will imitate that action more 
faithfully than if they perceive the action as having a distinct, external goal. Thus goal 
understanding influences imitation fidelity in pre-schoolers.  
As discussed in Chapter 1, the IMAIL and ASL accounts posit that imitation is not 
necessarily related to goal-understanding, as imitation can occur automatically and be driven 
by low-level perceptual features (Bird et al., 2007; Leighton et al., 2010; Mizuguchi et al., 
2011). However these accounts also stress that imitation can be affected by children’s 
understanding of goals, as goal-inference can modulate the basic action-effect matching 
processes that develop in infancy (Paulus, 2014; Ray & Heyes, 2011). The findings from the 
current studies support both the generalist claim that goal inference is not necessarily 
involved in imitation, as it can instead be explained using basic action control processes, and 
the idea that imitation is affected by goals under certain circumstances. With regards to this 
latter claim, I posit that, as argued by Schachner and Carey (2013), high-fidelity imitation in 
pre-schoolers is an example of movement-based goal inference. Movement-based goals will 
be inferred for arbitrary actions as they cannot be readily associated to other, external goals 
(as predicted by the model of direct perception, Froese & Leavens, 2014). When this is the 




Children’s inferences of goals may also change with age. In particular children seemed to 
become more likely to infer the goal of copy the present model with age, in the type of 
successive-models game used here. In accordance with Over and Carpenter’s theory of goals 
in imitation (2012, 2013) this could suggest that children become more likely to infer social 
goals in action situations from mid- to late-childhood. This would fit with Marsh et al.’s 
findings (2014) that children became more likely to imitate arbitrary actions between the ages 
of 5 and 8 years, and grew more likely to do so even though they grew better at recognising 
that these actions were arbitrary (which suggests they copied for social reasons, to affiliate 
with the model). Children’s increased exposure to situations where they are expected to copy 
(as in school) may thus bias them to imitating models who are seen as reliable without being 
told to do so. Children become more likely to conform to majorities on ambiguous tasks 
(where there is no evident right or wrong answer) between the ages of 3 and 10 years (Haun 
et al., 2013). Whilst imitation is not the same thing as conformity, a growing tendency to 
align one’s actions with other people may underlie both imitation in dyads and with other 
groups, as it may be of adaptive benefit (as imitation has been posited to serve as social glue 
with other individuals, Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). Children’s motivations change with age, as 
they develop more complex social cognition and gain more experience of social learning 
situations. Becoming more sensitive to social pressure, and aligning oneself automatically 
with the actions of one’s counterpart, can therefore be a product of growing social experience 
which children gain as they age. 
LIMITATIONS TO THE PRESENT WORK 
The studies described in this thesis have attempted to explain the development of 
children’s imitation throughout childhood. The work has drawn upon a large amount of 
literature to design appropriate research questions and provide meaningful data. However 
there are several limitations to the studies described above which are worth highlighting 
before conclusions can be drawn. 
The choice of games used in these studies was driven by a number of factors. One was 
to keep actions simple so as to avoid the likelihood of children forgetting part of the action 
sequences throughout the testing sessions. Another was the presence/absence of arbitrary 
actions to distinguish between Model 1 and Model 2’s action sequences in Studies 1 to 5. 
This matches previous work on high-fidelity imitation (Nielsen & Blank, 2011; Keupp et al., 
2013; Schleihauf et al., 2017) as it helped determine how children were conceiving of the 
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task in question (as their imitation of arbitrary actions reveals more about their imitation than 
would their imitation of only functional actions). However it must be pointed out that these 
choices necessarily limit the conclusions to be drawn from this work.  
Firstly the fact that the actions used in Studies 1 to 5 were so simple may have 
affected children’s imitation. Redundancy and repetitiveness are qualities that have been 
argued to bias children into viewing actions as ritualised (Nielsen et al., 2015) which may 
give them a normative dimension, affecting the way children imitate (Keupp et al., 2013). 
The current findings may not generalise to other paradigms where action sequences are more 
complex and the effect of each action is unclear on the final outcome of the sequence (e.g. 
Gardiner, 2014). For instance children may show different imitation of successive models if 
the action sequences used by said models include more steps and are more complex. In such 
complex cases children may use a copy-all, refine-later strategy where they may isolate the 
key components of actions over time (Whiten et al., 2009). Nielsen et al.’s (2015) multiple-
stance theory may predict that demonstrating more complex actions may lead to a focus on 
the causal mechanisms involved rather than a reflection on the social implications of one’s 
imitation, which in turn may lead to different copying behaviour. Another common paradigm 
in imitation research is, rather than to use an arbitrary action to distinguish between models, 
to provide children with an apparatus upon which can be performed two equally functional 
actions. For example in Horner and Whiten’s (2005) box, the bolts covering the lid could 
either be pushed out or dragged out using the stick, and the door could either be lifted or slid 
out of the way. The use of two equally functional actions may be an even clearer test of how 
children react when they are taught two different ways of performing the same task. It would 
be useful to investigate this in future work and decide how it is that children may react to 
being asked to imitate two functionally equivalent actions. The main point to take away is 
that the use of simple, game-like actions in the current thesis means that any discussion of 
children’s imitative abilities will be more related to work on children’s understanding of 
games and their social copying, rather than their pure causal inferences.  
A second limitation is the restricted age range investigated in the majority of the 
thesis. Whilst Study 1 looked at children’s imitation between the ages of 2 and 12 years, 
Studies 2 to 7 focussed on children aged 3 to 5 years. My initial plan at the start of the thesis 
was to review a larger age range, to determine why children imitated successive models more 
faithfully after the age of 4 years and more faithfully still after the age of 9 years. However 
the initial follow-up studies to Study 1 did not provide clear answers to explain children’s 
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imitation pattern under the age of 5 years (as labelling did not have much of an effect on 
imitation, as shown in Studies 2 and 3). I decided to focus on this pre-school age-range as I 
thought it would be of more value to analyse the factors affecting imitation at one stage in 
more detail than to examine different ages more superficially (and there is more literature on 
imitation in the pre-school years). However this does mean that a lot of potential work could 
be done to clarify the change in imitation that occurred towards late childhood/pre-
adolescence. With regards to my thesis, the explanations of imitation in later childhood will 
necessarily be less in-depth as I did not control for the effect of various factors in a 
systematic way. 
Another limitation in the current thesis that should be mentioned is the fact that all 
studies used a cross-sectional design. While this type of study allows for greater data 
collection over a shorter period of time, this does not allow for the analysis of individual 
children’s changes in imitation throughout childhood. Given that the thesis looked at how 
imitation may change throughout childhood, it is important to recognise that without a 
longitudinal analysis the conclusions will be limited. For future work longitudinal analyses of 
imitation would be beneficial to determine how children imitate differently as they age, for 
example in the manner of the study by Jones (2007) with infants aged between 6 and 20 
months.  
A final limitation is the absence of video-recording. Whilst the coding procedure 
always involved multiple coders for Studies 1 to 5, Study 6 and 7 did not include a second 
coder. The findings from this present research would be made far more reliable if the 
responses of each child could be recorded and then analysed by naïve coders later on. Given 
that a crucial variable of interest in Studies 6 and 7 was the style of a particular movement, 
this behaviour would be able to be analysed in more detail if video recordings were made 
available. This will be addressed in future work. With these caveats addressed it is now 
possible to turn to the conclusions that can be drawn from the present work. 
CONTRIBUTIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The current thesis makes several novel contributions to the existing literature on 
children’s imitation, and highlights several directions for future research. Successive-models 
studies have mainly examined imitation in children under the age of 5 years (Keupp et al., 
2013, 2016; Nielsen & Blank, 2011; Rakoczy et al., 2008). Study 1 extends such work by 
looking at a larger age range, between the ages of 2 and 12 years. Above the age of 10 years 
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children could imitate the different models, whereas children under 5 years did not imitate 
M2 as faithfully as M1. In the type of game-like tasks used here, the older children easily 
inferred the goal of “copy the present model” whereas the younger children did not do so. 
Children under the age of 5 years can infer this goal and imitate models faithfully (as shown 
by Horner & Whiten, 2005; Moraru et al., 2016), but do not do so with multiple models. 
Future research should extend these findings by determining under what circumstances 
children infer the social goal of “copy the present model” and confirm the prediction made 
here that this goal is inferred more automatically with age. 
Chapter 3 produced a systematic investigation of children’s imitation of successive 
models under the age of 5 years, which is an age that has been the focus of a lot of research 
on imitation. One finding is that, for game-like contexts, labelling does not affect how well 
children imitated the models, either in the successive-models tasks (Studies 2 and 3) or for a 
single model (Study 7). The presence of a novel label, or having the models use different 
labels, did not affect children’s imitation. Adults were more likely to imitate both models 
when they used different labels, but they could have been more sensitive to the implications 
of the use of separate labels. It is possible that, in children, labels only encourage more 
faithful imitation of actions when more care is taken to dissociate the salient effect that can be 
produced on an apparatus from the action referred to with the label (e.g. when the model 
demonstrates “ringing the bells” and contrasts this with “daxing”, see Keupp et al., 2013). In 
the absence of such prompts children did not automatically imitate actions signalled by novel 
labels more faithfully than actions without labels. 
I have also shown that using a puppet as a model affects children’s imitation on 
successive-models tasks. Children will be more likely to deviate from a known action 
sequence if the original model is seen as less reliable than the deviant model (e.g. when M1 is 
a puppet and M2 is an adult, Study 4). They are also less likely to deviate from the original 
solution if the deviant model is a puppet, suggesting that model evaluations do indeed affect 
children’s imitation in this paradigm. It should be noted that in Study 4 at no point were 
children told that the puppet was more reliable than the adult, meaning that their tendency to 
avoid imitating the puppet was not explicitly encouraged by the model. Imitation studies 
using puppets should therefore consider that children are less inclined to imitate puppets than 
people, and that this bias may affect children’s performance. One possibility is that puppets 
may encourage children to think of the games as a form of pretence, and children may imitate 
differently when they are under this assumption. 
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A consistent finding in Studies 2 to 4 was that the older children were, the more likely 
they were to copy M2 on the AFFirst tasks: only the older children in these studies could copy 
M2 when this involved omitting an arbitrary action they had previously performed when 
copying M1. Study 3 suggests that this age difference could have been due to children’s 
growing inhibitory skills, but as this was not tested throughout all studies this is still 
unverified. However this finding does suggest that once children have performed an action 
one way they struggle to omit the actions they have previously done when doing that same 
task. Future work on imitation should thus consider whether children will have the inhibitory 
ability required to copy multiple models. This finding also suggests that if one is attempting 
to teach something to a child, one should do it correctly, as it may be harder for young 
children to stop performing actions once they have done them. To avoid forming bad habits 
pre-schoolers need to be taught something correctly the first time, as it is only when they are 
older that they will be able to inhibit previously performed actions: in this case, an ounce of 
prevention is worth a pound of cure.  
Another consistent finding in Studies 1 to 4 was that, once having seen two models do 
different action sequences on the same object, children were at chance as to which action 
sequence to use (as shown by their scores on M1rep). Similarly, if the model and the object 
present on the child’s turn had been associated with different action sequences, children 
showed no preference for copying either one (Study 5). In both cases, there was a dilemma as 
to the actions children should perform, caused by either seeing the object manipulated in two 
ways or by the mismatch between the object and the model. It was only when children were 
above 6 years that they began to imitate the present model faithfully on every turn, and this 
only reached ceiling level above the age of 10 years (Study 1). When children under 6 years 
did not know which of two actions they should do, they performed either one at chance – 
model presence was only used as the deciding factor by children in mid- to late-childhood. 
Study 5 showed that for children under 5 years, model presence interacted with the presence 
of the object to encourage imitation fidelity. The presence of the model thus interacts with 
other aspects of the learning situation to determine children’s imitation. 
Chapter 4 supports the idea that goal inference affects children’s imitation above the 
age of 3 years. Pre-schoolers, like adults (Baker et al., 2009; Schachner & Carey, 2013), 
interpret the actions of others using likely goals, which determines the way they imitate 
actions. However children’s imitation in Studies 6 and 7 was not related to their performance 
on a false-belief task, suggesting that goal inference was not related to perspective taking. 
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This supports the argument made by Paulus (2012) that action goals can be inferred without 
reference to an understanding of intentions. On the whole the findings from Chapter 4 would 
fit with the idea that children understood the model’s actions as goal-oriented without 
understanding them as goal-directed (Perner & Doherty, 2005). Other work has also drawn 
this distinction between understanding action goals and understanding intentions: Uithol et al. 
(2011) argue that while mirror neurons can be used to infer action goals, they cannot be used 
to infer intentions as this requires abductive reasoning processes beyond the type of one-to-
one mapping mirror neurons do. Supporting this, van Overwalle and Baetens (2009) suggest 
that, neurologically speaking, the action mirroring and mentalising systems are distinct, yet 
can be used in a complimentary way to understand actions (a similar argument is made by de 
Lange et al., 2008). Chapter 4 further supports this distinction and also extends this work by 
showing that mentalising does not appear to be necessary for inferring movement-based 
goals. 
The findings from Chapter 4 could be extended to further explore under what 
circumstances children infer movement-based goals for actions. Movement-based goals are 
inferred for actions when these cannot be attributed external goals based upon the context 
(Froese & Leavens, 2014; Schachner & Carey, 2013). In Study 7, this was done by having 
actions performed in a distinctive manner before completing an observable goal (e.g. having 
a coin hop towards a box before being slotted into it). However in this example the action 
sequence ended by the completion of a goal that seemed plausible given the context: the coin 
ends up slotted into the box, via a slot that seems purpose-made for that coin. It is unclear 
what would happen if, in addition to the distinctive hopping motion, the model also ended the 
action with an unusual goal, for instance by placing the coin on the side of the box instead of 
slotting it in. In this case, would children infer that the model wanted to place the coin in the 
box, and do so on their turn? Or would they infer a movement-based goal and replicate the 
model’s movements? Would children finish the plausible goal of slotting the coin – and 
would they imitate the distinctive hopping style when they did so? Future studies should help 
clarify how the presence/absence of unusual end goals determine children’s inference of 
movement-based goals and their subsequent imitation (Anderson, 2017, personal 
communication). 
In conclusion, the current thesis has shown that, throughout childhood, imitation is 
affected by a number of different abilities. Imitation, in line with the claims of IMAIL and 
ASL, is governed by general processes of action control: the same associative learning that 
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helps infants form links between movements and observed effects governs imitation in later 
years. Nevertheless, this simple mechanism is affected by other abilities that develop 
throughout childhood. Imitation comes to be used for more complex social uses that merely 
mirroring the actions of the model, and children’s interpretations of actions, models and the 
context determines the way they imitate. Imitation is thus a composite ability, involving basic 
perceptual and higher-order cognitive processes. The sensitivity with which children can 
imitate is astonishing: the complex way multiple skills combine to produce this phenomenon 
has made it an absolute pleasure to study over the last few years, and make me excited to 
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APPENDIX 1: TABLES 
Table 1. Materials and actions used for the games in Study 1. 
Label - Transparency Materials Functional Action (F) Arbitrary Action (A) 
Lopping / Transparent 
 
 
A plastic food 
container, a small dog 
plush toy, a small 
wicker basket and a 
toothbrush. 
Opening the container lid with 
the goal of placing the dog toy 
in the basket 
Brushing the top of the 
container with the 
toothbrush 
Mooshing / Transparent 
 
 
A CD case containing 
marbles, a small 
golden ring and a 
plastic container 
Opening the CD case, with the 
goal of moving a marble into 
the plastic container 
Removing a ring from the 
centre of the CD case 




A cardboard box, a 
small caterpillar toy, a 
plastic container and 
some marbles in a 
green cup 
Lifting the caterpillar out of the 
side of a box with the goal of 
moving it to the container 
Placing a marble in the 
top hole of the box (into a 
separate hidden 
compartment) 




A big plastic jug, a 
plastic wand, some 
marbles in a cup and 
an additional plastic 
cup 
Placing marbles in the jug with 
the goal of pouring them into an 
empty cup 
Using the wand to stir the 
marbles in the jug 
Note. Portrayed are the four different games, their names and transparency as well as the 






Table 2. Mean M1, M2 and M1rep imitation scores for all six age groups in both the FFirst and 
AFFirst conditions. Figures in brackets are standard errors.  
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1rep 
F First AF First F First AF First F First AF First 
2- to 3-year-olds 2 (0) 2 (0) .24 (.54) .12 (.49) 1.94 (.24) 2 (0) 
4- to 5-year-olds 2 (0) 2 (0) 1.65 (.79) .12 (.49) .41 (.8) 1.88 (.49) 
6- to 7-year-olds 2 (0) 2 (0) 1.77 (56) 1.71 (.59) .82 (.95) .88 (.99) 
8- to 9-year-olds 2 (0) 2 (0) 1.94 (.24) 1.94 (.24) 1 (.91) 1.12 (.93) 
10- to 11-year-olds 2 (0) 2 (0) 2 (0) 1.94 (.24) 1.84 (.5) 1.78 (.55) 






Table 3.  Materials and actions used in Study 5. 
Name Materials Size Functional action Arbitrary action 
Daxing 
 
3 ½ x 3 ½ inches 
Turn the object on its side 
and shake it from side to 
side, producing a noise  
Hold the object upright 
and move it anti-
clockwise in a circle twice 
Trepping 
 
3 x 10 inches 
Turn the object on its side 
and shake it from side to 
side, producing a noise 
Rotate the object forward 
one full turn  
Zerping 
 
4 ½ x 4 ½ x 4 ½ 
inches 
Turn on the side light and 
then the top light 
Lift the box and place it 




4 ½ x 4 ½ x 4 ½ 
inches 
Press the black switch in and 
then the white switch in 




4 ½ x 3 ½ x 9 
inches 
Turn the box right side up 
and open the lid 
When the box is on its 










Table 4. Descriptions of the actions and materials for the object games in Studies 6 and 7 
Game Materials Action 1 Action 1 movement 
style 
Action 2 
Gilbing / Filling the cup 
 
 
Both conditions: cut-out shapes 
of triangles and squares, a cup. 
C condition only: a larger 
triangle and square 
C condition: moving the cut-outs from 
their pile to their corresponding shape 
NC condition: moving the cut-outs to 
unmarked places on the table 
Zigzagging the shapes 
across the table towards the 
locations  
Placing the cut-outs into 
the cup  
Teebing / Ringing the bell 
 
 
Both conditions: bell in a 
wooden tripod 
C condition only: a piece of A4 
paper and a pen 
NC condition only: no paper and 
a stick replaces the pen 
C condition: drawing a circle on the paper 
with the pen 
NC condition: moving the stick around in 
a circle on the table  
Dragging the pen/stick 
across the table 
Ringing the bell with the 
pen 
Yemsing / Threading the 




Both conditions: wooden beads 
and a wire necklace 
C condition only: three plastic 
prongs 
C condition: placing the wooden beads 
onto each of the prongs in a circle 
NC condition: hopping the bead around in 
a circle 
Sliding the wooden beads 
across the table on their 
side 
Threading the beads onto 
the wire necklace 
Wubsing / Slotting the 
coins into the box 
 
 
Both conditions: set of red and 
yellow coins and a slotted box 
C condition only: larger red and 
yellow circles 
C condition: sorting the coins by colour 
onto the corresponding shape 
NC condition: moving the coins onto the 
unmarked locations 
Jumping the coins across 
the table in a hopping 
motion 





Table 5. Descriptions of the actions for the body games in Studies 6 and 7. 
Game Action 1 Action 1 movement style Action 2 
Qulling / Rubbing hands C condition: scratching one’s 
face 
NC condition: moving one’s 
hand up to one’s face 
Holding one’s hand in a claw-
like position 
Rubbing one’s hands 
Lupping / Squeezing your 
nose 
C condition: patting one’s 
head 
NC condition: moving one’s 
hand up and down above 
one’s head 
Raising the arm from the front 
to the back till it is raised 
above the head 
Squeezing one’s nose 
Zerping / Clapping hands C condition: rubbing one’s 
shoulders 
NC condition: moving one’s 
arms up and down above 
one’s shoulders 
Holding one’s arms 
contralaterally 
Clapping one’s hands 
Daxing / Rubbing tummy C condition: rubbing one’s 
earlobes 
NC condition: rubbing one’s 
fingers together above one’s 
ears 








APPENDIX 2: FIGURES 
 
Figure 1. Mean M1, M2 and M1rep imitation scores across all tasks between age groups. Bars 

























































































































































































































Figure 7. Model imitation scores between the Puppet M1 and Puppet M2 conditions. Bars 







































Figure 8. Imitation scores for Functional and Arbitrary actions on the Own and Other tasks. 



















































































Figure 10. Movement style imitation scores split for context-present (C) and context-absent 

















































Figure 11. Imitation scores split for context-present (C) and context-absent (NC) condition 
for both age groups. 11A: End-goal imitation scores. 11B: Movement style imitation scores. 



























































2- to 3-year-olds 4- to 5-year-olds
